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The Circumstances of Democracy: An Investigation of Global 
Constitutionalist Scholarship 
 
Ruth Alice Houghton 
Abstract  
 
A conceptual understanding of democracy is missing from global constitutionalist 
discourse. Whilst there are heated debates on the plausibility of transferring democracy 
to governance systems beyond the state, the discourse lacks grounding in democratic 
theory. There are discussions on improving participatory or deliberative processes and 
the mechanisms of accountability, but without further reflection on what makes these 
processes and mechanisms democratic, the global constitutionalist literature on 
democratisation falls short of striving towards democracy.  
 
The current debate on democracy spans across two waves of global constitutionalist 
thought. The first is an organisational wave, which builds on international legal 
frameworks, and the second is a principled wave that takes theories of constitutionalism 
as its starting point. The thesis examines the approach to democracy in international 
legal scholarship and the two waves of global constitutionalist literature, to expose the 
fragmented nature of the current debates. In response to this fragmentation, this thesis 
directs the scholarship towards democratic theory as an alternative starting point, whilst 
also demonstrating the importance of engaging with the relationship between 
constitutionalism and democracy. This is done by using a new matrix, the Circumstances 
of Democracy (the Who, What, When, Where and How), which builds on democratic 
theory to explore the components of democracy. Current global constitutionalist 
approaches inconsistently prioritise certain components and sidestep others, 
constructing mere proxies for democracy. Using the Circumstances of Democracy 
ensures that all the components are considered. Ultimately, this thesis redirects the 
global constitutionalist literature towards the concept of democracy.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Democracy in Global Constitutionalist Scholarship 
 
Global constitutionalist literature is an attempt to use constitutionalist frameworks 
to improve the legitimacy of international law, the international legal system, and 
more broadly, global governance.1 Responding to a perceived legitimacy deficit, 
global constitutionalist scholarship has embarked on a discourse about 
democracy in global governance and within international organisations. 
Discussions on the plausibility of a global demos, the viability of global 
parliaments, and alternative methods of accountability abound within this 
scholarship. Yet, the current discussions on democracy in global constitutionalist 
literature lack a grounding in democratic theory. 
 
Global constitutionalist scholarship is unwieldy, as it intercepts across 
international relations, politics, international and comparative law.2 This 
scholarship embraces a plethora of research themes and agendas.3 The 
nebulous nature of global constitutionalist literature raises unique challenges for 
coherent discussions on democracy as there is little agreement on where 
                                                          
1 See, Anne Peters, ‘Global Constitutionalism’ in Michael T Gibbons (ed), The Encyclopaedia of 
Political Thought (1st edn, John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2015). 
2 Anne Peters and Klaus Armingeon, ‘Introduction: Global Constitutionalism from an 
interdisciplinary perspective’ (2009) 16(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 385; Antje 
Wiener, Anthony F Lang, James Tully, Miguel Poiares Maduro and Mattias Kumm, ‘Global 
constitutionalism: Human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (2012) 1(1) Global 
Constitutionalism 1, 2; Klaus Bosselmann, ‘Global Environmental Constitutionalism: Mapping the 
Terrain’ (2015) 21 Widener Law Review 171; David S Law and Mila Versteeg, ‘The Evolution and 
Ideology of Global Constitutionalism’ (2011) 99(5) California Law Review 1163. 
3 Rossana Deplano, ‘Fragmentation and Constitutionalisation of International Law: A Theoretical 
Inquiry’ (2013) European Journal of Legal Studies 85, 97; Christine EJ Schwöbel, ‘The Appeal of 
the Project of Global Constitutionalism to Public International Lawyers’ (2012) 13(1) German Law 
Journal 1. 
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democracy and constitutionalisation are located or the actors that should be 
involved in either process. Moreover, scholars choose different frames of 
reference, such as constitutionalism and related constitutional theory or 
international law, which then directs how democracy is conceptualised. 
 
One of the problems with the global constitutionalist discussion on democracy is 
that it is unclear where constitutionalisation and democracy take place. Projects 
that consider constitutionalism beyond the state each have a different object of 
study, which has ramifications, as it is not clear where democracy is located. 
Within global constitutional scholarship, democracy is discussed at different 
‘layers of governance’, which can include national, regional and international 
governance.4 Habermas constructs a three-tiered system of national, regional 
and global,5 and Cottier constructs a ‘Five Storey House’ with levels at the local, 
sub-national, national, regional and global.6 Other levels of governance are 
chosen by different scholars.7 The different levels discussed can influence the 
                                                          
4 Peters, ‘Global Constitutionalism’ (n 1). In de Wet’s international constitutionalism, the ‘different 
national, regional and functional (sectoral) regimes form the building blocks of the international 
community (‘international polity’)’. Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order 
(Amsterdam University Press 2005) 6-7. Compare Kumm and Peters: Mattias Kumm, ‘The 
Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the relationship between constitutionalism in and 
beyond the state’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? 
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 260 and 296; Anne 
Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental 
International Norms and Structures’ (2006) 19(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 579, 583. 
See also Petersmann on how the GATT/WTO rules have a ‘democratic function’ because they 
protect individual freedom and do not infringe on the democracy within a state. See, Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann, ‘Multilevel Trade Governance in the WTO Regimes: Multilevel Constitutionalism’ in 
Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade 
Governance and Social Regulation (Bloomsbury Publishing 2006) 26. 
5 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems 
of a Constitution for World Society’ (2008) 15 Constellations 444, 448-9. Armingeon et al., argue 
that there is a regional, national, and international level. Klaus Armingeon, Karolina Milewicz, 
Simone Peter and Anne Peters, ‘The constitutionalisation of international trade law’ in Thomas 
Cottier and Panagiotis (eds), The Prospects of International Trade Regulation: from fragmentation 
to coherence (CUP 2011) 79. 
6 Thomas Cottier, ‘Towards a Five Storey House’ in Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and International Economic 
Law (Hart Publishing 2011) 499. 
7 Brunkhorst argues for ‘a great variety of different governmental bodies at all levels [which he 
outlines as local, national, regional, and global]’. Hauke Brunkhorst, ‘Constitutionalism and 
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breadth of decisions people have power over, and thus the scope of democracy. 
This raises problems because there are multiple conversations about democracy. 
 
Scholars disagree on how the levels of governance interact. Some, such as 
Kumm, argue that democracy, as understood in the domestic context, cannot 
occur at the international level without revisions.8 In contrast, in the compensatory 
model adopted by Peters, democracy is envisioned at both the domestic and at 
international organisations.9 In the pluralist school, constitutionalisation can be 
scattered across sites of governance.10 In this case, democracy might be situated 
within a particular level of governance or elements of democracy might be 
situated across governance levels. All these separate projects that fall under the 
umbrella of global constitutionalism, with their distinct approach to the levels of 
governance and where democracy falls across these levels creates siloed 
conversations, where academics can exchange models or approaches to 
democracy, without necessarily considering that the level of governance or 
relationship between levels has changed. The different levels of governance and 
the relationships between them offer alternative remits for decision-making, 
which influences the scope of democracy. 
 
Identifying the actors within global constitutionalist debates is complex. Within the 
literature, individuals are placed at the core of international law,11 participation of 
                                                          
Democracy in the World Society’ in Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism? (OUP 2010) 196-197. 
8 See Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism’ (n 4) 296-297. 
9 Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism’ (n 4) 580 and 591-592. 
10 Neil Walker, ‘Beyond the Holistic Constitution?’ in Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The 
Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP 2010) 304. 
11 Anne Peters, ‘Membership in the Global Constitutional Community’ in Jan Klabbers, Anne 
Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 2009) 155. 
See also Deplano (n 3) 83. 
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NGOs and other civil society actors is considered ‘constitutional’,12 and 
international organisations are considered a site for processes of 
constitutionalisation to act upon as well as a source of evidence that international 
constitutionalisation is taking place.13 Moreover, sociological approaches to 
global constitutionalism seek to discuss corporations and trade organisations 
within a constitutionalist frame.14 Both democracy and constitutionalism are 
dependent on a relationship between a polity (i.e. a demos, constituent power, or 
community)15 and authority (i.e. constituted power). Yet, who falls within these 
categories is not self-explanatory within global constitutionalist discourse.  
 
Scholars in global constitutionalist scholarship disagree on the starting point for 
discussions on constitutionalisation. Some scholars point to international 
organisations as a starting point for the contemporary debate on global 
constitutionalism.16 International organisations are used as a source and a 
subject of constitutionalism. One of the ways in which they are a source of 
constitutionalism is that their treaties are re-read as constitutions. A more recent 
                                                          
12 Jan Klabbers, ‘Autonomy, constitutionalism and virtue in international institutional law’ in 
Richard Collins and Nigel D White (eds) International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy 
(Routledge 2011) 130; Steve Charnovitz, ‘The Emergence of Democratic Participation in Global 
Governance (Paris, 1919)’ (2003) 10(1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 45, 74-76; Bruno 
Simma, ‘From bilateralism to community interest in international law’ (1994) 250 Recueil Des 
Cours 217, 262; Anne Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein 
(eds), The Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 2009) 313. 
13 Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl argue that global constitutionalists have seen the ‘increasing 
authority of [international organisations] as an indication of a constitutionalization of the 
international order’ in particular because of increased participation and accountability 
mechanisms. See Christian Kreuder-Sonnen and Bernhard Zangl, ‘Which post-Westphalia? 
International organizations between constitutionalism and authoritarianism’ (2015) 21(3) 
European Journal of International Relations 568, 569. 
14 See Gunther Teubner and Anna Beckers, ‘Expanding Constitutionalism’ (2013) 20(2) Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 523, 545. 
15 Cf de Wet who argues that European Constitutionalism has challenged the idea that 
constitutionalism requires a demos. Erika de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 
55 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 51, 52. 
16 Peters, ‘Global Constitutionalism’ (n 1). See also Paulus who argues that ‘International lawyers 
have often construed international constitutionalism as an offspring of the institutionalization of 
international law’. Andreas L Paulus, ‘The International Legal System as a Constitution’ in Jeffrey 
L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and 
Global Governance (CUP 2009) 69. 
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use of international organisations as a source of constitutionalism, is their role in 
facilitating participation and accountability.17 The creation of new institutions is 
also construed as constitutionalisation as the proliferation of courts, tribunals, 
decision-making bodies, systems of checks and balances, are used as evidence 
that there is a constitutionalisation process at the global level.18 
 
International law is also a proposed starting point and it features prominently in 
global constitutionalist literature. It features as a source and a subject of 
constitutionalisation. The discussion on norms, such as jus cogens and erga 
omnes as well as provisions within the UN Charter are examples of the way in 
which international law is used as a source in global constitutionalist scholarship. 
In other words, global constitutionalists collect evidence of a constitutionalisation 
process from the rules of international law.19 International law is also considered 
to be a subject of constitutionalisation. To the extent that there is a shift away 
from sovereign and equal states, towards non-consensual international law and 
a sense of community that trumps the consent principle, scholars advocate that 
international law is subjected to constitutionalisation.20  
 
                                                          
17 See Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl ‘Which post-Westphalia? (n 13) 569. Cf Jan Klabbers, 
‘Constitutionalism Lite’ (2004) 1 International Organisations Law Review 31, 37. 
18 Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Between Myths and Norms: Constructivist Constitutionalism and the 
Potential of Constitutional Principles in International Law’ (2012) 81 Nordic Journal of International 
Law 79, 84; Neil Walker, ‘Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (2008) Political Studies 519, 
519. Cf de Wet who criticises the lack of judicial review. See, Erika de Wet, ‘The 
Constitutionalization of Public International Law’ in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2012) 1213 and 1219. 
19 For example, see: Erika de Wet, ‘The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems 
as a Manifestation of the Emerging International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 19 Leiden Journal 
of International Law 611, 614; Jürgen Habermas, ‘Does the Constitutionalization of International 
Law Still Have a Chance?’ in Ciaran Cronin (ed), The Divided West by Jürgen Habermas (Polity 
2006) 160-161. 
20 See Peters, ‘Global Constitutionalism’ (n 1); Oliver Diggelmann and Tilmann Altwicker, ‘Is There 
Something Like a Constitution of International Law? A Critical Analysis of the Debate on World 
Constitutionalism’ (2008) 68 ZaöRV 623; Kleinlein, ‘Between Myths and Norms’ (n 18) 79. 
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A potential starting point for discussions on democracy in global constitutionalist 
literature is the debate on the ‘emerging norm of democratic governance’.21 The 
international legal scholarship on the ‘emerging norm of democratic governance’, 
which developed in the 1990s, is used as uncontested evidence for democracy 
at the state level in parts of global constitutionalist scholarship.22 Peters and 
Kleinlein refer to Franck’s emerging norm of democracy as evidence that states 
should be democratic,23 and de Wet uses his thesis as evidence of the 
importance of the principle of democracy within the international community.24 
However, the discussion on the ‘right to political participation’, led by Fox, is not 
often referred to, even when there are discussions on such a right,25 and even 
where this debate is invoked it is not questioned.26 This international legal 
discussion on democracy within states is distinct from the global constitutionalist 
literature, which is predominantly concerned with democracy and 
constitutionalisation beyond the state. Nevertheless, as Franck, a proponent of 
                                                          
21 See for example, Thomas M Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Clarendon 
Press 1995); Gregory H Fox, ‘The right to political participation in international law’ in Gregory H 
Fox and Brad R Roth (eds) Democratic Governance and International Law (CUP 2000) 48. 
22 Peters and Kleinlein refer to the emerging norm of democracy. See Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ 
(n 12) 273; Kleinlein, ‘Between Myths and Norms’ (n 18) 80. Kumm and Catá Backer refer to 
Franck, but for his discussion on fairness. See, Mattias Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International 
Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ (2004) 15(5) EJIL 908, 908, 918; Larry Catá 
Backer, ‘From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Framework for Legitimate Public Power 
Systems’ (2009) 113(3) Penn State Law Review 101, 103.  
23 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 12) 273; Kleinlein, ‘Between Myths and Norms’ (n 18) 80. See 
also, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘State Sovereignty, Popular Sovereignty and Individual 
Sovereignty: From Constitutional Nationalism to Multilevel Constitutionalism in International 
Economic Law?’ (2006) EUI Law Working Paper 2006/45, 24-25 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/6446> accessed 9 September 2017. 
24 de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (n 15) 63. See also Bardo Fassbender, The 
United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community (BRILL 2009) 93-94. 
25 See, Thomas Giegerich, ‘The Is and the Ought of International Constitutionalism: How Far Have 
We Come on Habermas’s Road to a “Well-Considered Constitutionalization of International 
Law”?’ (2009) 10(1) German Law Journal 31, 45; Karolina Milewicz, ‘Emerging Patterns of Global 
Constitutionalization: Towards a Conceptual Framework’ (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 413, 430. 
26 Besson, who engages with constitutional questions, in her discussion of global democracy 
refers to the international law debate on the right of democracy. She critiques the debate for not 
engaging with the legitimacy of international law-making processes, but she does not critique the 
debate itself. See, Samantha Besson, ‘Institutionalising global demoi-cracy’ in Lukas H Meyer 
(ed), Legitimacy, Justice and Public International Law (CUP 2009) 58, 61-62; Samantha Besson, 
‘Sovereignty, International Law and Democracy’ (2011) 22(2) EJIL 373, 382. 
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the emerging norm thesis, also offers proposals for democratic reform of 
international law and organisations, which have been considered part of a debate 
on constitutionalisation in international law,27 the debate on democracy within 
states could provide a foundation for global constitutionalist discussions on 
democracy.  
 
Given that international law and international organisations are common starting 
points in global constitutionalist literature, some scholars have questioned the 
extent to which the literature relies on theories of constitutionalism.28 Whether 
domestic, nation-state models of constitutionalism can be used as benchmarks 
for constitutionalism beyond the state is a fierce debate in global constitutionalist 
scholarship.29 Critics have argued that using domestic theories of 
constitutionalism is inappropriate, inconceivable, improbable and illegitimate 
because the subject of constitutionalism is the state.30 Perju, for example, argues 
that divorcing constitutionalism from the state, means ‘leaving the concept empty 
or overly vague, and therefore unusable, at the international level’.31 In response, 
supporters of the idea of constitutionalism beyond the state have discussed the 
flexibility of constitutionalism, and the extent to which constitutionalism can be 
freed from the state.32 Scholars, such as O’Donoghue and Paulus have called on 
                                                          
27 Bardo Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’ 
(1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529, 538-539; Christian Volk, ‘Why Global 
Constitutionalism Does Not Live up to Its Promises’ (2012) 4 Goettingen Journal of International 
Law 551, 558. 
28 Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism’ (n 4) 259-260; Aoife O’Donoghue, 
Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (CUP 2014) 9-11 and 14; Paulus, ‘The 
International Legal System’ (n 16) 71.  
29 Walker, ‘Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (n 18) 520; Vlad Perju, ‘International 
constitutionalism and the state: A reply to Aoife O’Donoghue’ 2013) 11(4) I·CON 1046; Aoife 
O’Donoghue, ‘International constitutionalism and the state: A rejoinder to Vlad Perju’ (2013) 11(4) 
I·CON 1052, 1052. 
30 Walker, ‘Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (n 18) 522.  
31 Perju, ‘A reply to Aoife O’Donoghue’ (n 29) 1048. 
32 Aoife O’Donoghue, ‘International constitutionalism and the state’ (2013) 11(4) I·CON 1021, 
1031; Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism’ (n 4) 264; Paulus, ‘The International 
Legal System’ (n 16) 90-92 (focus on principles); Gunther Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism: 
 
20 
global constitutionalist scholarship to engage with domestic theories of 
constitutionalism.33 This domestic literature is richly informative and could be 
used as a starting point for discussions on democracy in global constitutionalist 
literature.  
 
As the latest forum for a debate on democracy beyond the state, global 
constitutionalist scholarship provides a platform to revisit democracy within global 
governance. Constitutionalism literature offers a thick debate on democracy at 
the domestic level, which arguably could inform the global constitutionalist 
discussions. Whether scholars embrace a more conceptual understanding of 
democracy, which is informed by constitutionalism, depends on the biases and 
assumptions that structure their debates. Global constitutionalist literature is an 
intra-disciplinary project that reads international law and international 
organisations through a constitutionalist lens. International law, international 
organisations and constitutional theory, as sub-disciplines, each have their own 
contours and biases. Moreover, each sub-discipline has a particular approach to 
democracy. As scholars within global constitutionalist scholarship pick different 
starting points, a comprehensive discussion on democracy is obscured and 
scholars operate in siloed debates.  
 
                                                          
Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory?’ in Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand 
and Gunther Teubner (eds) Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart 2004) 3, 7; 
Ulrich K Preuss, ‘Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the 
Relations between Constituent Power and the Constitution’ (1992-1993) 14 Cardozo Law Review 
639, 646. 
33 Antje Wiener, ‘Contested Meanings of Norms: A Research Framework’ (2007) 5 Comparative 
European Politics 1, 8; Ulrich K Preuss, ‘Disconnecting Constitutions from Statehood: Is Global 
Constitutionalism a Viable Concept?’ in Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism? (OUP 2010) 30-32. 
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Global constitutionalist scholarship is acknowledged to be inter-disciplinary34 as 
it situates itself alongside discussions in international relations on global 
democracy and cosmopolitanism.35 What is less discussed is the role of the legal 
sub-disciplines that global constitutionalist scholarship builds upon. What is 
needed is an exploration of the interplay between these sub-disciplines of legal 
scholarship, and how this influences the debate on democracy. This thesis 
examines how global constitutionalist scholarship discusses democracy and how 
it uses, to differing extents, international law, scholarship on international 
organisations and constitutional literature in its debates on democracy.  
 
1.2 Research Question 
 
This thesis is concerned with how schoalrs in global constitutionalist discourse 
debate and conceptualise democracy. It asks how the disciplinary underpinnings 
and biases of global constitutionalist literature shape approaches to the question 
of democracy and if this influences how democracy is formulated.  
 
Global constitutionalist discourse is an intra-disciplinary project, which is informed 
by international law and theories of constitutionalism. Thus, to explore how global 
constitutionalist scholarship discusses democracy, requires an exploration on 
how constitutional theory and international law conceptualise democracy. As part 
of this investigation, the thesis investigates the relationship between democracy 
and constitutionalism and asks whether this discourse takes place within global 
constitutionalist scholarship. To date, aspects of global constitutionalist 
                                                          
34 Peters and Armingeon, ‘Introduction’ (n 2) 385; Wiener et al., ‘Global constitutionalism’ (n 2) 2. 
35 Peters for example in ‘Dual Democracy’ references key international relations scholars writing 
on ‘global democracy’. 
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scholarship have used international law and international organisations as a 
starting point, so this thesis analyses the approaches to democracy in 
international law and global constitutionalist scholarship to demonstrate how the 
relations between the sub-disciplines shape the discussion on democracy.  
 
1.3 Methodology  
 
To analyse how global constitutionalist scholarship constructs debates on 
democracy, the adopted method needs to be able to deconstruct those 
discussions. Rhetoric, as a theory of argumentation, offers tools for the 
construction of arguments and as such can also be used to unpack how global 
constitutionalist arguments on democracy are constructed.36 The Circumstances 
are an aspect of rhetorical argument, and they are ‘resources used in discovering 
materials for argument’.37 The Circumstances are a series of questions (the Who, 
What, When, Where, Why, How and What Resources38), which are used in 
ancient philosophical writings and journalistic writing to demarcate a topic.39 The 
Circumstances break down the elements of a topic, and then they interrelate to 
reconstruct it. This dual function of deconstruction and reconstruction is crucial to 
investigate the components of democracy. This thesis proposes the 
                                                          
36 Michael Leff, ‘The Uses of Aristotle’s Rhetoric in Contemporary American Scholarship’ (1993) 
7 Argumentation 313, 319. 
37 Michael Leff, ‘Commonplaces and Argumentation in Cicero and Quintilian’ (1996) 10 
Argumentation 445, 448. 
38 Boethius, De topicis differentiis (Eleonore Stump trans and ed, Cornell University Press 1978) 
1205C; Michael C Leff, ‘The Topics of Argumentative Invention in Latin Rhetorical Theory from 
Cicero to Boethius’ (1983) 1(1) Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetorica 23, 28. 
39 The specific genealogy of ‘circumstances’ is debated. See, Michael C Sloan, ‘Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics as the original locus for the Septum Circumstantiae’ (2010) 105(3) Classical 
Philology 236. This thesis does not adopt the Aristotelian utilization that refers to agency. Rather, 
this thesis employs the ‘circumstances’ as an aid in describing tensions within democratic theory. 
Leff, ‘The Topics of Argumentative Invention’ (n 38) 28. For a discussion on the use of the ‘Five 
Ws and H’ in legal writing, see Natalie A Markman, ‘Bringing Journalism Pedagogy into the Legal 
Writing Class’ (1993) 43(4) Journal of Legal Education 551. 
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Circumstances of Democracy as an analytical matrix to discuss democracy within 
global constitutionalist scholarship.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, five Circumstances will be considered: Who, 
What, When, Where and How. The Who allows for an exploration of the people, 
the What instigates a call for a reflection on the scope of people’s power, the 
When in this thesis offers a discussion on whether people should wield power in 
both everyday decision-making and constitutional moments, the Where points to 
questions of institutions, and the How is concerned with processes of democracy. 
This thesis does not explicitly deal with the ‘What Resources’ Circumstance, as 
it can be subsumed within the How. ‘Why’ within this frame would refer to why 
scholars of global constitutionalism discuss democracy, and this is a meta-
question. It is a question that cannot be answered through a discourse analysis 
alone and would require reflection on the functional and instrumental role of 
democracy. Instead, the five Circumstances considered in the thesis provide 
investigatory prompts to deconstruct how global constitutionalist literature 
debates democracy.  
 
Rhetoric is concerned with real situations, rather than hypothetical issues or 
abstract concepts, and the Circumstances are used within rhetorical theory as a 
tool for contextualisation.40 The Circumstances, for the purposes of this thesis, 
can then respond to the changing approaches to democracy through history. The 
Circumstances of Democracy are informed by historical philosophical reflections 
on democracy. Examples from history are used in the thesis to work through the 
                                                          
40 Michael Leff, ‘Rhetoric and Dialectic in the Twenty-First Century’ (2000) 14 Argumentation 241, 
243 and 245. 
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tensions within democratic theory and to explore how democracy is manifested 
in different contexts. For example, this thesis analyses discussions of democracy 
in Ancient Athens as well as The Federalist Papers. Using history as an 
exploratory tool can be useful as it can help challenge the notion that there are 
universal understandings of concepts, such as democracy.41  
 
This thesis investigates the extent to which global constitutionalist approaches to 
democracy are influenced by international law and constitutionalist thought. To 
do this, the thesis focuses on the intra-disciplinary nature of global 
constitutionalist scholarship. This necessitates both an in-depth exploration of the 
constitutional thought on democracy and the international law scholarship on 
democracy.  
 
The use of domestic theories of constitutionalism is controversial, but as 
O’Donoghue correctly argues, certain norms of constitutionalism, such as the rule 
of law, human rights, the separation of powers, and democratic legitimacy, ‘must 
be present’ in discussions of constitutionalisation at any level or system of 
governance.42 To investigate the relationship between constitutionalism and 
democracy, this thesis explores the difference between Habermas’ co-original 
thesis and Walker’s iterative conceptualisation.43  
 
                                                          
41 See Jeffrey Edward Green, ‘Political Theory as Both Philosophy and History: A Defense Against 
Methodological Militancy’ (2015) 18 Annual Review of Political Science 425, 431-432; Theda 
Skocpol and Margaret Somers, ‘The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry’ (1980) 
22(2) Comparative Studies in Society and History 174, 181. 
42 O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 28) 53. See also Paulus, ‘The 
International Legal System’ (n 16) 90-92. 
43 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory 
Principles?’ (2001) 29(6) Political Theory 766, 767; Neil Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the 
Incompleteness of Democracy: An Iterative Relationship’ (2010) 39(3) Rechtsfilosofie & 
Rechtstheorie 206 
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Part of the discussion on the relationship between constitutionalism and 
democracy concerns the role of constituent power. An examination of constituent 
power in this thesis is of importance because of the recent drive within global 
constitutionalist discourse to engage with constituent power beyond the state.44 
Taking Sieyès as the starting point, this thesis uses Loughlin’s categorisations of 
constituent power to explore the different interpretations of the scope of 
constituent power. These philosophical discussions on constituent power are 
used in the thesis to unpack the complex relationship between constituent power 
and democracy, which is lacking in global constitutionalist scholarship.  
 
This thesis considers the approach to democracy within international legal 
scholarship as it offers a departure point for discussions in global constitutionalist 
literature. In relation to the discussions on international law and democracy, the 
thesis adopts Franck’s work as an indicative starting point. The use of self-
determination, elections monitoring and human rights provisions, in Franck’s and 
his contemporaries’ work, is unpacked in the thesis with the aim of ascertaining 
how international law scholarship conceptualises democracy. The thesis then 
considers to extent to which the doctrinal approach adopted by this American 
tradition of international lawyers in the 1990s,45 is used by elements of the global 
constitutionalist debate.46 
 
                                                          
44 Antje Wiener and Stefan Oeter, ‘Introduction: Who recognizes the emperor’s clothes anymore?’ 
(2016) 14(3) I·CON 608, 609; Geneviève Nootens, ‘Constituent power and the people-as-the-
governed: About the “invisible” people of political and legal theory’ (2015) 4(2) Global 
Constitutionalism 137; Neil Walker, ‘The return of constituent power: A reply to Mattias Kumm’ 
(2016) 14(4) I·CON 906. 
45 See for example, Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 21); Fox, ‘The right 
to political participation in international law’ (n 21) 48. 
46 See for example, Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 12) 273. See also Besson, ‘Institutionalising 
global demoi-cracy’ (n 26) 61-62; Besson, ‘Sovereignty, International Law and Democracy’ (n 26) 
382. 
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There are, of course, limitations to the approach adopted in this thesis. The thesis 
offers an analysis of democracy as understood in global constitutional debates. 
It is not a definitive study of democracy in international legal scholarship, neither 
is it a conclusive discussion on democracy. The thesis does not offer a 
comprehensive overview of democracy within the global legal space, nor a 
critique of democracy as a governance system. Democracy beyond the state is 
a topic addressed simultaneously by lawyers and international relation theorists. 
But, this thesis is concerned with how global constitutionalists discuss democracy 
and so it does not investigate the international relations models of ‘Global 
Democracy’. Adopting an analytical approach denies space for a critique of 
democracy as a form of governance. As the Circumstances break democracy into 
its component parts, it does not accommodate space for critiques of democracy, 
such as those from feminist or Marxist perspectives.  
 
Despite these limitations, the Circumstances are a starting point for analysing the 
debates on democracy in global constitutionalist literature. The Circumstances, 
and an awareness of the intra-disciplinary biases underpinning debates on 
democracy, can then act as a guide to buttress future debates on democracy in 
other global legal projects. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This investigation exposes the current limitations of global constitutionalist 
scholarship and offers an alternative approach to debating democracy within and 
beyond states. Understanding how the sub-disciplines, such as constitutionalism 
and international law shape the discourse on democracy in global constitutionalist 
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literature is of paramount importance to critiquing the current debates and offering 
an alternative approach. This thesis offers a matrix that is rooted within 
foundational questions, placing democratic theory and theories of democracy in 
constitutionalism as the starting point. If global constitutionalist discourse is to 
adopt a constitutionalist position on democracy, then it needs to place democratic 
theory and the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy at the 
forefront. 
 
The first part of this thesis is dedicated to the construction of The Circumstances 
of Democracy, which offers an analytical framework to explore how global 
constitutionalist scholarship engages with democracy. The second part of the 
thesis is dedicated to the analysis of the current approach to democracy in 
international law and global constitutionalist scholarship. The final part of the 
thesis, informed by this analysis, offers an alternative methodology to discuss 
democracy.  
 
Chapter 2 provides the analytical tool used to discuss global constitutionalist 
scholarship. The tool is conceived of two elements. The first element is the 
Circumstances of Democracy and the second is the complex relationship 
between democracy and constitutionalism. The Circumstances of Democracy are 
the foundational questions used to deconstruct and reconstruct the meaning of 
democracy. The Circumstances are the Who, What, When, Where and How. 
Each Circumstance isolates a component part of democracy, and then they are 
pieced back together with cognisance of how they interrelate to facilitate a debate 
on the meaning of democracy. Using theories of democracy from Ancient Athens, 
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The Federalist Papers, and modern electoral democracy, Chapter 2 establishes 
what is meant by the Who, What, When, Where and How of democracy.  
 
The second element of the tool for analysing and discussing democracy is to 
explore the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy. In Chapter 2 
the complexity of the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy is 
unpacked. Particular focus is placed on the role of constituent power within this 
relationship. Global constitutionalist discourse shifts to discuss constituent power, 
and therefore this chapter lays the foundation for considering how this shift might 
shape the approach to democracy. Constitutionalism and democracy are 
intertwined and there are tensions between the Who, What, and When of 
democracy and the question of constituent power. It is these interactions and 
tensions between constitutionalism and democracy that call for them to be 
considered together in Chapter 2. 
 
Having established this analytical matrix, it is first applied to international legal 
scholarship on democracy in Chapter 3. As global constitutionalist scholarship is 
constructed as an intra-disciplinary literature, which is heavily influenced in parts 
by international legal scholarship, Chapter 3 applies the matrix to this 
international legal literature on democracy. Chapter 3 analyses how international 
law conceptualises democracy and identifies the limitations of the approach. In 
this chapter, the work of Franck, his contemporaries and his critics, are explored 
to show how international law frames the question of democracy within the nation-
state and reifies elections as fundamental to democracy.  
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Chapters 4 and 5 then use the Circumstances to analyse global constitutionalist 
scholarship. In these two chapters, two waves of global constitutionalist literature 
are discussed. The first is the organisational wave and the second is the 
principled wave. How these waves are understood is discussed below, but 
essentially Chapter 4 is concerned with the way democracy is discussed as a 
process within international organisations and Chapter 5 explores how 
democracy, as a principle of constitutionalism, is discussed in global 
constitutionalist scholarship.  
 
In Chapter 4, the Circumstances of Democracy are used to analyse the 
organisational wave of global constitutionalist discourse. This literature is closely 
related to the scholarship on international organisational law and it builds on the 
international legal discourse analysed in Chapter 3. The use of international 
organisations as a source and subject of constitutionalisation is especially 
prevalent in the organisational wave of global constitutionalist scholarship. There 
is a developing literature on the legitimacy of international organisations, which 
has close ties with the global constitutionalist scholarship and both literatures are 
concerned with questions of accountability, legitimacy, and democratisation. 
These disciplinary influences shape the approach to democracy, giving rise to a 
liberal, procedural notion of democracy.  
 
Chapter 5 considers the principled wave of global constitutionalist scholarship. 
This chapter is concerned with the way in which the approach to democracy is 
shaped when it is conceptualised as a norm or principle of constitutionalism. The 
shift to discuss constituent power beyond the state is discussed in relation to how 
it frames the question of democracy. In this chapter, societal constitutionalism is 
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used as an antagonist, to explore potential alternatives to framing a discussion 
on constitutionalism and democracy beyond the state.47 The principled wave 
responds to the perceived limitations of the organisational wave. In so doing, 
there is the potential that it focuses on elements democracy at the expense of 
other aspects. A comparison of the findings in Chapters 4 and 5 explores whether 
a comprehensive discussion of democracy is present in global constitutionalist 
scholarship. 
 
After exploring the current debates in global constitutionalist scholarship, Chapter 
6 draws together the limitations and provides an alternative method for discussing 
democracy. Building on the Circumstances of Democracy and the complex 
relationship between constitutionalism and democracy, this chapter offers 
prompts for future dialogue on democracy. Chapter 6 provides a method for 
ensuring that democracy, as a concept, informs debates in global constitutionalist 
discourse.  
 
Dividing the thesis up in this way and applying the Circumstances of Democracy 
to democratic theory, constitutionalism, international law and then two waves of 
global constitutionalist scholarship, facilitates a close analysis of the influence of 
the different disciplinary biases. Separating out the approach in international law 
and the two waves of global constitutional scholarship ensures that the biases 
can be isolated and then how these inform democracy can be considered.  
 
                                                          
47 Within the global constitutional literature, societal constitutionalism is presented as under-taking 
a different project. See, Vicki C Jackson, ‘Paradigms of public law: transnational constitutional 
values and democratic challenges’ (2010) 8(3) I·CON 517, 521; Volk, ‘Why Global 
Constitutionalism Does not Live up to its Promises’ (n 27) 554-555. 
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1.5 Preliminary Issues  
 
The language choices around democracy (both with respect to the polity and 
manifestation of democracy), the meaning of constitutionalism, and of global 
constitutionalism in this thesis are pertinent given the different sub-disciplines that 
appear within the thesis. This section considers the variety of language used to 
discuss a polity and power within democratic theory and constitutionalist 
scholarship. Then the section outlines how constitutionalism and global 
constitutionalism are conceptualised in the thesis.  
 
1.5.1 Demos, The People, The Nation: ascertaining the people and their power 
in multi-disciplinary scholarship  
 
The diverse disciplinary backgrounds that inform global constitutional scholarship 
result in the use of overlapping terms. There are two troubling overlaps; the 
variety of invocations of polity and the diverse ways the power of people within a 
polity is expressed. This cross-disciplinary variability around people and their 
powers can lead to misunderstandings in a discussion on democracy.  
 
The demarcation of people into a polity is expressed differently according to 
context and discipline. In democratic theory, the common polity is the demos, but 
in international law the polity is a nation-state. Where the organisational wave of 
global constitutionalist literature uses demos, the principled wave refers to polities 
and constituencies. Moreover, constitutional theory uses The People, with 
debates around who is included and excluded within this idea. How a polity is 
constructed within the respective disciplines is the subject of much debate, with 
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some commentators paying reverence to territory and ethnicity whilst others look 
to alternative means of constructing commonality. In current discourse, the 
prevailing opinion is that the demos, the nation-state, and The People within 
constitutionalist thought, are bounded by territorial markers, and as such these 
different terms point to persons attached to a state.  
 
These invocations of polity have distinct connotations of relative homogeneity 
that have implications for discussions on democracy. A nation (or a peoples), as 
understood in international law,48 means a group of people tied together through 
a commonality, usually a common ethnicity. The nation thus excludes persons 
that do not conform with the particular ethnicity. The demos, traditionally tied to 
territorial markers, has also been associated with ethnicity. Scholars, influenced 
by 19th century nationalism, argue that a demos requires commonalty that can 
only be derived from common heritage, common history, and common 
language.49 Recent scholarship that attempts to disconnect demos from the state, 
focuses on a commonality of position; in other words, people are brought together 
into a demos through their common subjection to a decision or act.50 Such 
approaches remain controversial, and the prevailing approach ties demos to the 
state. The People is used in constitutional discourse to refer to a unitary collective 
that stands in contrast to the multitude of persons living in a territory. In other 
                                                          
48 See Wheatley for a discussion on the diverse meanings of nation in international law. Steven 
Wheatley, ‘Modelling Democratic Secession in International Law’ in Stephen Tierney (ed), 
Nationalism and Globalisation: New Settings, New Challenges (Hart 2015) chapter 7.  
49 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Parker, Son and Bourn 1861) 
547. For a discussion see, Keith Breen and Shane O’ Neill, ‘Introduction; A Postnationalist Era?’ 
in Keith Breen and Shane O’ Neill (eds) After the Nation? Critical Reflections on Nationalism and 
Postnationalism (Palgrave MacMillan 2010) 1. See also, David Miller, ‘Against Global Democracy’ 
in Keith Breen and Shane O’Neill (eds), After the Nation: Critical Reflections on Post-Nationalism 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 145; Laura Valentini, ‘No global demos, no global democracy? A 
systematization and critique’ (2014) 12(4) Perspectives on Politics 789, 793. 
50 Robert E Goodin, ‘Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives’ (2007) 35(1) 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 40, 49. 
 
33 
words, it is a construction, which Loughlin exposes as a myth.51 This imposed 
homogeneity of the collective, whilst not necessarily predicated on ethnicity,52 has 
the potential to exclude dissenting opinion and groups of persons that resist the 
unitary identity. This thesis does not offer a solution to the demos debate, but 
rather exposes the types of issues that need reflection. An example being the 
differences in these invocations of a polity, how they differ in the use of 
exclusionary practices or the imposition of unitary identities.  
 
The use of overlapping, but distinct, terms for a polity means that discussions can 
be conceived as democratic when the true extent of the inclusion or exclusion is 
overlooked. The intra-disciplinary nature of global constitutionalist scholarship 
witnesses the use of these terms interchangeably, without reflection on the 
implication for a discourse on democracy. Being alert to these distinctions, and 
their respective connotations, is important when reflecting on what actors are 
considered to be part of democracy. Mindful of these connotations, this thesis 
reflects the dual use of demos and polity within global constitutionalist scholarship 
to indicate the collective persons. Furthermore, for the purposes of this thesis, 
‘the people’ refers to the relevant persons within a polity or demos, ‘The People’ 
refers to the constitutionalist construction, and ‘the peoples’ invokes the 
nationalistic connotations it holds in international law.  
 
The power of people is expressed in diverse ways. Within the discourse on 
constitutionalism, there are references to ‘popular sovereignty’, ‘self-
                                                          
51 Martin Loughlin, ‘The concept of constituent power’ (2014) 13(2) European Journal of Political 
Theory 218, 222. 
52 For a discussion on the use of demos and ethnos see, Preuss, ‘Constitutional Powermaking for 
the New Polity’ (n 32) 645-646, and 649. 
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government’,53 ‘consent of the governed’ and ‘popular will’. What these mean and 
their relationship to democracy is unclear. Taking popular sovereignty first, this 
nebulous idea can hide the true extent of people’s power. Popular sovereignty 
can refer to ‘the right to abolish any form of Government’ and to create a new 
one.54 Popular sovereignty is also invoked loosely to refer to the idea that power 
vests in people,55 which can be symbolic. But, popular sovereignty only has 
purchase if people are provided with the means to exercise their power. 
Habermas argues that a liberal conceptualisation of popular sovereignty rests on 
elections, but the republican approach looks at questions of authority.56 
Democracy has two components; the right to choose a system of government, 
and ‘a method of group decision making characterized by a kind of equality 
among the participants’.57 If popular sovereignty is only the right to choose a 
system of government, then it is only a fragment of democracy.  
 
‘Self-government’ corresponds with the idea of decision-making being based on 
the consent of people.58 This needs to be unpacked. Unlike the discussion on 
popular sovereignty, which can be tied to the construction of the system of 
                                                          
53 ‘Self-government, as we almost invariably understand it, consists of government by the will or 
consent of the governed’. See Jed Rubenfeld, ‘Legitimacy and Interpretation’ in Larry Alexander 
(ed) Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (CUP 1998) 211; A V Dicey, ‘Note 2: Self-
Government’ in J W F Allison (ed) Lectures on Comparative Constitutionalism A. V. Dicey (vol II, 
OUP 2013) 299. It can take the form of representative or direct democracy, see András Sajó, 
Limiting Government: an Introduction to Constitutionalism (Central European University Press 
1999) 49. 
54 See Thomas Paine, Rights of Man (Dover Publications 1999) 92; Michael Gordon, 
Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK Constitution: Process, Politics and Democracy (Hart 2015) 
34. 
55 For a discussion on the difference between popular sovereignty and self-government, see 
Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power’ (2005) 12(2) 
Constellations 223, 238. Post argues that popular sovereignty means the ultimate control of the 
government by the people. He argues that this conceptualisation of popular sovereignty is not 
akin to democracy, because it results in a tyranny of the majority. Robert Post, ‘Democracy and 
Equality’ (2005) 1 Law, Culture and the Humanities 142, 143. 
56 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Three Normative Models of Democracy’ (1994) 1(1) Constellations 1, 9. 
57 T D Christiano, ‘Democracy’ (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2006) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democracy/ > accessed 19 September 2017; Gordon (n 54) 34 
58 Cf Post who argues that self-government is about authorship. Post (n 55) 144. 
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government, self-government situates itself after the system is chosen and within 
decision-making process. If democracy requires both popular sovereignty, as the 
choice of the system of government, and self-government within that system, then 
self-government might only be a fragment of democracy.  
 
There is a lack of clarity around the scope of people’s power in a democracy. Not 
only does this mean that scholars talk passed each other, but also if references 
to popular sovereignty and self-government are used interchangeably, there is 
little reflection on what that means for the extent of power that people wield within 
a democracy. The ambiguity risks the construction of conceptualisations of 
democracy that fail to give adequate power to people.  
 
Self-government, along with ideas of consent of the governed or popular will are 
often equated with democracy.59 But, the use of self and popular needs 
unpacking. There is an ambiguity around the meaning of self and popular, and 
the roles they invoke. The self can imply a specific importance on the role for the 
individual, but it can also refer to the idea of The People as a single entity. Popular 
could refer to a majority opinion, but it is usually invoked as a reference to the 
population and is akin to the common will.60 There is a debate over the 
construction of the popular/common will. On the one hand, it refers to an 
amalgamation of individual wills that are aggregated to make a common will.61 
On the other hand, the common will denies the individual will.62 This has 
                                                          
59 Abraham Lincoln, ‘Gettysburg Address’ (19 November 1863); Richard S Kay, ‘Constituent 
Authority’ (2011) 59 American Journal of Comparative Law 715, 738; Gordon (n 54) 34. 
60 See Amy Gutmann, ‘The Disharmony of Democracy’ in John W Chapman and Ian Shapiro 
(eds), Democratic Community: Nomos XXXV (NYU Press 1995) 132; Jürgen Habermas, ‘Popular 
Sovereignty as Procedure’ in James Bohman and William Rehg (MIT Press 1997) 45. 
61 Gerald Gaus, ‘Does Democracy Reveal the Voice of the People? Four takes on Rousseau’ 
(1997) 75(2) Australian Journal of Philosophy 141, 144. 
62 Philip Pettit, ‘Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization’ in Ian Shapiro and 
Casiano Hacker-Cordón, Democracy’s Value (CUP 1999) 174. 
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implications for how the rights of individuals are protected. How the self or 
individual interacts with the common or popular is discussed under the 
Circumstances of Who, it highlights the lack of clarity around the demos for 
democracy and a simplification of the relationship between individual and 
collective, which means scholars can invoke one term, without reflecting on the 
implications for democracy.  
 
Understanding the terms and their usage is important for a discourse on 
democracy. Whilst authors can infuse terms with their own conceptualisations, it 
has been shown that such terms can carry connotations. Understanding these 
connotations is crucial because these terms have a function in democracy 
scholarship. Reliance on mere labels, such as demos, nation, and The People, 
should be replaced with a broader question of Who, which as the Circumstances 
of Democracy demonstrate, is a question about the demarcation of a polity and 
potential exclusions. The use of self-government or popular sovereignty acts as 
an answer to the What of democracy. But again, the Circumstances require a 
reflection on the extent of people’s power in democracy. As this thesis progresses 
through democratic theory, constitutional, international legal scholarship and 
global constitutional literature, the confusion around terms and how they shape 
democracy is explored.  
 
1.5.2 Constitutionalism, Constitutionalisation and Constitutional  
 
Constitutionalism refers to the normative values and principles that underpin the 
constitutional framework of a governance system;63 it offers a model for 
                                                          
63 See O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 28) 11, 14.  
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organising political power.64 These normative principles of constitutionalism 
include principles that speak to both the allocation and restraint of political power, 
such as the rule of law and the separation of powers.65 What norms, values and 
principles are included within constitutionalism are contested, but for the 
purposes of this thesis, constitutionalism is taken to mean modern 
constitutionalism, which includes the idea that the authority of government 
derives from constituent power,66 the rule of law, the separation of powers, and 
fundamental human rights.67 The role of democracy within constitutionalism is 
contested,68 but modern constitutionalism has become intertwined with 
democracy and liberalism. 
 
Constitutionalism is neither constitutional law nor a process of 
constitutionalisation.69 Rather, a state’s constitution, its constitutional law and 
processes of constitutionalisation are girded by constitutionalism.70 Werner draws 
a distinction between a state’s constitution and constitutionalism.71 For Loughlin, 
a constitution can mean ‘a formal framework of fundamental law that establishes 
and regulates the activity of governing a state’.72 For the purposes of this thesis, 
a constitution, as a framework of fundamental law that regulates governance, is 
                                                          
64 Dieter Grimm, ‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed World’ in 
Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP 2010) 3. 
65 Kalyvas (n 55) 223-225; Michael W Dowdle and Michael A Wilkinson, ‘On the Limits of 
Constitutional Liberalism: In Search of Constitutional Reflexivity’ in Michael W Dowdle and 
Michael A Wilkinson (eds), Constitutionalism Beyond Liberalism (CUP 2017) 17 and 21. 
66 Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker, ‘Introduction’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds), The 
Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (OUP 2012) 1 
67 Wouter G Werner, ‘Democracy, Constitutionalism and the Question of Authority’ (2010) 39(3) 
Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie 267, 269. 
68 See Chapter 2, sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. 
69 Martin Loughlin, ‘What is Constitutionalisation?’ in Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The 
Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP 2010) 55; Dieter Grimm, Constitutionalism: Past, Present, 
and Future (OUP 2016) ch 1. 
70 O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 28) 5, 14-15; Backer, ‘From 
Constitution to constitutionalism’ (n 22) 106. 
71 Werner, ‘Democracy, Constitutionalism and the Question of Authority’ (n 67) 268-269. 
72 Martin Loughlin, ‘Constitutional Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25(2) Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 183, 184. 
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not limited to states. Constitutionalisation is a process where a legal system 
moves away from decentralisation and towards constitutionalism, for example, 
constitutionalisation can refer to a system that and becomes ‘curtailed by legal 
form’.73  
 
Modern constitutionalism differs from calling something ‘constitutional’. Broadly 
speaking, ’constitutional’ refers to ‘the character of actually existing constitutional 
arrangements’.74 Loughlin argues that ‘constitutional’ is not prescriptive,75 and so 
its content is unclear. It is often used to invoke ideas of shifting towards a legal 
order and removing decisions from politics spaces,76 hierarchy, supremacy and 
the entrenchment of fundamental laws. It is important to distinguish between 
constitutional and constitutionalism because within global constitutionalist 
debates, there are many discussions on hierarchy and supremacy but only 
recently have ideas of modern constitutionalism been debated.  
 
1.5.3 Global Constitutionalist Scholarship  
 
Global constitutionalist scholarship is an evolving literature, which can overlap 
with comparative constitutionalism and transnational constitutionalism.77 For the 
purposes of this thesis, global constitutionalist literature is a strand of international 
legal scholarship, which encompasses the discussions on the 
constitutionalisation of international organisations, constitutional pluralism and 
                                                          
73 O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 28) 11, 24-25. 
74 Loughlin, ‘Constitutional Theory’ (n 72) 186. 
75 ibid 186. 
76 Walker, ‘Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (n 18) 526 (‘a mature rule-based or legal 
order’). 
77 Bosselmann, ‘Global Environmental Constitutionalism’ (n 2) 171; Law and Versteeg, ‘The 
Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism’ (n 2) 1163. 
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societal constitutionalism. Broadly concerned with exploring international law and 
its organisations through a constitutionalist lens, the literature on global 
constitutionalism studied in this thesis, covers discussions on the UN Charter as 
a constitution,78 the legitimacy of, and accountability at, international 
organisations from a constitutionalist perspective,79 as well as the most recent 
shift to consider constitutional principles such as the rule of law, democratic 
legitimacy and the separation of powers. The focus on global constitutionalist 
discourse as an international legal debate, obscures other ‘global democracy’ 
discussions in international relations scholarship and other global legal projects 
that have engaged with democracy, such as global legal pluralism and global 
administrative law (GAL), which could be subjected to The Circumstances of 
Democracy in future research. 
 
The roots of global constitutionalist literature are contested,80 but Verdross is 
often considered the ‘Founding Father’ of the movement,81 and the UN Charter 
in 1945 is often seen as the turning point.82 Prior to the Charter, the international 
                                                          
78 Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of The International Community’ (n 
27) 529. 
79 For example, Anne Peters, ‘International Organizations: Effectiveness and Accountability’ 
(2016) Max Planck Institute Research Papers Series No. 2016-01 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2770606> accessed 9 September 2017. 
80 O’Donoghue notes that Holtzendorff first mentions international constitutionalisation in 1877. 
See Aoife O’Donoghue, ‘Alfred Verdross and the Contemporary Constitutionalisation Debate’ 
(2012) 32(4) OJLS 799, 799. Cf Tokkel Opsahl, ‘An “International Constitutional Law”?’ (1961) 10 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 760, 761. 
81 Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Alfred Verdross and a Founding Father of International Constitutionalism?’ 
(2012) 2 Goettingen Journal of International Law 385. 
82 The idea that the UN Charter is a constitution is debated. See Habermas, ‘Does the 
Constitutionalization of International Law Still Have a Chance?’ (n 19) 131 (proto-constitution); 
Christian Tomuschat, ‘Obligations arising for states without or against their will’ (1993) 241 
Recueil Des Cours 1, 307 (role of jus cogens); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Constitutionalism, 
International Law and We the Peoples of the United Nations’ in Hans-Joachim Cremer, Thomas 
Giegerich, Dagmar Richter and Andreas Zimmerman (eds), Tradition und Weltoffenheit des 
Rechts: Festschrift für Helmut Steinberger (Springer 2002) 303 (lack of effective human rights 
protection and judicial review). 
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community of states was perceived as disorganised.83 The Charter,84 the 
development of jus cogens norms,85 and the sense of community that came to 
bear on the organised international community, are crucial to early 
constitutionalists, such as Mosler and Verdross, who look to norms of 
international law to demonstrate the creation of a coherent community of states.86 
Focusing on jus cogens and the UN Charter gives rise to a constitutionalisation 
that is concerned with hierarchy and the normative content of international law.87 
More recent iterations of global constitutionalist literature, though still concerned 
with the constitutional nature of international organisations and their constitutive 
documents, are more focused on the accountability and legitimacy of 
international organisations.88 This could be referred to as an organisational wave 
of global constitutionalist literature. In addition, there is now a shift to consider 
questions of modern constitutionalism, such as democratic legitimacy, the 
                                                          
83 Alfred Verdross ‘Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law’ (1966) 60 AJIL 55, 62.  
84 See for example: Jost Delbrück, ‘Laws in the Public Interest – Some Observations on the 
Foundations and Identification of erga omnes norms in international law’ in Volkmar Götz, Peter 
Selmer and Rudiger Wolfrum (eds) Liber amicorum Günther Jaenicke (Springer 1999) 35; 
Giegerich, ‘The Is and the Ought of International Constitutionalism’ (n 25) 31. 
85 Alfred Verdross, ‘Fundamental Human Rights, The Journey of an Idea’ (1979-80) 8 Human 
Rights 20, 23; Hermann Mosler, The International Society as a Legal Community (Brill 1980) 15-
16; de Wet, ‘The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of 
the Emerging International Constitutional Order’ (n 19) 614. See also, Kleinlein, ‘Alfred Verdross 
as a Founding Father of International Constitutionalism’ (n 81) 399; Michel Byers, 
‘Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules’ (1997) 66 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 211, 220; Delbrück, ‘Laws in the Public Interest (n 84) 35; Giegerich, 
‘The Is and the Ought of International Constitutionalism’ (n 25) 41. 
86 Verdross, ‘Fundamental Human Rights’ (n 85) 23; Mosler, The International Society as a Legal 
Community (n 85) 15-16. 
87 In other words, it is not too dissimilar to the normative hierarchy debate in international law. 
Indeed, Diggelmann and Altwicker reference the normative relativity debate when they discuss 
trends in constitutionalisation. See, Diggelmann and Altwicker, ‘Is There Something Like a 
Constitution of International Law?’ (n 20) 627. See also, Johannes Gerald van Mulligen, ‘Global 
Constitutionalism and the Objective Purport of the International Legal Order’ (2011) 24(2) Leiden 
Journal of International Law 277, 283. Kleinlein and Peters have argued that there needs to be a 
clearer divide between constitutional hierarchies and relative normativity. See, Thomas Kleinlein 
and Anne Peters, ‘International Constitutional Law’ in Oxford Bibliographies (2014), 9 
<http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-
9780199796953-0039.xml> accessed 10 September 2017. For the relative normativity debate in 
international law, see Dinah Shelton, ‘International Law and “Relative Normativity”’ in Malcolm 
Evans (ed), International Law (OUP 2010) 141; Prosper Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in 
International Law?’ (1983) 77 AJIL 413. 
88 See e.g. Christine E J Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) 110. 
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separation of powers and the rule of law, which could be referred to as a 
principled wave of global constitutionalist debate.89 Global constitutionalist 
literature, then, embraces a ‘conglomeration’ of research interests and themes,90 
but for the purposes of this thesis, two waves of global constitutionalist literature, 
which have most recently engaged with discussions on democracy, will be 
discussed: an organisational and a principled wave. 
 
The organisational wave acts as a response to the institutionalisation of 
international law.91 As such there is an overlap between the organisational wave 
and the literature on international organisations. This wave focuses on 
accountability mechanisms and the legitimation of decision-making at 
international organisations. Examples of scholars working within this wave are 
Peters, Dunoff, Trachtman and Petersmann. Fassbender is illustrative of how 
scholars can traverse a number of waves; his discussions on the UN Charter as 
a constitution, where the focus is on hierarchy and supremacy fit within an earlier 
debate on international constitutional law,92 but his discussion on the democratic 
legitimacy of the UN falls within this organisational wave. As the organisational 
wave is closely aligned with the scholarship on international organisations, there 
are scholars that operate between international organisational law and global 
constitutionalist debates. For example, Klabbers’ discussions on international 
organisations and global constitutionalism exposes accountability as an 
                                                          
89 Armingeon et al., have referred to this idea as ‘constitutionalist constitution’. See Armingeon et 
al., ‘The constitutionalisation of international trade law’ (n 5) 70. Paulus refers to it as ‘substantive 
constitutional principles’. See, Paulus, ‘The International Legal System as a Constitution’ (n 16) 
87. 
90 Deplano (n 3) 97.  
91 See, Anne Peters, ‘Constitutional Fragments: On the Interaction of Constitutionalization and 
Fragmentation in International Law’ (2015) Centre for Global Constitutionalism Working Paper No 
2 < http://cgc.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/files/2015/04/CGC-Working-Paper-No-2-Constitutional-
Fragments.pdf > accessed 10 September 2017; Deplano (n 3) 67. 
92 See for example: Delbrück, ‘Laws in the Public Interest’ (n 84) 35; Giegerich, ‘The Is and the 
Ought of International Constitutionalism’ (n 25) 31. 
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underlying impetus of this wave.93 Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, Klabbers 
is considered within the organisational wave.  
 
The principled wave of global constitutionalist scholarship seeks to respond to 
the limitations of the organisational approach. Engaging in a more abstract 
discourse, the principled wave takes constitutionalism as its starting point and 
explores the potential of moving principles and related institutions of 
constitutionalism beyond the state. Heeding a call from O’Donoghue to adopt 
constitutionalist literature, rather than international legal doctrine as the 
foundation,94 the principled wave witnesses discussions on key elements of 
constitutionalism, most recently a move to debate constituent power in the global 
legal space.95 Key commentators within this wave are Habermas, Walker, and 
mostly recently, O’Donoghue, and their scholarship forms the basis of the chapter 
on principled global constitutionalist literature. Though perhaps not a self-defining 
global constitutionalist, de Búrca’s expertise in European Constitutional Law 
influences her scholarship on democracy beyond the state, where she specifically 
engages with constitutional democracy,96 thus for the purposes of this thesis her 
work is considered as part of a principled wave of global constitutionalism. 
 
                                                          
93 Jan Klabbers, ‘The Paradox of International Institutional Law’ (2008) 5 International 
Organizations Law Review 1, 17. See also, Peters, ‘International Organizations: Effectiveness 
and Accountability’ (n 79). 
94 O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 28) 14-15. 
95 See, for example: Nico Krisch, ‘Pouvoir constituant and pouvoir irritant in the postnational order’ 
(2012) 14(3) I·CON 657; Nootens, ‘Constituent power and the people-as-the-governed’ (n 44) 
137; Mattias Kumm, ‘Constituent power, cosmopolitan constitutionalism, and post-positivist law’ 
(2016) 14(3) I·CON 697, 698; Markus Patberg, ‘Against democratic intergovernmentalism: The 
case for a theory of constituent power in the global realm’ (2016) 14(3) I·CON 622; Saki Bailey & 
Ugo Mattei, ‘Social movements as Constituent Power: The Italian Struggle for the Commons’ 
(2013) 20 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 965; Jürgen Habermas, ‘Citizen and State 
Equality in a Supranational Political Community: Degressive Proportionality and the Pouvoir 
Constituant Mixte’ (2017) 55(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 171. 
96 Gráinne de Búrca, ‘Developing Democracy Beyond the State’ (2008) Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 101, 129. 
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Within the principled wave of global constitutionalist discourse, there are 
particular approaches espoused; constitutional pluralism and societal 
constitutionalism. Constitutional pluralism is concerned with de-bunking the myth 
of the unified constitution of the state, it offers new ways of thinking about the 
location of democracy and constitutionalism across levels of governance. 
Concerned with the constitutionalisation of systems, other than the state, societal 
constitutionalism sits within the principled wave. Teubner’s challenge to the role 
of traditional actors and the structural features in constitutionalism, questions the 
prevailing liberal approach adopted within global constitutionalist discourse.97 
The different locations of constitutionalisation and the different actors invoked 
within societal constitutionalism, facilitate alternative discussions on democracy. 
Whilst Teubner does not resolve the question of democracy, as proxies are still 
relied upon, he does offer an alternative way of debating constituent power and 
democracy both within and beyond the state. Thus, Teubner’s societal 
constitutionalist discussions are used here to both consider the different 
approaches taken to democracy and as an antagonistic approach that exposes 
the limitations of the global constitutionalist debate. Given the different positions 
adopted, the principled wave is not defined by a particular normative approach, 
but rather its distinctive characteristics are the research questions and 
approaches.  
 
The organisational and principled waves are differentiated in relation to 
methodology. Usually approaches to global constitutionalism are formulated into 
categories, and scholars refer to normative, functional, institutional and 
                                                          
97 See Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization 
(OUP 2012) 17-18. 
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analogical forms of global constitutionalism,98 but there is little agreement over 
these categories. Instead of using these competing categorisations, this thesis 
considers the research themes brought to bear on constitutional norms or 
institutions. The organisational and principled waves place emphasis on different 
research questions, with the organisational wave placing more emphasis on 
accountability mechanisms, and the principled wave engaging in questions on 
the rule of the law, the separation of powers and democratic legitimacy. The 
literature they engage with and what they adopt as their starting points influence 
their approach both to constitutionalism and democracy. The organisational 
wave, which is concerned with the reform and creation of international 
organisations, is influenced by the international legal scholarship on democracy. 
In contrast, the principled wave, in seeking to reply to the narrow approach to 
constitutionalism adopted in the organisational strand, engages in a fuller debate 
on constitutionalism beyond the state.  
 
Focusing on the research themes and research method is one way of 
demarcating global constitutionalist literature and of considering how the 
disciplinary contours shape the debate on democracy. The thesis offers a 
discussion on how the method, the research questions, and the literature used 
by these two waves shapes the approach to democracy. Applying the 
Circumstances of Democracy to the two waves will show how the biases 
                                                          
98 Across the scholarship there are attempts to categorise global constitutionalism. Antje Wiener, 
Anthony F Lang, James Tully, Miguel Poiares Maduro and Mattias Kumm, ‘Global 
constitutionalism: Human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (2012) 1(1) Global 
Constitutionalism 1, 6 (normative, functionalist and pluralist); Christine E J Schwöbel, ‘Situating 
the debate on global constitutionalism’ (2010) 8(3) I·CON 611, 617-630 (sociological, institutional, 
normative and analogical); Mattias Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the 
relationship between constitutionalism in and beyond the state’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P 
Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance 
(CUP 2009) 259 (formal, substantive, and functional); Karolina Milewicz, ‘Emerging Patterns of 
Global Constitutionalization: Towards a Conceptual Framework’ (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 413 (formal, substance, civil-political and socio-economic). 
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influence the discussion on democracy, and how these lead to an insufficient 
discourse.  
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
Global constitutional scholarship is a nebulous discourse that encompasses a raft 
of competing research questions, aims and agendas. Debates on democracy and 
the democratisation of international organisations within this unwieldy sub-
discipline, are influenced by the different research methods and questions. Within 
global constitutionalist literature, terms associated with democracy are used 
without being situated within a conceptual understanding of democracy and 
discussions on democracy beyond the state stagnate around the plausibility of a 
global demos and the inappropriateness and ineffectiveness of democracy on 
such a large scale. This thesis tackles how the debates on democracy are 
structured, it considers what restrictions are placed on a discussion of democracy 
when competing claims from international law and constitutionalist theory come 
to bear on global constitutionalism. This thesis offers the Circumstances of 
Democracy as a tool to ensure that it is democracy which is at the forefront of 
debates.  
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Chapter 2: The Circumstances of Democracy 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
‘[D]emocracy has become an altar on which everyone hangs his or her favourite 
ex voto’.1 As a ‘contested concept’,2 democracy invokes competing values and 
has multiple manifestations.3 Democracy can be representative, deliberative, or 
participatory. Such is its malleability that democracy has been promoted for 
justice,4 economic redistribution,5 as well as the more traditional promotion of 
equality and freedom.6  
 
As an idea democracy has a complex history. Democracy has not always been 
well received.7 Winston Churchill famously said; ‘democracy is the worst form of 
Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to 
time’.8 Ancient Greek philosophers were sceptical and concerned that democracy 
would lead to demagogue,9 similar scepticism was voiced in the revolutionary 
                                                          
1 Adam Przeworski, ‘Minimalist conception of democracy: a defense’ in Ian Shapiro and Casiano 
Hacker-Cordón (eds), Democracy’s Values (CUP 1999) 24. 
2 See W B Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ (1955) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 167, 168. 
3 Michael Coppedge, Democratization and Research Methods (CUP 2012) 11; Laurence 
Whitehead, ‘The Vexed Issue of the meaning of “democracy”’ (1997) 2(2) Journal of Political 
Ideologies 121, 130 (accountability, citizenship and deliberation are ‘“indispensable” components’ 
of democracy).  
4 Joshua Cohen, ‘For a Democratic society’ in Samuel Freeman (ed), The Cambridge Companion 
to Rawls (CUP 2006) 93 (‘the justice of political process and to the justice of outcomes’ (emphasis 
added)).  
5 For a discussion see, Carl Henrik Knutsen and Simone Wegmann, ‘Is democracy about 
redistribution?’ (2016) 23(1) Democratization 164. 
6 For a discussion see, Adam Swift, Political Philosophy: A Beginners’ Guide For Students and 
Politicians (3rd edn, Polity Press 2014) 197 and 212-221. 
7 See David Held, ‘Democracy: From City-states to a Cosmopolitan Order?’ (1992) Political 
Studies 10, 10. 
8 Winston Churchill, House of Commons, 11th November 1947. 
9 For a discussion on Plato’s approach to democracy see, David Held, Models of democracy (3rd 
edn, Polity Press 2006) 23-27. For Aristotle, see Andrew Lintott, ‘Aristotle and Democracy’ (1992) 
42(i) Classical Quarterly 114, 127. 
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periods in America and France,10 and again in early 20th century Europe in 
response to mass society.11 In contrast, in 1989 it was proclaimed that liberal 
democracy had won the battle of history and democracy indices appear to 
demonstrate that the decades at the end of the 20th century witnessed a surge of 
countries becoming democratic.12  
 
Alongside this celebration of democracy, there is a growing sense amongst 
political scientists that democracy has failed. This failure, arguably, comes from 
three potential sources; sham democracies, globalization, and discontent with 
political elites. Democracy indices, though flawed,13 demonstrate that the moniker 
of democracy is used when there is little evidence of democratic processes. Take 
for example, the People’s Republic of China. The preamble of the constitution 
refers to democracy and democratic elections,14 but there is little evidence of 
democracy in practice.15 This highlights that the normative content of democracy 
can be disconnected from the label. Popular discussions on the state of 
democracy today show anxieties around decisions being taken at supranational 
organisations and the introduction of new unaccountable actors.16 Political 
developments in 2016-2017 are testament to a growing discontent with 
                                                          
10 For example, James Madison, ‘Letter No X: The Same Subject Continued’ in Isaac Kramnick 
(ed), James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay: The Federalist Papers (Penguin 1987) 
126 (‘[d]emocracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been 
found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in general been as 
short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths’).  
11 For a discussion see, Richard Bellamy, ‘The advent of the masses and the making of the 
modern theory of democracy’ in Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (eds), The Cambridge History 
of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (CUP 2003) 70, 87. 
12 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Penguin 1992) xi. 
13 For a discussion see, Diego Giannone, ‘Political and ideological aspects in the measurement 
of democracy: the Freedom House case’ (2010) 17(1) Democratization 68. 
14 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (amended 14 March 2004), Preamble, Chapter 
1, and Article 3. 
15 Paul Cartledge, Democracy: A Life (OUP 2016) 306. See also, David Runciman, The 
Confidence Trap: A History of Democracy in Crisis from World War I to the Present (Princeton 
University Press 2013) 318. 
16 Runciman outlines war, the environment, international rivals and finance as the biggest 
contemporary challenges from democracy. Runciman (n 15) xiv. 
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democracy in liberal democracies as sections of populations lose faith in political 
elites and there is a rise of voter apathy. This is the paradox of democracy; it is 
often simultaneously in crisis and endorsed.17  
 
Democracy manifests in a variety of ways across history.18 For instance, Ancient 
Athens has a direct form of democracy, in post-revolutionary America, a 
representative form and within East European countries in the late 20th century, 
a ‘one-party model’ of democracy dominated.19 At the beginning of the 20th 
century, liberalism and democracy became embroiled and liberal democratic 
models promoted.20 Then liberal models were challenged by mass societies21 
and cultural idiosyncrasies,22 and mixed systems were developed.23 For example, 
under Putin, Russia combines liberalism, elections and repression.24 These 
examples show the fluidity of democracy in politics. There is a distinction between 
democracy’s use in politics and its meaning in philosophical debate. This thesis 
is not a discussion on the realities of democracy in the 2010s, rather, this is a 
discussion about the use of democracy as a concept within international legal 
theory. 
 
                                                          
17 ibid 21-22. 
18 See Ellen Meiksins Wood, ‘The demos versus “we, the people”: from ancient to modern 
conceptions of citizenship’ in Ellen Meiksins Wood (ed), Democracy against Capitalism: 
Renewing Historical Materialism (CUP 1995) ch 7; Daniele Archibugi, ‘Demos and Cosmopolis’ 
in Debating Cosmopolitics (2002) 13 New Left Review 24, 24-25. 
19 Held, ‘Democracy: from City-state to a Cosmopolitan Order?’ (n 7) 12. 
20 See Wood, ‘The demos versus “we, the people”’ (n 18) 225. 
21 See Bellamy, ‘The advent of the masses and the making of the modern theory of democracy’ 
(n 11) 70.  
22 See Bhirku Parekh, ‘Non-Western Political Thought’ in Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (eds), 
The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (CUP 2003) 559. 
23 See also ‘democradura’, which means ‘the mixture of formal democracy and de facto 
dictatorship in force in many countries of the world’. See Archibugi, ‘Demos and Cosmopolis’ (n 
18) 27. 
24 Runciman (n 15) 321. 
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Within political philosophy there are ongoing debates about the values supported 
by democracy. Some argue that democracy is about ensuring the freedom of the 
individual, but what freedom means is contested.25 Likewise, there are debates 
on the extent to which democracy promotes equality, as well as whether it can 
reconcile political and substantive equality,26 whether human rights protections 
are necessary or whether they place undue limits on democracy.27 These 
debates are heightened when democracy is incorporated into constitutionalism. 
Considering the contentious issues within democratic theory, this chapter starts 
to unpack democracy for global constitutionalist scholarship.  
 
This chapter provides a matrix, called the Circumstances of Democracy, to 
explore fundamental questions. Asking the Who, What, When, Where and How 
analyses how democracy can be discussed within global constitutionalist 
scholarship, highlighting the sorts of questions that the scholarship must engage 
with. Firstly, this chapter explores the relationship between constitutionalism and 
democracy and then the contestation between constituent power and democracy. 
This chapter then outlines the Circumstances, and using historical examples, this 
chapter garners important, fundamental questions to guide a discussion on 
democracy.  
 
2.2 Democracy and Constitutionalism  
 
                                                          
25 For a discussion see Philip Pettit, ‘Republican freedom and contestatory democratization’ in 
Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón (eds), Democracy’s Value (CUP 1999) 163. 
26 Robert A Dahl, On Democracy (Yale University Press 1998) 37-38 (political equality); Robert 
Post, ‘Democracy and Equality’ (2005) 1 Law, Culture and the Humanities 142, 150-151. 
27 Compare Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, (OUP 1999) 212; Ronald Dworkin, 
Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Harvard University Press 1996) 
17. 
 
 
51 
Modern constitutionalism is closely intertwined with democracy. This is, however, 
a development arising from the American and French revolutions.28 
Constitutionalism now relies on democracy to ensure its legitimacy and 
acceptability.29 Yet, arguably constitutional norms, such as the rule of law and the 
separation of powers, act to limit democracy. A harmonious marriage between 
the two cannot be assumed. Global constitutionalist discourse, to the extent that 
it adopts a constitutionalist frame, must be mindful of this complex relationship 
and how it influences democracy. This section first explores this contentiousness 
to demonstrate how it shapes discussions on democracy.  
 
One of the implications of the relationship between constitutionalism and 
democracy is the conflation of constituent power and democracy. Depending on 
the approach to democracy, both democracy and constituent power have the 
potential to invoke the radical, destructive and constructive power of people. 
Scholars argue that for democracy, people must have constituent power to create 
the constituted power holders in a constitutional system,30 the power to hold these 
constituted power holders to account, as well as the power to genuinely 
participate in decision-making processes. But others have drawn a divide 
between constituent power and democracy to illustrate the different powers and 
to highlight how democracy can be limited by constitutionalism. This section 
                                                          
28 Kay outlines theocratic and monarchical underpinnings of constitutions. See, Richard S Kay, 
‘Constituent Authority’ (2011) 59 American Journal of Comparative Law 715, 736-737. 
29 Kelly L Grotke and Markus J Prutsch, ‘Constitutionalism, Legitimacy and Power: Nineteenth 
Century Experiences’ in Kelly L Grotke and Markus J Prutsch (eds), Constitutionalism, Legitimacy 
and Power: Nineteenth Century Experiences (OUP 2014) 11. See also, Francis Sejersted, 
‘Democracy and the rule of law: some historical experiences of contradictions in the striving for 
good government’ in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (eds), Constitutionalism and Democracy (CUP 
1997) 131, 132; András Sajó, Limiting Government: an Introduction to Constitutionalism (Central 
European University Press 1999) 54. 
30 Illan rua Wall, ‘Notes on an “Open” Constituent Power’ (2015) 11(3) Law, Culture and the 
Humanities 378, 378. Cf Neil Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: 
An Iterative Relationship’ (2010) 39(3) Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie 206, 215. 
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explores the approach to constituent power taken by Sieyès, followed by 
Loughlin’s categorisation of normativist, decisionist, and relationalist constituent 
power to expose the complicated relationship between constituent power and 
democracy.  
 
2.2.1 The Relationship between democracy and constitutionalism: Tension or Co-
original?  
 
Scholars disagree on whether constitutionalism and democracy are antithetical 
concepts, or whether they coexist in a harmonious coupling. The way these 
theories construct an idea of democracy or constitutionalism, exposes the idea 
that the relationship is one of complexity. Starting from the idea that the concepts 
are antithetical, this sub-section discusses theories that operate on the idealistic 
assumption that democracy and constitutionalism are compatible. Habermas’ co-
originality thesis and the idea of constitutional democracy is compared with 
Walker’s and Tully’s reflections, which highlight how the concepts marshal one 
another.  
 
Constitutionalism, as understood as human rights, the rule of law, and the 
separation of powers, places limits on the power of the people. Whilst some 
scholars argue that constitutionalism can be a tool to prevent democracy 
becoming a tyranny of the majority,31 others see the limits that constitutionalism 
places on democracy as ‘anti-democratic’32 because constitutional laws, such as 
                                                          
31 Ronald Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain (Chatto & Windus 1990) 13-14; Sajó, Limiting 
Government (n 29) xiv. 
32 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Constitutionalism: A Skeptical View’ (2012) New York University Public Law 
and Legal Theory Working Papers < http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/248/ > accessed 22 
September 2017; Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay between identity and 
diversity: an introduction’ (1992-1993) 14 Cardozo Law Review 497, 514-522. 
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fundamental human rights provisions, are protected from contestation. In 
contrast, MacCormick argues democracy is ‘anti-constitutionalist’ as the idea of 
unlimited political power expressed in democracy is at odds with the limits 
constitutionalism seeks to place on legislative and executive power.33 These 
approaches show narrow understandings of democracy as mere majoritarianism 
and constitutionalism as a form of hierarchy and a way of limiting power. 
 
Yet, there are other conceptualisations of constitutionalism and democracy that 
shifts the relationship.34 Some scholars argue that constitutionalism and 
democracy are ‘mutually dependent and mutually reinforcing’.35 For Habermas, 
for example, human rights and democracy are co-original36 and both democracy 
and constitutionalism are working towards the same objectives. He distinguishes 
between the protection of public autonomy and the protection of private 
autonomy.37 Constitutionalism protects the private autonomy, whilst democracy 
is concerned with public autonomy. Democracy cannot happen without rights 
protection and the rights are not protected without democratic processes. Each 
complements the other.  
 
The complementary nature of the relationship proffered by Habermas is a result 
of a particular conceptualisation of constitutionalism and democracy. For 
Habermas, constitutionalism is synonymous with the rule of law and human 
                                                          
33 Neil MacCormick, ‘Constitutionalism and Democracy’ in Richard Bellamy (ed), Theories and 
Concepts of Politics: An Introduction (Manchester University Press 1993) 137.  
34 Walker refers to this as defining up and defining down democracy. Walker, ‘Constitutionalism 
and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 30) 211. 
35 Rosenfeld, ‘Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay between identity and diversity: an 
introduction’ (n 32) 522. 
36 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory 
Principles?’ (2001) 29(6) Political Theory 766, 767. 
37 ibid 767. 
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rights.38 To ensure compatibility, democracy is modified. He argues that 
democracy is not majoritarianism because the will of the people should meet the 
requirements of the rule of law.39 He argues that this is ‘disciplining or enabling 
(but not constraining)’.40 Yet, the rule of law (as understood as a principle of 
legality41) does place limits on the scope of power people have in democracy as 
it restricts the types of decisions that can be made. Arguably, placing such limits 
operates to ensure the equality of actors and the longevity of democracy. But, if 
anything, this demonstrates a complex relationship between constitutionalism 
and democracy, rather than mere coexistence. The construction of 
constitutionalism and democracy to make them complementary subsumes 
important tensions around the individual within the collective. 
 
Some liberal constitutional scholars argue that democracy and human rights are 
compatible. They suggest that both democracy and rights are instrumental to 
protecting personal liberties.42 Though there is disagreement on the ‘core rights’, 
liberal scholars argue that democratic rights, such as the freedom of speech, 
freedom of association, due process of law, the right to vote and hold office are 
a prerequisite for democracy.43 This manifestation of the relationship between 
democracy and human rights is criticised for two reasons; it places limits on the 
decisions people can make within a democracy and it acts as ‘defining up’ 
                                                          
38 See Bonnie Honig, ‘Dead Rights. Live Future: A reply to Habermas’s “Constitutional 
Democracy”’ (2001) 29(6) Political Theory 792, 793. 
39 Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other (MIT Press 1998) 259. 
40 ibid 259. 
41 The rule of law is also a contested concept, but such a debate falls outside the scope of this 
thesis, which focuses on democracy. For a discussion on the rule of law in relation to 
constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation, see Aoife O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in 
Global Constitutionalisation (CUP 2014) 156-170; Jane Marian Rooney, ‘The Paradox of 
Extraterritoriality at the European Court of Human Rights: A Global Constitutionalist Approach’ 
(PhD thesis, Durham University 2016) 97. 
42 See Amy Gutmann, ‘Rawls on the Relationship between Liberalism and Democracy’ in Samuel 
Freeman (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (CUP 2002) 169. 
43 Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (n 27) 17. 
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democracy.44 Envisioning certain human rights as intrinsic to democracy places 
these rights above political debate. In contrast, Waldron argues that the people 
should decide disagreements about rights45 and for republican theorists, the 
constitution ‘never escapes democracy, insofar as it is never beyond question or 
amendment’.46 Whilst some scholars would label the combined protection of 
human rights and democracy as substantive or thick democracy,47 Walker argues 
that adding human rights (and other aspects of constitutionalism) into democracy 
‘defines up’ democracy.48 The utility of conceptualising this as ‘defining up’ lies in 
acknowledging the tension between human rights and democracy. Human rights, 
aspects of constitutionalism, and democracy interact; where a majority could 
violate the rights of the minority, human rights and constitutionalism can 
intervene, but likewise democracy is needed to add previously hidden voices and 
interests to constitutional arrangements. Encapsulating all of these interactions 
and contradictions into ‘democracy’ is to ignore the tension between 
constitutionalism and democracy.  
 
The contestation between human rights and democracy, or between 
constitutionalism and democracy, can be understood as a tension between the 
individual and the collective.49 If democracy is a process of collective decision-
                                                          
44 Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 30) 211. 
45 Waldron, Law and Disagreement (n 27) 212. 
46 Graham Gee and Grégoire C N Webber, ‘What is a political Constitution’ (2010) 30(2) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 273, 283. 
47 See, Dahl, On Democracy (n 26) 48; Joel I Colón-Ríos, Weak Constitutionalism: Democratic 
Legitimacy and the Question of Constituent Power (Routledge 2012) 41. Cf Richard Bellamy and 
Dario Castiglione, ‘Three Models of Democracy, Political Community and Representation’ (2013) 
20(2) Journal of European Public Policy 206, 208 (thick democracy means the ‘intrinsic promotion 
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rights and interests’). 
48 Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 30) 211. 
49 For a discussion see Chantal Mouffe, ‘Democratic citizenship and the political community’ in 
Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (Verso 1993) 61-63; Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty, 
International Law and Democracy’ (2011) 22(2) EJIL 373, 383. 
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making, it can negate the interests of the individual so as to promote a collective 
response.50 Constitutionalism, and human rights, are used to mitigate the impacts 
on the autonomy and freedom of an individual within such collective decision-
making.51 This tension between the individual and the collective, and the way that 
democracy and constitutionalism interact to balance these interests, is an 
ongoing process that needs constant revision. It is this tension and the need to 
revisit it that should inform global constitutionalist debates.  
 
The compatibility of democracy and constitutionalism is expressed in the term 
‘constitutional democracy’. Under ‘constitutional democracy’, constitutionalism 
and democracy coexist, such that one cannot trump the other.52 The liberal 
constitutional state is built on this constitutional democratic model, and 
constitutional democracy, with its distinctive features of representative 
government and the separation of powers, has become an indicator of 
democracy. Yet, this restricts democracy to a particular model with associated 
institutions and limits the power of the people to elections and voting. 
Constitutional democracy can overlook the relationship between democracy and 
constitutionalism.53  
 
Tully argues that constitutional democracy must be accompanied by ‘democratic 
constitutionalism’, which is the idea that constitutionalism and its relationship with 
                                                          
50 See below, section 2.3.2 text at fn 206-217. 
51 For a discussion see, Jean Blondel, ‘Democracy and Constitutionalism’ in Takashi Inoguchi, 
Edward Newman and John Keane (eds), The changing nature of democracy (United Nations 
University Press 1998) 81. 
52 Walter F Murphy, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy’ in Douglas Greenberg, 
Stanley N Katz, Melanie Beth Oliviero and Steven C Wheatley (eds), Constitutionalism and 
Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World (OUP 1993) 3, 6; James Tully, ‘The 
Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional Democracy’ (2002) 
MLR 204, 207. 
53 Neil MacCormick, ‘Constitutionalism and Democracy’ in Richard Bellamy (ed), Theories and 
Concepts of Politics: An Introduction (Manchester University Press 1993) 145. 
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democracy is open and contested so that people can rewrite their constitutional 
system.54 Democratic constitutionalism is used by Tully to ensure that 
constitutionalism does not smother democracy. So as aspects of 
constitutionalism, such as the separation of powers and the rule of law, can be 
said to protect democracy, democracy facilitates the reformation of constitutional 
institutions and processes.55 Tully’s pairing of constitutional democracy and 
democratic constitutionalism is illustrative of the impact of democracy on 
constitutionalism, which contrasts with Walker, who focuses on how 
constitutionalism shapes democracy.56 
 
Walker argues that democracy and constitutionalism need to be considered as 
being in a state of iterative tension, but working together to achieve particular 
aims.57 He argues that democracy is incomplete and as such constitutionalism 
both realises and qualifies democracy.58 He outlines six instances where 
constitutionalism and democracy are said to collide. These are: the authority of 
the polity, the membership of a polity, the representative processes in a system, 
the competences of stakeholders and representatives, public goods and human 
rights, and the institutional arrangement of a constitutional system.59 In essence, 
for Walker, constitutionalism (through a constitution) shapes the polity and the 
political processes.  
 
                                                          
54 Tully, ‘The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional 
Democracy’ (n 52) 207. 
55 ibid 207. 
56 Cf Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 30) 216 (notes the role 
of democracy in the reflexivity of the polity). 
57 ibid 213. 
58 ibid 207. 
59 ibid 214-221. 
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Walker accepts that constitutionalism qualifies democracy. For example, he 
argues that the protection of human rights and the provision of other public goods 
require a modification of democracy.60 In addition, in realising democracy, 
constitutionalism modifies democracy.61 For Walker, an undemocratic expression 
of constituent power constructs a system, and it is within this system that 
democracy can prosper.62 The system has ‘the necessary framing conditions and 
any additional norm-generating capacity for the fashioning and operation of 
democracy within that polity’.63 It is not clear what these conditions are, but if 
democracy is then restricted to that system, it operates within those conditions. 
For some theorists, such restrictions are not legitimate, as scholars contest the 
undemocratic expression of constituent power.64 Whilst Walker acknowledges 
that these conditions have not been consented to by the demos,65 further work is 
needed to demonstrate the implications of this. As Walker is both a constitutional 
theorist and a commentator on global constitutionalism, he initiates a 
conversation within global constitutionalist literature on the relationship between 
constitutionalism and democracy, but leaving constituent power as an expression 
of undemocratic power and constitutionalism as an imposition on the people has 
the unsatisfactory outcome that nascent constitutionalisation in global 
governance might be imposed upon an unwilling global populace. 
 
The relationship between constitutionalism and democracy is both unresolved 
and unresolvable. Democracy and aspects of constitutionalism stand in a 
                                                          
60 ibid 220. 
61 Habermas’ co-original thesis is another example of this. Human rights realise democracy, but 
at the same time, they modify democracy. Habermas, ‘Constitutional Democracy’ (n 36) 767.  
62 Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 30) 214-215. 
63 ibid 215. 
64 Yaniv Roznai, ‘We the Limited People’ (NYU Global Fellows Forum, 10 March 2015) 15 < 
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complex, iterative relationship, in which both modifies the other. Idealistic co-
existence models subsume the tension between constitutionalism and 
democracy, and obscure the way that democracy can become conflated with 
other concepts. To rectify this, the scholarship must query the relationship, 
acknowledge how their current solutions do not fully resolve the tensions, and be 
clear as to where limitations are placed on democracy. The complexity between 
constitutionalism and democracy is compounded when the issue of constituent 
power is considered, and this is discussed next.  
 
2.2.2 Constituent Power and Democracy 
 
Modern constitutionalism is predicated on popular sovereignty and authority is 
said to derive from the people. Yet, traditionally this is not explained by 
democracy.66 Rather, who has the power to constitute and how is explained 
through constituent power. For instance, scholars argue that constituent power 
does not have to be expressed through a democratic procedure nor produce a 
democratic system. In recent global constitutionalist scholarship, constituent 
power and democracy are entwined,67 but the relationship between the two needs 
further unpacking to demonstrate that there are potential differences in the scope 
of power between constituent power and democracy, making it problematic to 
conflate the two. This sub-section begins by exploring Sieyès’ conceptualisation 
of constituent power. Then Loughlin’s normativist, decisionist, and relationalist 
                                                          
66 Cf Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power’ (2005) 
12(2) Constellations 223, 237. 
67 See, for example: Geneviève Nootens, ‘Constituent power and the people-as-the-governed: 
About the “invisible” people of political and legal theory’ (2015) 4(2) Global Constitutionalism 137; 
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and State Equality in a Supranational Political Community: Degressive Proportionality and the 
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conceptualisations of constituent power are used to demonstrate alternative 
approaches. Finally, this sub-section reflects on discussions on the scope of 
constituent power and how this relates to democracy. As noted above, 
democracy is invoked alongside popular sovereignty and self-government, and 
the idea of self-government is tied to elections and voting.68 Discussing 
constituent power in relation to the identification of who holds power, how it is 
used, and the scope of the power demonstrates how it can differ from democracy, 
if democracy is understood as self-government. 
 
The idea of constituent power is often traced back to Sieyès’ discussion. What is 
the Third Estate? provides a tripartite explanation of the positions of power and 
people within constitutionalism: ‘the people as a nation are the constituent power, 
the government is the constituted power, and the terms on which it functions are 
the constitution’.69 In this approach, the exercise of constituent power takes place, 
in what is called, a constituent or constitutional moment, in which a new political 
and legal order is established.70 Constituent power creates the constituted power, 
which is the legislative and executive power within a constitutional order. In this 
sense, constituent power is a radical power that destroys a previous order and 
creates a new one.71 Sieyès conceptualisation of constituent power is influential 
and forms a starting point. But, there are other approaches and Loughlin 
distinguishes between three further conceptualisations of constituent power; 
                                                          
68 Chapter 1, section 1.5.1.  
69 Denis J Galligan, ‘The People, the Constitution, and the Idea of Representation’ in Denis J 
Galligan and Mila Versteeg (eds), Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions (CUP 2013) 
148. 
70 For a discussion see, Kalyvas (n 66) 226. See also Bruce Ackerman, We the People, Volume 
2: Transformations (Harvard University Press 2000). 
71 Negri refers to constituent power as a power that ‘is aimed at revolutionizing the status quo’. A 
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normativist, decisionist, and relationalist.72 These conceptualisations have 
competing approaches to who holds constituent power. Normativism is 
predicated on the pre-supposed Grundnorm, rather than the will of the people.73 
Dyzenhaus, a proponent of normativism, argues that constituent power is 
superfluous.74 If, as the normativist position argues, constituent power is a 
political myth,75 there is no space for the will of the people in the authority of the 
constitutional order. The decisionist strand, in contrast to normativism, 
acknowledges that constitutions are a product of political moments in history.76 
Decisionists recognise that constituent power can be held by the people or the 
monarch,77 where the people is a pre-supposed unified political entity.78 In the 
relational approach, constituent power is exposed as a paradox: it ‘involves the 
exercise of power by a people [and] simultaneously constitutes a people’.79 In the 
relational perspective, constituent power is not exhausted in the constituent 
                                                          
72 The German, French, American and English traditions of constitutionalism have conceptualised 
constituent power differently as well. See Martin Loughlin, ‘Constituent Power Subverted: From 
English Constitutional Argument to British Constitutional Practice’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil 
Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form 
(OUP 2012) 27; Stephen M Griffin, ‘Constituent Power and Constitutional Change in American 
Constitutionalism’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: 
Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (OUP 2012) 49; Lucien Jaume, ‘Constituent Power in 
France: The Revolution and its Consequences’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds), The 
Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (OUP 2012) 67; 
Christoph Möllers, ‘“We are (afraid of) the people”’: Constituent Power in German 
Constitutionalism’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: 
Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (OUP 2012) 87. 
73 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (BL Paulson and SL Paulson trans, 
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Global Constitutionalism 233, 253. 
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Schmitt’s use of constituent power undermines democracy. Firstly, as Dyzenhaus notes Schmitt 
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David Dyzenhaus, ‘The Politics of the Question of Constituent Power’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil 
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practices in the realm of constituted power. As Schmitt’s theory ultimately leads to dictatorship, it 
is not used in this thesis.  
77 Loughlin, ‘The concept of constituent power’ (n 73) 225. 
78 ibid 228. 
79 ibid 229. 
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moment. Rather, constituent power and constituted power are in a dialectical 
relationship, in which constituent power irritates the instituted power.80  
 
Conceiving of constituent power through these three conceptualisations is useful 
because it demonstrates the different ways the people are constructed and given 
particular roles. How the decisionist, normativist and relational approaches 
conceive of the power of the people impacts the scope of democracy. Scope 
refers to the breadth of decisions and institutions, the more decisions and 
institutions that fall within the power of the people the wider the scope of 
democracy. These conceptualisations of constituent power are re-produced in 
global constitutionalist scholarship, as scholars translate domestic ideas of 
constitutionalism for the global level. One example, which is elaborated on in the 
thesis, is the German tradition that informs Peters and Fassbender.81 This 
adoption of a domestic tradition is insufficient as it side-lines the differing extents 
of people’s power, which are uncovered when Loughlin’s three 
conceptualisations are compared. It is critical to reflect on how these 
conceptualisations impact democracy.  
 
Traditionally, constituent power was not exercised democratically and was not 
thought to give rise to a democratic constitutional order.82 Whilst there is a shift 
towards tying constituent power more closely with democracy, the way the two 
are disconnected in the literature means it is advisable to initially separate 
constituent power and democracy. When considering the relationship between 
constituent power and democracy, there are two issues to consider: how 
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82 See for example, Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 30) 215. 
 
63 
constituent power is exercised and whether the outcome of constituent power 
should be democratic.  
 
For Sieyès, constituent power vests in the nation.83 The nation here means a 
unity of The People, rather than all the people together, so it is a construct that 
implies one common identity and one will.84 The unity imposed through the idea 
of the nation has been criticised by critical legal theorists, who proffer the idea of 
the multitude.85 The multitude expresses the plurality of all the people. According 
to Sieyès, it is the nation that holds constituent power and the nation is 
represented in an assembly.86 In essence, the assembly has constituent power 
and the people hold it only symbolically. Within this representative model, the 
people themselves cannot influence the content of the constitution. The 
representative aspect of Sieyès’ constituent power potentially excludes the 
genuine participation of people because not only is the nation a construct, but it 
is this construct that is represented in the assembly. Roznai responds to this, and 
argues, that ‘an exercise of constituent power should be inclusive, participatory, 
and deliberative’.87 Whilst arguably, in an ideal world, constituent power should 
be exercised through democratic processes to ensure the consent of the people, 
traditionally constituent power is not exercised democratically; Sieyès’ reliance 
on the nation means for him constituent power is divorced from the genuine 
participation of the people.  
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There is a debate about whether constituent power necessitates the creation of 
a democratic system.88 Sieyès argues that nothing is above the nation, which is 
interpreted to mean that constituent power cannot be limited, and therefore it is 
not obliged to create a democratic system.89 If constituent power vests in the 
nation and nothing is above the nation, constituent power can create any form of 
constitutional order. However, Sieyès argues that the nation is limited by natural 
law.90 Roznai interprets this to mean that Sieyès saw constituent power as limited 
by the natural rights of men.91 From this limitation, Roznai argues that norms of 
constitutionalism marshal the exercise of constituent power,92 and that it must 
lead to a democratic output. The norms of constitutionalism are contested, and 
as noted above, do not necessarily include democracy,93 which weakens 
Roznai’s argument. If constituent power does not have to create a democratic 
constitutional order, it is not sufficient to focus a discussion on democracy on 
constituent power. It is imperative that constituent power and the constituted 
powers it creates are treated separately.  
 
The scope of the power, whether it expires and what it can reappear to do, has 
implications for the relationship between constituent power and democracy. To 
understand the relationship between constituent power and democracy, there 
needs to be further reflection on the scope of that power. To what extent is 
constituent power absorbed into the constituted power is an important question. 
                                                          
88 See Kalyvas (n 66) 236. 
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Whilst some argue that constituent power is exhausted in the constituent 
moment,94 others argue that it lies latent, and can reappear.95  
 
Loughlin refers to Lawson to suggest that the constituent power can ‘reappear’ 
as the ‘the power to constitute, abolish, alter, [and] reform forms of government’.96 
The meaning of alter and reform here needs unpacking. Constitutions provide 
rules for amendments, following these rules is a power granted under the 
constitution. As nothing is above constituent power, constituent power stands 
outside the constitution, so following amendment procedures is not an expression 
of constituent power.97 Constituent power amends the constitutional order without 
conforming to rules in the constitution.98 Constituent power plays a role in 
constitutional amendment, but only those radical changes that are not provided 
for in the constitution. Following amendments procedures are powers commonly 
afforded by the constitution to the demos, alongside elections and voting. 
Treating constituent power as outside the constitution, in the first instance, 
demonstrates its radical nature and how it differs from the powers traditionally 
associated with processes in a democracy. 
 
Sieyès was clear about the scope of the power and he constructs a differentiation 
between constituent power and constituted power. For him, constituent power 
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Foundations of Public Law (OUP 2010) 3 fn 7.  
97 Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (CUP 
2012) 310. Cf Griffin argues that in the American tradition, amendments to the constitution under 
Article V are an expression of constituent power. Griffin (n 72) 50.  
98 Pettit, On the People’s Terms (n 97) 310. 
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and the legislative processes should be treated differently.99 In France, the 
Constituent Assembly made laws before they dealt with writing a constitution, this 
meant that the distinction between constituent and constituted power 
collapsed.100 If all laws are made by a constituent power, then the distinction 
between constitutional and ordinary law is lost.  
 
Ignoring the difference between constituent power and constituted power has 
negative consequences for democracy. For example, in England constituent and 
constituted power was conflated. Once constituent power moved from the King 
to the people, the representatives assumed this power and acted on behalf of the 
people, not to create an order but to govern that order.101 Relying on the idea that 
they represented the will of the people, there was little need to revert questions 
to the people. Here the role of democracy in keeping check on the constituted 
power is overlooked. If, as the relationalist approach argues, constituent power 
is in a dialectical relationship with constituted power, then the clear-cut divide 
between the two is lost. Whilst the irritative function of the constituent power in 
this relationalist approach is attractive as it ensures that constituted powers are 
accountable to constituent power holders. It can also mean that democratic 
processes established in a constitution to hold to account constituted powers are 
replaced with a non-democratic exercise of constituent power. Thus, in the first 
instance, the constituent and constituted power should not be conflated but 
treated separately.  
 
                                                          
99 In What is the Third Estate, Sieyès draws a distinction between the Constituent Assembly and 
the National Assembly. For Sieyès, the powers of these powers are distinct. Sieyès, ‘What is the 
Third Estate’ (n 83) 139 and 143. 
100 Jaume (n 72) 69. 
101 See Loughlin, ‘Constituent Power Subverted (n 72) 33. 
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The section outlined a number of ideas, such as the extent of constituent power, 
applicable limitations on the power, and its relationship with democracy. It 
demonstrates that a relationship between constituent power and democracy 
cannot be assumed. The identity of the constituent power holders, how it is 
exercised, and the scope of the power was not always addressed through 
democracy. Who holds constituent power has not traditionally been answered 
using democracy. Sieyès’s reliance on the nation, or ‘The People’ is a symbolic 
construct, not linked to the multitude of persons. The role of representation in how 
constituent power is exercised, means that traditionally people have little 
influence over the content of a constitutional agreement. There are calls in the 
scholarship to democratise constituent power, so that it is exercised through 
democratic processes.102 The relationship between constituent power and 
democracy is further complicated by considering the relationship between 
constituent and constituted power. Within global constitutionalist literature, it is 
imperative that the relationship between constituent power, constituted power, 
and democracy is unpacked albeit just as in the domestic debates conclusive 
answers will inevitably remain elusive, the debate remains necessary. 
 
The complexity of constituent power and democracy is one aspect of the 
constitutionalism and democracy debate, and assuming a complementary 
relationship sidesteps the ways in which constitutionalism modifies democracy. 
Although constitutional democracy suggests a harmonious marriage between 
constitutionalism and democracy, this cannot be presumed. The complexity 
around how constitutionalism and democracy intersect and interact must be 
considered in the global constitutionalist literature to identify the modifications to 
                                                          
102 Roznai, ‘We the Limited People’ (n 64) 15. 
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democracy. The next part offers a partial starting premise by setting out the terms 
of the Circumstances of Democracy, and each Circumstance evidences the ways 
constitutionalism and democracy intersect and the critical need to engage with 
them to understand constitutionalism at the global level. 
 
2.3 The Circumstances of Democracy  
 
Searching for a definition of democracy often generates models and labels. 
Models such as representative, deliberative and participatory democracy are 
pitted against one another. Another popular trope is to label democracy as thick 
(meaning the inclusion of substantive rights) and thin (which invokes a mere 
procedural account of democracy).103 Yet, as noted above there are heated 
debates on the meaning of equality and freedom and the role of human rights, 
which makes ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ or ‘procedural’ and ‘substantial’ labels often overly 
simplistic.104 These prevailing tropes are unhelpful; rather than relying on labels, 
these tropes should be deconstructed to unpack what they say about people and 
power. This thesis adopts the Circumstances of Democracy as a matrix that 
functions to both deconstruct the meaning of democracy and then to facilitate a 
discussion of democracy in different contexts including global governance. 
 
The Circumstances are a series of situational questions that construct a 
narrative.105 Common questions are: Who, What, When, Where, and How. The 
                                                          
103 See, Dahl, On Democracy (n 26) 48; Colón-Ríos (n 47) 41. Cf For Bellamy and Castiglione, 
thick democracy means the ‘intrinsic promotion of a supposed common good’ and thin democracy 
means the ‘instrumental protection of individual rights and interests’. Bellamy and Castiglione, 
‘Three Models of Democracy’ (n 47) 208. 
104 See above, text at fn 25-27. 
105 Natalie A Markman, ‘Bringing Journalism Pedagogy into the Legal Writing Class’ (1993) 43(4) 
Journal of Legal Education 551. 
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Circumstances, as a tool of rhetoric, are often associated with emotions and 
persuasion,106 and within law, they are used to construct proof in legal trials,107 
making them potentially unhelpful as a method for analysing legal scholarship. 
However, the Circumstances are not just a tool of legal argument,108 and Leff 
gives the Circumstances a broader role. For him, they are a method of ancient 
philosophical argument, used to ‘mark out the boundaries of rhetorical subject 
matter’ or, in other words, demarcate a topic.109  
 
Rhetoric, broadly construed, is a form of argumentation that is concerned with 
specific situations.110 Leff contrasts this with dialectical argumentation, which is 
concerned with abstract concepts.111 Within rhetoric, the Circumstances play a 
key role in providing the situational and contextual nature of rhetorical 
arguments.112 The Who, What, When, Where and How are used to generate the 
material for argument, this material is then subjected to the processes of 
inference, induction and deduction.113 Leff argues that the Circumstances are 
used to ‘locate argumentative bits’ that are relevant to an issue.114 Whilst Cicero 
referred to a legal case,115 ‘issue’ can also mean something which is in dispute 
                                                          
106 Michael Carter, ‘Stasis and kairos: Principles of social construction in classical rhetoric’ (1988) 
7(1) Rhetoric Review 97, 99-101; Lorna Hutson, ‘Rhetoric and Law’ in Michael J MacDonald (ed), 
The Oxford Handbook of Rhetorical Studies (OUP 2017) 399. 
107M T Cicero, De inventione (H M Hubbell trans, Harvard University Press 1949) 1.34-43; Michael 
Leff, ‘Commonplaces and Argumentation in Cicero and Quintilian’ (1996) 10 Argumentation 445; 
Lorna Hutson, Circumstantial Shakespeare (OUP 2015) 5. 
108 Kathy Eden, ‘Forensic Rhetoric and Humanist Education’ in Lorna Hutson (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook of English Law and Literature 1500-1700 (OUP 2017) 28. 
109 Michael C Leff, ‘The Topics of Argumentative Invention in Latin Rhetorical Theory from Cicero 
to Boethius’ (1983) 1(1) Rhetoric: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 23, 29. 
110 ibid 23-25; Michael Leff, ‘Rhetoric and Dialectic in the Twenty-First Century’ (2000) 14 
Argumentation 241, 243. 
111 Leff, ‘The Topics of Argumentative Invention in Latin Rhetorical Theory from Cicero to 
Boethius’ (n 109) 23-25. 
112 Carter, ‘Stasis and kairos’ (n 106) 99-10. 
113 Leff, ‘The Topics of Argumentative Invention in Latin Rhetorical Theory from Cicero to 
Boethius’ (n 109) 29. 
114 Leff, ‘Commonplaces and Argumentation in Cicero and Quintilian’ (n 107) 446. 
115 Cicero, De inventione (n 107) 1.34-43; Leff, ‘Commonplaces and Argumentation in Cicero and 
Quintilian’ (n 107) 445. 
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or something which does not have a single meaning.116 Democracy is a disputed 
term,117 making it suitable to subject to the Circumstances.  
 
Leff tracks the development of the Circumstances from Cicero, to Hermagoras, 
through to Quintilian and then their use in the Middle Ages.118 His commentary 
on this rhetorical method identifies two trends; the complex relationship between 
rhetoric and dialectical argument, and how certain Circumstances move in and 
out of fashion. These trends have ramifications for the use of the Circumstances 
within this thesis. Leff shows how Cicero sought to unify dialectical argument and 
rhetoric, by removing the Circumstances from his later works, Topica and De 
oratore.119 Focused on contextualisation, the Circumstances sit uneasily with 
dialectical argument, which is concerned with abstract ideas and 
generalisations.120 This thesis, in relying on the Circumstances, is grounded in 
rhetoric rather than dialectic reasoning. This means that it cannot then offer 
general theories of democracy, however democracy is contextualised, and it is 
through these situational questions that the debates on democracy are 
deconstructed. 
 
Comparing Cicero’s early approach to rhetoric with the work of scholars in the 
Middle Ages, Leff shows how in the Middle Ages, there is a shift away from 
focusing on the subject, towards focusing on the performance of the act.121 This 
thesis reverses this shift and gives the Who question prominence as it seeks to 
                                                          
116 Leff, ‘The Topics of Argumentative Invention in Latin Rhetorical Theory from Cicero to 
Boethius’ (n 109) 23. 
117 See Gallie (n 2) 168. 
118 Leff, ‘The Topics of Argumentative Invention in Latin Rhetorical Theory from Cicero to 
Boethius’ (n 109) 23. 
119 ibid 30. 
120 Leff, ‘Commonplaces and Argumentation in Cicero and Quintilian’ (n 107) 450. 
121 Leff, ‘The Topics of Argumentative Invention in Latin Rhetorical Theory from Cicero to 
Boethius’ (n 109) 36. See also, Hutson, ‘Rhetoric and Law’ (n 106) 398. 
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interrogate the global constitutionalist approach to demos as well as associated 
questions to do with the people. Leff also highlights how focusing on the 
performance of an act places more emphasis on the When as it divides it into 
multiple questions of time and occasion.122 The flexible use of the Circumstances 
makes them useful for exploring where the international legal and global 
constitutional scholarship places emphasis and how that scholarship discusses 
democracy. 
 
These Circumstances do not presuppose an answer, but rather act as 
investigatory prompts. For Carter, the Circumstances are part of a broader 
tradition within rhetoric that is concerned with arguments and disagreements.123 
This means that they can accommodate the complex debates within democratic 
theory, such as the relationship between the individual and the community, the 
role of the state in demarcating the demos, and the relationship between 
constituent power, popular sovereignty, and democratic decision-making.  
 
There are two alternative approaches to discussing democracy that could have 
been exploited within this thesis; an analytical (or models) method and a 
conceptual approach. The strengths and weaknesses of each of these and their 
role within this debate are elaborated upon below, but it is important to remember 
that to explore how global constitutionalist literature currently discusses 
democracy, this thesis requires a method that promotes investigation into the 
approach within global constitutionalist literature to fundamental aspects of 
democracy. 
                                                          
122 Leff, ‘The Topics of Argumentative Invention in Latin Rhetorical Theory from Cicero to 
Boethius’ (n 109) 27-28 and 32. 
123 Carter, ‘Stasis and kairos’ (n 106) 99. 
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Scholars compete to present the best model for democracy.124 The models are 
differentiated in relation to the types of institutions they discuss, the types of 
processes they emphasise, and the weight attached to certain values.125 In 
Models of Democracy, Held outlines different models of democracy and 
investigates their unique characteristics. He adopts a historical approach to show 
how democracy varies across different political contexts. Held’s historical 
approach has value because in discussing the different models he highlights the 
limitations with respect to enfranchisement, noting in particular the exclusion of 
women. Held asks foundational questions about the meaning of rule and people, 
and seeks out areas of disagreement between the models.126 He also explains 
how normative ideals (whether freedom or equality) are interpreted into 
institutional arrangements, which is useful for shifting thinking towards the values 
rather than conceiving of certain processes as fundamental to democracy. 
 
The value of the models’ approach is that it demonstrates the various forms 
democracy can take and the different institutional arrangements.127 For instance, 
in this thesis, a particular model could have been adopted and its characteristics 
could have been used to structure democracy in global constitutionalism. But, this 
would not have addressed the research question, which asks how global 
constitutionalists discuss democracy and thus requires a methodology that is not 
tied to particular models of democracy.  
 
                                                          
124 See for example, Jürgen Habermas, ‘Three Normative Models of Democracy’ (1994) 1(1) 
Constellations 1; Bellamy and Castiglione, ‘Three Models of Democracy’ (n 47) 206. 
125 See David Held, Models of Democracy (3rd edn, Polity Press 2006). 
126 ibid 1-2. 
127 Michael Farrelly, Discourse and Democracy: Critical Analysis of the Language of Government 
(Routledge 2014) 13. 
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One of the limitations of the models’ approach is the shifting labels and 
preferences. Within this analytical approach, models can move in and out of 
fashion. Which models Held focuses on changes across editions of this pivotal 
text. In the first edition there are nine different models of democracy: classical 
democracy, protective democracy, developmental democracy, direct democracy, 
competitive democracy, pluralism, legal democracy, and his model of ‘democratic 
autonomy’.128 Other commonplace models are liberal democracy and deliberative 
democracy, which Held explicitly investigates in the third edition of his book.129 
How these models are labelled is subject to individual preference, as Held notes 
that these models could fit into broader ‘categories’ of participatory or 
representative democracy.130 The plethora of models is suggestive of a desire to 
categorise and label systems as democratic. Their interchangeability is evidence 
of the futility of relying on a models’ approach to construct a means of democracy. 
 
Furthermore, whilst a model’s approach facilitates a comparison between 
models, it can neglect the differences of opinion within a model. For example, it 
would be difficult to encompass the competing theories of liberalism within a 
liberal model of democracy as liberal democracy is not necessarily 
homogenous.131 Furthermore, the different models are process-based, which 
means this approach can disregard the disagreement on other aspects of 
                                                          
128 David Held, Models of Democracy (Polity Press 1988). NB that liberal democracy does not 
appear in this 1st edition, a reminder that the so-called victory of liberal democracy, in which the 
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131 See Jane Arscott, ‘Review: Models of Democracy, David Held (Stanford: Stanford University 
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democracy. What is needed is a focus on the core aspects of democracy, or the 
foundational questions.  
 
Alternatively, conceptual analysis could be used. Conceptual analysis offers an 
explanation of a term and it can be used to find a set of common criteria that 
characterise that term.132 This form of analysis can be used to ‘distinguish 
between those forms of government that are democratic and those that are 
not’.133 List and Valentini break-down conceptual analysis into; ‘domain of 
application’, ‘defining conditions’ and ‘extension’.134 The ‘domain of application’ 
refers to an object which can be said to fall within a concept or not.135 In relation 
to democracy, List and Valentini argue that the domain would be ‘systems of 
government or decision-making’, for these can be said to be democratic or not.136 
The ‘defining conditions’ are criteria that determine whether the object falls within 
the concept and the ‘extension’ refers to those things that satisfy the criteria. In 
relation to democracy, List and Valentini state ‘[t]he extension of the concept 
democracy is the set of all those systems of government or decision-making that, 
according to the concept, count as democratic’.137 Conceptual analysis is useful 
for the way it deconstructs the concept into component parts. The use of domain, 
conditions and extensions could be used as a starting point in the thesis. 
Furthermore, List and Valentini show that the domain of application, defining 
                                                          
132 James L Hyland, Democratic Theory: The Philosophical Foundations (Manchester University 
Press 1995) 38; David Collier, Jody LaPorte and Jason Seawright, ‘Typologies: Forming 
Concepts and Creating Categorical Variables’ in Janet M Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E Brady and 
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conditions and extension are contested,138 which facilitates a discussion on 
competing approaches to democracy.  
 
The limitation of this approach is that it does not provide a working definition of 
the concept. The conceptual analysis does not say what would accord with the 
concept of democracy, rather scholars can construct their own defining 
conditions. Furthermore, the utility of conceptual analysis lies in categorising 
things as democratic or not.139 This thesis investigates how a scholarship 
discusses democracy, rather than how the scholarship categorises governance 
structures. As such, the defining conditions would need to be broken down into 
key aspects.  
 
To explore how global constitutionalist scholarship discusses democracy, this 
thesis requires a methodology that asks fundamental questions. The inquiry is 
not restricted to one model of democracy, and so the methodology needs to 
facilitate an exploration of different approaches to democracy. The next part 
demonstrates how the Circumstances of Democracy matrix is used within this 
thesis to build a set of questions with which to analyse global constitutionalist 
literature.  
 
2.3.1 How the Circumstances of Democracy Work 
 
Within this thesis, the Circumstances (the Who, What, When, Where and How) 
work as an analytical tool to break down component parts of a topic or narrative, 
                                                          
138 ibid 531. 
139 Hyland, Democratic Theory (n 132) 39; Collier et al., (n 132) 157. 
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and then they interrelate to reconstruct the topic or narrative. This dual function 
of deconstruction and reconstruction is useful to investigate the components of 
democracy. Who discusses the requisite demos and the role of the individual 
within it. What reflects on the extent of the power of the people. When considers 
whether democracy is required at constitutional moments and everyday 
governance. Where can refer to the levels of governance at which democracy 
should be present, which is a question raised by the global constitutionalist 
debate, but more pertinent questions are the role of institutions and the 
public/private divide. The How within this matrix has two functions; firstly, it 
analyses the types of processes the scholarship uses, and secondly, it facilitates 
a discussion on the interrelationship of the Circumstances of Democracy.  
 
The propositions posed within each Circumstance are complex, as how 
democracy is manifested changes over time and across different theoretical 
perspectives. Selection of public officials by lot, the regular rotation of persons in 
office and the direct democracy of Ancient Athens can be contrasted with the 
parliamentary buildings and elections of liberal democracy.140 There was a shift 
towards representation rather than participatory democracy141 and a shift away 
from majoritarianism towards a concern for the protection of rights.142 These 
different approaches to democracy will garner mixed responses to the 
Circumstances.  
 
                                                          
140 George Tridimas, ‘Constitutional choice in ancient Athens: the rationality of selection to office 
by lot’ (2012) 23 Constitutional Political Economy 1, 1. 
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Deriving the meaning of the Circumstances of Democracy is done through an 
investigation of historical examples and theories of democracy. One response to 
these shifts in the approach to democracy is to argue that past conceptualisations 
of democracy were not really democracy at all. Scholars have criticised Athenian 
democracy because it excluded certain groups in society and did not have an 
understanding of the civil and political rights seen in modern liberal 
democracies.143 It is also arguable, that the form of representative democracy 
that is most common today, to the Ancient Athenian would have looked more like 
an ‘elective oligarchy’.144 Whilst some historians have favourably compared 
Ancient and modern democracy, others question whether comparisons can be 
made.145 As such, these historical sources need to be unpacked. In the historical 
examples, it is often critics of democracy that are discussed. Plato and Aristotle 
both offered critiques of democracy in Ancient Athens, Madison and Rousseau 
critiqued direct democracy, and de Tocqueville wrote a critique of America’s 
democracy. Madison considered himself to be anti-democratic, if democracy 
meant direct participation of the people. He argued that direct democracy risked 
a tyranny of the majority. He offered instead a republican, representative notion, 
which can be considered a form of representative democracy.146 Another 
example is the work of Schumpeter. Often heralded as a commentator on modern 
democracy, Schumpeter offers a critique of what he termed ‘classical’ 
                                                          
143 Anthony H Birch, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy (Routledge 1993) 45. 
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democracy.147 Based on empirics, he denies the plausibility of government by the 
people in the current climate of mass populations.148 Schumpeter rejects 
participatory models of democracy, and argues that ‘[d]emocracy means only that 
the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing [representatives]’.149 So 
the Schumpeterian approach to democracy offers a restricted power for the 
people. When using these commentaries of democracy, it is imperative to 
consider the nuances around their use of the term ‘democracy’, in particular to 
reflect on what models they are referring to and what aspects of democracy are 
rejected.  
 
Within the matrix adopted for the purposes of this thesis, democracy is an 
amalgamation of all the Circumstances. Take, for example, elections. This 
democratic process is a question of How, but the investigation into why this is 
democratic must consider Who gets to participate, What power they have, When 
they have the power to vote and on what sorts of questions, and at which levels 
of governance can they elect representatives. It is not sufficient to focus on the 
question of How, and thus to prioritise processes, procedures and institutional 
reforms. These Circumstances must interrelate to facilitate a reflection on the 
scope of the power of the people at all levels of governance and decision-making.  
 
Whilst the Circumstances are interrelated, they each have an integral role, and 
cannot be conflated or substituted with one another. In discussions on 
democracy, How can easily become synonymous with democracy; discussions 
                                                          
147 For a discussion see, Shapiro and Hacker-Cordón, ‘Promises and disappointment (n 143) 4; 
David Held, Models of Democracy (3rd edn, Polity Press 2006) 141-143 and 146. 
148 Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (Allen and Unwin 1976) 284-
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revolve around the types of voting mechanisms or institutional practices.150 
Without further reflection, the question of How can neglect the question on What; 
the scope of the power of the people over decision-making. The problem with this 
sort of conflation and substitution is that the focus of discussions becomes 
skewed in favour of one or two of the Circumstances, in this instance voting 
becomes an inherent part of democracy, which can obscure the meaning of 
democracy.  
 
Modalities of democracy, such as accountability, representation and participation 
are often discussed as a means of moving away from fixed institutions and 
specific mechanisms.151 For example, Macdonald and Macdonald offer revised 
non-electoral accountability mechanisms as a means of making democracy 
transnational.152 But, accountability, as discussed below, is only a part of 
democracy.153 These modalities require an assessment against the 
Circumstances, in particular a consideration of the extent of the power being 
invoked and when that power can be exercised. Democracy requires reflection 
on who is represented, who participates and how and there are different models 
of participation and representation that offer varying degrees of power to the 
people. A discussion on accountability, representation and deliberation is 
necessary, but not sufficient for a debate on democracy. This chapter discusses 
                                                          
150 Within the global constitutionalist literature, see Anne Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ in Jan 
Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization of International Law 
(OUP 2009); Joel P Trachtman, ‘Constitutional Economics of the World Trade Organization’ in 
Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International 
Law, and Global Governance (CUP 2009).  
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(CUP 2009) 260. 
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153 See below, section 2.4.1 
 
80 
accountability, representation and participation as examples of How, and 
demonstrates the potential for the conflation of the Circumstances. 
 
The Circumstances of Democracy provide a matrix for exploring what democracy 
means and offers a way to discuss democracy in global constitutionalist literature. 
The use of historical examples demonstrates the different approaches that are 
taken to democracy and the tensions that arise between constitutionalism and 
democracy, and within democracy itself. The next part of this chapter fleshes out 
the content of each Circumstance to identify the types of questions and issues 
global constitutionalist scholarship should engage with when discussing 
democracy.  
 
2.3.2 Who 
 
Democracy, etymologically, stems from demos (the people) and kratos (rule or 
power).154 This translates to mean power of the people.155 But a study of the 
etymology shows that the meaning of ‘people’ is contested and changes over 
time.156 The conceptualisation of the demos within Ancient Greek is not the same 
as the construction of ‘The People’ in modernity.157 This section raises three 
questions; how the people is demarcated, what is meant by ‘people’, and the role 
of the people.  
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Demarcation of the people 
 
How the demos is demarcated is an important question in a world where the state 
does not contain all decision-making power. Political scholars (including 
cosmopolitan theorists) are debating non-territorial means of constructing a 
demos. Traditionally, the demos is territorially defined158 and although the 
expansion of Roman citizenship bucks this territorial trend, the 19th century 
witnessed the cementing of the relationship between demos and nation-state. 
This sub-section considers variations on the demarcation of the demos.  
 
The polis (or demos), according to Aristotle, is demarcated in relation to territory 
and population. In relation to population, Aristotle argues that a polis reaches the 
ideal size when it has the largest population which can still be self-sufficient.159 
Aristotle argues that the ideal territory should be self-sufficient, difficult to invade, 
and ‘easily taken in with one view’.160 This meant that the city-state was the ideal 
size for a territory.161 This form of Ancient Athenian democracy is predicated on 
a small and homogenous society because those were the conditions that ensured 
people were like-minded and had common interests.162 
 
In contrast, Roman citizenship was not confined to Rome. Unlike Athens, Rome 
granted foreigners full citizenship rights.163 This more flexible idea of citizenship 
                                                          
158 Wood argues that even in Ancient Greek manifestations of democracy, the deme were 
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allows for conquered peoples to be incorporated into the Roman state,164 and for 
migrants to gain citizenship by moving to Rome.165 Outside the city of Rome, 
there were citizens across Italy and in ‘citizen colonies’.166 This offers the potential 
for non-territorial means of demarcating the demos. But, there was a return to the 
idea of the city-state and the territorial tools for demarcation in the Renaissance 
period.167 
 
In America, the Founding Fathers were versed in the political theory of Ancient 
Athens and classical models of democracy, which were premised on city-states. 
Contemporaneous political thought was also premised on the smaller polis. For 
Rousseau, who discussed ‘homogenous principalities’, the citizenry is small and 
he envisages that ‘the entire population could meet in the town square’.168 In 
contrast, the Founding Fathers had to discuss democracy on a larger scale. 
Whilst Jefferson argues that the state should be small, Hamilton argued that 
provided there was a powerful centre, there could be a wider union of states.169 
Madison argued that the larger the federal state, the greater protection against 
the vices of direct democracy, by which he meant the tyranny of the majority.170 
The bigger the state, the more interests there are to avoid concentration of power 
in one faction.171  
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Despite the variations in the construction of a demos, in the 19th century, demos 
became synonymous with the nation-state. Habermas and Held argue that the 
demos and the nation developed together.172 This interconnection gives rise to 
the argument that the demos has to be bounded by the state because only the 
state constructs the level of trust and commonality within a society of people.173 
But, the interconnection between demos and nation-state should be unpacked.  
 
The argument that democracy requires a connection between the people, can be 
more or less nationalistic in nature. Miller argues that ‘for democracy to be 
possible, there must be sufficient convergence of interests and belief among the 
set of people who will constitute its domain’.174 For Mill, only nationalism ensures 
the necessary ‘fellow-feeling’.175 In other words, democracy is built around the 
need to believe that ‘others are genuinely willing to consider your own views’, 
which can be found in a shared nationality.176 Under this approach the nation is 
defined by its ethnicity.177 This means that there are pre-political characteristics, 
such as ‘commonness of origin, language, religion, [and] customs’ that bind 
people together.178 Yet, in the abstract this could also mean ‘trust and 
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reciprocity’,179 which is not necessarily reliant on nationality and geographical 
proximity. Moreover, the reliance on nation does not necessitate a territorial 
connection. Whilst a nation can be conceived as being within a ‘particular 
territory’,180 a nation does not have to be organised in a single state.181  
 
As Habermas argues, democracy is not reliant on the existence of a nation.182 In 
2003 he outlined four components for democracy: ‘political apparatus for the 
execution of collectively binding decisions’, a defined ‘self’, a citizenry ‘with an 
orientation toward the common good’, and ‘an economic and social milieu’.183 In 
2012, he outlined three components, which do not place emphasis on the 
decision-making apparatus (which is important to remember when reading 
aspects of global constitutionalist scholarship which prioritises institutional 
arrangements). The three common components are: association between free 
and equal persons, a sense of civic solidarity, and a bureaucratic organisation 
that will ensure collective action.184 Whilst the nation-state provides these, it is 
not the only formation that can support these components.  
 
In relation to the Who, Habermas argues that democracy only requires a ‘self’ 
and ‘an orientation toward the common good’.185 For Habermas, national 
consciousness is created; the nation-state has made an ‘artificial form of 
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“solidarity among strangers”’.186 As Gerstenberg argues, a requirement that the 
society has a homogenous identity will undermine democracy, if democracy 
protects the idea that citizens are free and equal.187 Furthermore, post-modern 
discussions on democracy acknowledge the role of heterogeneous groups and 
models such as conscionable democracy are designed to facilitate divided 
societies.188 The critiques of the reliance on the nation-state and the alternatives 
proffered, suggest that tying democracy to the nation-state seems to be an issue 
of coincidence rather than necessity.  
 
Though the demos is often demarcated using territorial and national claims, this 
sub-section has highlighted some of the tensions, such as size and identity, which 
arise when constructing a demos. The demarcation of a demos has preoccupied 
international legal and international relations scholars, as scholars argue there is 
little plausibility of recreating the necessary commonality witnessed within a 
nation-state.189 There are attempts to move away from the state-bound 
conceptualisation of demos. For example, scholars proffer the all-affected or all-
subjected principle as an alternative to territory and nationality.190 Rather than 
offering a means of constructing a demos for global constitutionalist scholarship, 
this thesis highlights that there are other pertinent questions around the 
construction of the demos that can get lost when the focus is on demarcation. 
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These questions include the meaning of ‘the people’ and their role. This sub-
section will now expand upon those issues.  
 
What is meant by The People? 
 
It is not clear what is meant by ‘The People’ or demos in Ancient Greek because 
the meaning of demos is ambiguous; it was used in different ways.191 For 
example, it could mean the whole of the citizenry rather than just a fragment.192 
It could also be used to mean ‘the common people’,193 and the poor.194 For 
example, Aristotle, an anti-democrat, conceptualised democracy as rule of the 
poor.195 The issue then is whether ‘The People’ refers to the whole population or 
just a segment and what criteria is used to construct the franchise.  
 
Across history, various limitations are placed on the demos. In Ancient Athens, 
the citizenry was limited to men over the age of 20, who were Athenian.196 
Repeatedly, women, people of differing ethnicities, and slaves are excluded from 
demoi.197 Across the 17th to 19th centuries, in Western states, the demos was 
constructed using property requirements.198 In essence ‘The People’, or the 
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demos, becomes a privileged elite.199 In the late 19th century and early 20th 
century, there were renewed questions about the extent of the franchise,200 with 
Mill expressing an anxiety about extending the suffrage to less educated 
members of society.201 The idea of ‘The People’ can invoke a broader franchise 
than these limitations suggest. The criteria used to exclude persons should be 
considered.  
 
There is a schism between those that see ‘a people’ and those that see ‘a 
multitude’. 17th century debates can highlight this difference. For Parker, for 
example, the people were a ‘corporation’ acting with one will and one voice.202 
Hobbes argued that there was a multitude and every man was at war with the 
other (or in other words, the state of nature),203 and the people only became a 
unified person through a representative. Hobbes states; the multitude ‘confer all 
their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may 
reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will’.204 This representative, 
then, could be a single person or a group of people. Though Hobbes thought 
power was best concentrated in one person.205 Hobbes argued that the people 
were only a people via the sovereign and there was no ‘people’ for a parliament 
to represent. Rather than referring to a conglomeration of individuals, ‘The 
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People’ is a construct, with potentially little role for actual persons. This raises the 
issue of the role of the actual people in a democracy.  
 
Role of the people 
 
Looking at how the individual is conceptualised across different manifestations of 
democracy highlights the need to ask about the relationship between the 
individual and the community. In Ancient Athens, a commitment to the common 
good was combined with an understanding of active citizenship. Citizens were 
active in the sense that they were ‘subjects of political authority and the creators 
of public rules and regulations’.206 For the Ancient Athenians, society, not the 
individual, was central.207 Human rights protections and the dominance of 
liberalism increases the prominence of the individual. The liberal democratic 
position conceptualises a passive citizen with negative rights vis-à-vis the 
state.208 The republican model of democracy imagines an active citizen, but one 
with positive liberties of political participation and communication.209 This sub-
section unpacks the role of the individual in the community. 
 
Democracy, some suggest, is dependent on the expression of a common will and 
the commitment to a common good. The common good is the aim of the 
common/general will, and it is akin to a decision which is for the benefit of the 
people as a whole. From a republican perspective, for example, decisions by the 
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people should be for the common good.210 How this common will is achieved and 
the relationship between the common will and the individual will is contested. 
 
The common/general will could be an accumulation of individual interests211 or it 
could be a constructed common will.212 For Rousseau, the common/general will 
was constructed; he argued that individuals have to put their personal interests 
aside and promote the common good.213 If in a vote, there are disagreements 
that is because, Rousseau argues, individuals have misunderstood the common 
good and common/general will.214 Whilst some argue that democracy ‘binds us 
together while allowing us to live individually’,215 others argue that the 
common/general will trumps and therefore suppresses the individual will.216 
Feminist scholars have criticised the homogenous nature of the common/general 
will and the aim of a common good.217 This lack of individuality can be criticised 
for being akin to an imposition by a political elite. 
 
Democracy and constitutionalism potentially have different roles for the people. 
As discussed above, the powers of the demos and the constituent power are 
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distinct.218 A Western liberal picture of the role of the people within a democracy 
would be of participating in elections and perhaps referenda.219 In 
constitutionalism discourse, ‘The People’ are usually understood to be the 
authority of power.220 The extent to which the people themselves hold this power 
is contested. For example, in the 17th Century the parliamentarian writer, Parker 
wrote that the people are ‘the Authors, or ends of all power’.221 Hobbes in The 
Leviathan argues that the political covenant undertaken by the multitude means 
that they become the author of what is done by the representative.222 The 
implication of this is that for the parliamentarians, the people remain above the 
king,223 but for Hobbes there is no people that could be said to be above the king 
as the people are only brought into being via the king (or sovereign entity). Whilst 
from one perspective, the people have only the power to participate in elections, 
in a constitutionalist debate this is potentially symbolic of a greater authorial 
power.  
 
Interrogating what is meant by Who in democracy, this section highlights a series 
of questions that go beyond mere demarcation of a demos. Scholars disagree on 
the type of people that fall within the demos, on the size of the demos and the 
role of people within a democracy. In particular, there is disagreement on the role 
of the individual in democracy and how the individual sits in tension with the 
community. The discussion on common/general will highlights how the role of 
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individuals can be subsumed within a role for a community. When examining how 
international law and global constitutional scholarship discusses democracy, a 
concern is with who these scholars include in the demos, and then whether there 
is a reflection on the consequences of how they demarcate the demos and the 
role given to the people. Through the Circumstances matrix, the thesis exposes 
where certain questions need further attention within the global constitutionalist 
debates.  
 
2.3.3 What 
 
If What is a question about the scope of democracy, then it could consider 
whether democracy is a way of life224 or merely a decision-making process. For 
Athenians, democracy was both a way of life and a decision-making process. 
Pericles, in the Funeral Speech, conceives of democracy as making decisions 
but also about being a way of life where ‘each individual is interested not only in 
his own affairs but in the affairs of the state as well’.225 Similarly, de Tocqueville, 
talking of American democracy, speaks of both a decision-making process and a 
way of life.226 As, Runciman, puts it, democracy is ‘a way of doing politics’, ‘a set 
of political and moral principles’ as well as ‘a way of living altogether’.227 To speak 
of democracy as a way of life requires the democratisation of more than just 
decision-making process. As the Levellers in 17th century England noted, it 
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requires a call for social as well as political equality.228 This thesis considers, 
however, the global constitutionalist approach to democracy as a process of 
decision-making and system of governance and What becomes a question of the 
scope of power.  
 
Kratos in democracy is etymologically ambiguous. It can be taken to mean 
‘power’ or ‘rule’.229 Using the term ‘rule’ as a meaning of democracy is disputed 
because only ‘a small minority of individuals can be rulers in modern, populous 
societies’.230 If kratos means power, what the people have power over and what 
they have power to do is contested. Within democratic theory, there is a debate 
about whether democracy is ‘self-government and self-regulation’ or ‘a means of 
conferring authority’ on others.231 In other words, democracy can mean that 
people make the decisions, but it can also mean they choose representatives to 
make decisions. This section explores the disagreement that arises as to the 
extent of the people’s power. It considers popular sovereignty, the types of 
decisions people have the power to make, and the extent to which people can 
influence the agenda.  
 
Popular Sovereignty  
 
How much power the people should have within a democracy is a point of 
contention within democratic theory and political debate. Too much power and 
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there is a risk of a ‘tyranny of the majority’, too little power and the democracy is 
a sham. The What of democracy might be conceived as a spectrum. If the ability 
to construct the political system and make policy decisions is at one end of the 
spectrum and then somewhere along that spectrum there is participation in 
decision-making and policy-making, then accountability understood as an ex post 
facto event, is at the end of the spectrum, as the people only have the power to 
remove representatives. Participation and accountability are discussed in more 
detail below,232 this sub-section unpacks popular sovereignty.  
 
Whether popular sovereignty is related to democracy is debated,233 but there are 
similarities between the two concepts, namely the idea of giving power to the 
people, and democracy is discussed in relation to popular sovereignty.234 As 
noted, popular sovereignty can be invoked without reflecting on what power this 
means for the people.235 Asking the What question, ensures that the notion that 
the people have power within a democracy is brought to the fore. 
 
Popular sovereignty at its core means that the people (rather than God or a 
monarch) are sovereign. But, how it is manifested within political systems leads 
to competing ideas of what popular sovereignty means. Arguably, popular 
sovereignty can refer to the idea that people govern themselves.236 Post argues 
that popular sovereignty refers to the ultimate power over the government.237 
Understood in this way, popular sovereignty invokes a great amount of power for 
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the people. Yet, it can also be a symbolic totem, or in other words, the political 
system is built on the idea of the people as sovereign but the people are so far 
removed from decision-making, that they cannot exercise that sovereignty.238 In 
these cases, popular sovereignty acts as a mild threat to decision-makers that 
they are accountable to the people.  
 
As outlined previously, popular sovereignty can become tied to the idea of the 
creation of the constitution or political system, and thus divorced from everyday 
governance.239 Whilst Kalyvas argues that popular sovereignty is the greatest 
manifestation of democracy, because the people get to write the fundamental 
laws that govern them, it is also only an aspect of democracy.240 Popular 
sovereignty conceived as a constitutional-making power ignores the need for the 
people to have power over decisions of policy and law-making. The difference 
between constitutional and everyday decisions is discussed in the When section 
below.241 Understanding popular sovereignty as limited to constitutional 
decisions, limits the amount of power the people have. This thus demonstrates 
that the What and When questions are interconnected and it is an example of 
why both questions must be asked.  
 
Whilst it invokes the idea that the people are sovereign, which can mean that they 
construct the system, they make the decisions, and they ultimately wield 
power,242 popular sovereignty is used in the literature to mean something less 
than this. Ideas of popular sovereignty reappear within the global constitutionalist 
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discussions, and future chapters explore this usage. The contested nature of 
popular sovereignty is why asking the What question, and understanding how the 
manifestation of popular sovereignty within theoretical debates changes, is 
important.  
 
Types of Decisions  
 
The extent of the power of the people can be determined by the types of decisions 
people get to make. People within a representative democracy can elect 
representatives. But, in single-party elections voters are not given a choice. 
Whilst in multi-party elections there is a choice, these elections can be criticised 
for the limitation on the choice of the voter, as voters are selecting manifestos or 
parties rather than expressing their will on a government policy. A distinction 
should be drawn between elections and voting, as voting allows persons to 
decide particular policies. In some cases, and in direct democracies, people can 
choose policies through a plebiscite or referenda. Democracy can be used to 
label all these different decision-making processes, crucially asking the What 
question exposes how this influences the people’s power.  
 
Historical examples show how the scope of decision-making changes. For 
Rousseau, the people only get to decide whether a decision meets the 
expectations of the general will.243 As noted above, the individual will is subsumed 
within a general will geared towards a common good.244 The decision to be made, 
within Rousseau’s concept of democracy, is whether a decision furthers the 
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common good. This is not an extensive role in decision-making. From the late 
19th century, with the rise of mass society, the power of the people to make 
decisions is increasingly limited. For Schumpeter, contemporary democracy is an 
act of competition, in which people compete for the vote.245 In essence, the 
people within a democracy do not have power over decision-making, rather they 
get to make only a choice between political parties. But, Schumpeter’s reflections 
on democracy should be read as a comment on modern politics.246 Whilst it is the 
case that persons can only make choices between political parties, this is not 
necessarily sufficient for democracy. For the purposes of this thesis, the What 
aspect of the Circumstances matrix includes a reflection on the types of decisions 
people get to make. Increasing the range of decisions people have power over, 
increases the scope of the power of the people.  
 
Agenda 
 
Whether the people have power over the agenda is contested. Within Ancient 
Athenian democracy, the Council of 500 operated as the agenda-setter and thus 
decision-making was limited by that agenda. Within a liberal democratic model, 
the people might choose a manifesto and can ask their representative to raise 
issues, but Shapiro and Hacker-Cordón argue that ‘[v]oters do little, even, to set 
political agendas’.247 Dahl argues that ‘[t]he demos must have the exclusive 
opportunity to decide how matters are to be placed on the agenda of matters that 
are to be decided by means of the democratic process.’248 For Dahl, if democracy 
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is to be about self-government, then it is not sufficient that the people only get to 
choose a manifesto presented by a party. Giving the people power over the 
agenda, extends the scope of democracy. The What question asks about the 
agenda as this is a pertinent question for the global constitutionalist literature, 
especially given the limited spaces for the participation of people and their 
representatives in global decision-making. 
 
When considering the meaning of democracy, a question to ask is the extent of 
the power of the people and the sorts of decisions the people have power over. 
Some scholars will limit this to the choice of representatives, some assert the 
choice of policies, and others argue that democracy stretches to constitutional 
decisions. Arguments on democracy can span the idea that the people are 
sovereign, to the participation in decision-making (whether this be extensive or 
not) and to mere accountability of decision-making, so it is imperative that the 
amount of power being discussed is established.  
 
2.3.4 When 
 
How often the people are given the power to elect representatives is a point of 
contention within the scholarship249 and there are disputes on how frequently the 
people should be consulted. This section illustrates how a frequency question is 
intimately linked to the question of power. But, for the purposes of this thesis, 
When is not just a question of frequency, it also invokes a discussion on whether 
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democracy is located in legislative practices or also in constitution-making. These 
different moments can be labelled constitutional decisions and everyday 
governance. The When of democracy is connected to the What, because when 
the people have power and how frequently they have that power is a determining 
factor in the scope of their power. This section first discusses the question of 
frequency and then it elaborates on the distinction between constitutional 
decision-making and everyday governance.  
 
Frequency 
 
As the election approaches, intrigue becomes more active, agitation more 
lively and more widespread. […] As soon as fortune has pronounced, it is 
true, this ardour is dissipated, everything becomes calm, and the river, one 
moment overflowed, returns peacefully to its bed. But should one not be 
astonished that the storm could have arisen? 250 
   
(Alexis de Tocqueville) 
 
In this quote, de Tocqueville describes the excitement around the election and 
then the normality that seems to resume after an election. In this passage, he 
sums up an ongoing debate in democratic theory, about when the people have 
power. One of the criticisms of representative democracy is that people only have 
power at election time (and even then, a limited power to choose a decision-
maker or a manifesto). In contrast, in the Athenian model of democracy, the 
people had a continuous participation in decision-making. There were on average 
40 open meetings a year where 6,000 people would congregate to make 
decisions.251 This sense of frequent participation, which is a feature of more direct 
models of democracy, is contrasted with the infrequent participation of people in 
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the representative model of decision-making, where elections take place between 
4-6 years on average.252  
 
The infrequency of elections causes scholars to reflect on the scope of the power 
that people have within democracy. Some argue that elections are a fixed event 
in time and that it is only at that point the people have power. For Schumpeter, 
once electors have cast their vote, they ‘refrain’ from political activity.253 Others 
have noted the lasting impact of the election and the role of the threat of future 
elections. Beetham argues that ‘elections exert an effect well beyond the time 
when they are actually taking place’ because the decision-makers have to stay 
responsive to the will of their constituents.254 Asking the When question offers an 
opportunity to reflect on how much power people wield if their participation in 
elections or other decision-making is too infrequent.  
 
Discussions in the Federalist Papers on when elections should take place are a 
good example of the When and the What of democracy coming together. In Letter 
No 52 of the Federalist Papers, Madison argues that frequent elections are 
necessary to ensure a connection between people and representatives.255 The 
more frequent the elections, the more influence the people have over their 
representatives. However, for him the concern is that frequent elections might 
undermine the liberties of the people because elections can bring about too much 
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change.256 In an attempt to strike a balance, Madison argues for biennial 
elections.257 This lengthy debate, which runs across two letters, concerns a 
balance between giving people influence and restricting that influence so as to 
tame the ‘danger’ of democracy.258 This debate in The Federalist Papers shows 
how the When and What of democracy interconnect.  
 
Constitutional vs Everyday  
 
A crucial temporal dimension that should be highlighted is the distinction between 
everyday decision-making and the constitutional moment or the formation of the 
constitutional system. Cólon-Ríos draws a distinction between everyday 
decision-making (which he calls democratic governance) and ‘democracy at the 
level of fundamental laws’.259 Democratic governance in the everyday is about 
‘the adoption of ordinary laws and the administration of a state’s bureaucratic 
apparatus’.260 The Fundamental Law idea refers to ‘mechanisms of constitution-
(re)making’.261 As the discussions on the relationship between constitutionalism 
and democracy, and on the meaning of popular sovereignty, illustrate there is 
disagreement as to whether democracy is to be located within constitutional 
decision-making or just everyday governance.262  
 
                                                          
256 James Madison, ‘Letter No LIII: The Same Subject Continued with a view of the term of the 
service of the members’ in Isaac Kramnick (ed), James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John 
Jay: The Federalist Papers (Penguin 1987) 328. 
257 ibid 331. 
258 ibid 328. 
259 Colón-Ríos (n 47) 6. 
260 ibid 35. 
261 ibid 6. 
262 See Chapter 1, section 1.5.1. 
 
101 
The meaning of constitutional decisions requires further unpacking. There is the 
act of writing the constitution and the act of amending the constitution.263 The 
When of democracy in writing the constitution, refers to scholarly debates as to 
whether democracy has a function in such decision-making. Some argue there 
should be sufficient participation in the creation or adoption of a constitution.264 
In contrast, liberal constitutionalism is less concerned with how the constitution 
was written. For Dworkin, this is because the concern is with the content of the 
constitution and not with the process by which the constitution is written.265 
Dyzenhaus argues that liberal constitutionalism ‘grounds justification [of the 
constitutional system] in rightness itself’, rather than in the will of the people,266 
and as such, the process of adopting a constitution does not have to be 
democratic.267 These varied positions on the function of democracy within 
constitution-making shows that there is a disagreement as to the When of 
democracy.  
 
Constitutional amendments are another moment where people can have power. 
The extent to which the people should have the power to make amendments 
preoccupies constitutional theorists, especially those concerned with written 
                                                          
263 ‘Constitutional decision’ can also include the act of interpreting the constitution and 
adjudicating on decisions that invoke the fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution. 
264 See, Kalyvas (n 66) 237; Kay (n 28) 715; Waldron, ‘Constitutionalism: A Skeptical View’ (n 32). 
Cf Sajó, Limiting Government (n 29) 19.  
265 Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (Princeton 
University Press 2006) 131. See also, Colón-Ríos (n 47) 43 
266 Dyzenhaus argues that liberal political theory used to be ‘consent-based’, but this was 
‘hypothetical’ consent (it was the argument that the reasonable person would have consented). 
He argues that modern liberal political theory denies the role of consent. See, David Dyzenhaus, 
‘Consent, Legitimacy and the Foundation of Political and Legal Authority’ in Jeremy H A Webber 
and Colin Murray Macleod (eds), Between Consenting Peoples: Political Community and the 
Meaning of Consent (UBC Press 2010) 166. 
267 See Frank I Michelman, ‘Constitutional Authorship’ in Larry Alexander (ed), Constitutionalism: 
Philosophical Foundations (CUP 1998) 86. 
 
102 
constitutions. Taking the American constitution as an example,268 fault-lines are 
drawn between the Jefferson position and the Madison position.269 Jefferson 
promoted periodical constitutional conventions that would allow for constitutional 
change.270 Madison argued that constitutional questions should not be frequently 
opened to the people as this threatens stability.271 Whilst this is resolved in 
constitutions through procedures for constitutional amendments, it opens up a 
broader question as to whether democracy requires space for amendment to the 
constitution. The When of democracy asks if the people have the power to amend 
as well as create new constitutions.  
 
There is disagreement amongst scholars as to When democracy should be 
present. Republican constitutionalism envisages democracy at both the point of 
constitutional politics and everyday decision-making.272 For the republicans, 
democratic sovereignty cannot withstand a separation between constitutional 
authority and everyday as ‘judgments of the presenting sovereign’s title to rule 
[…] and judgments of the rightness of the pretender’s constitutional-legislative 
acts’ require democracy.273 In contrast, liberal constitutionalism constructs a 
divide between constitutional politics and everyday politics; whilst everyday 
politics might be subjected to a democratic process, the constitutional questions 
(i.e. questions of fundamental rights) are not subject to democratic debate. Such 
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a distinction illustrates the importance of asking the When question, because it 
changes how much power the people have and when they can use it.  
 
The difference between constitutional decisions and everyday governance was 
elaborated upon above in the discussion on constituent power and its relationship 
with democracy.274 As was demonstrated above, Sieyès draws a distinction 
between the everyday and the constitutional moment because they are different 
types of decisions using distinct powers.275 This distinction is eroded through the 
relational conceptualisation of constituent power, which envisages an ongoing 
construction of the relationship between constituent and constituted power.276 
The danger of conflating the two is that it overlooks the distinct powers between 
constituting a system and participating within that system.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, When refers to two issues: the frequency with 
which the people have power, and whether that power is utilised for constitutional 
decision-making or within everyday governance. The distinction between 
everyday governance and constitutional decision-making is pertinent given the 
relationship between constitutionalism and democracy. For example, focusing on 
constituent power can shift the debate towards constitutional decisions, at the 
expense of the everyday.  
 
2.3.5 Where 
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The Where of democracy can be a question of scale. For example, there are 
debates within domestic politics as to whether to locate democracy closer to the 
people through local government or devolution. Global constitutionalist literature 
already engages in a scale debate with respect to democracy,277 though there is 
a lack of consistency within this literature as to where democracy should be 
located. Where also covers the types of institutions debated. Focus on particular 
institutions can restrict democracy to particular types of decision-making. This 
section discusses the approaches to institutions found in democratic theory to 
identify the sorts of debates that should be taking place in the global 
constitutionalist literature. Moreover, Where for the purposes of this thesis refers 
to the public/private divide. This divide is pertinent given the attempt by societal 
constitutionalism to dismantle the distinction between the public and the 
private.278 The public/private divide is outlined here to show how it can place 
restrictions on democracy. This section first considers the question of scale, then 
it discusses the types of institutions used in democratic theory, and then the 
implications for democracy of the public/private divide are outlined. 
 
Scale  
 
The scale aspect of the Where of democracy refers to the different levels of 
governance. Scholars demarcate levels of governance, such as the local, 
domestic, regional, international, and global.279 Whilst cosmopolitan scholars 
have envisioned democracy at all levels of governance, some scholars cannot 
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conceive of democracy beyond the state.280 One of the reasons for this reticence 
is the role of the state in democracy. As discussed, debates on the demos have 
prioritised the state as a traditional site of democracy.281 These disagreements 
on whether democracy is plausible beyond the state, mean that across the global 
constitutionalist literature, democracy is envisioned at a plethora of levels of 
governance. It is then important to ask the Where question when investigating 
democracy in global constitutionalist literature to avoid potential generalisations 
about the meaning and implication of ‘global’.  
 
Institutions  
 
The Where of democracy is also a question about the types of institutions 
associated with democracy. A primary institution associated with democracy is 
an assembly. Discussions abound about the role of participatory and 
representative assemblies. Whether it is the direct participatory assemblies of the 
Ancient Athenians or the legislatures of Western liberal states, the assembly in 
its many forms is a prominent feature of democracy. Models of democracy within 
global constitutionalist literature have made use of representative and 
participatory assemblies, and so this thesis investigates how such a focus on one 
particular type of institution can shape the approach to democracy.  
 
There are two main types of assembly; the plenary assembly and the 
representative assembly. The plenary assembly allows all the citizens to come 
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together regularly. The representative assembly is an elected body. Further, 
there are two types of representative assembly: the first is statistically 
representative, which means that representatives mirror the population, and the 
second is responsively representative, where representatives represent the 
interests of the populace as a whole.282 If this is considered using the 
Circumstances of Democracy, the type of assembly influences the Who of 
democracy. The discussion on Who previously explored how the people can be 
a section of the population, the population as a whole, and how it can refer to the 
individuals or a constructed notion of the collective.283 The statistically 
representative assembly is an attempt to represent the individuals, whilst the 
responsively representative refers to a constructed collective. Thus, the Where 
impacts Who and it shows how the Circumstances are interconnected.  
 
In the literature on domestic constitutional democracies, there are often two 
assemblies discussed. The first is a constitutive assembly, which is where 
constituent power is expressed. The second is a legislature, or parliament. The 
legislature is the prominent place for everyday decisions, and it should be 
remembered that this representation is limited to the powers outlined in the 
constitution.284 This is an example of the Where and the When interconnecting. 
It is not sufficient to simply identify an assembly as an indicator of democracy, but 
rather using the Circumstances of Democracy can expose the types of decisions 
being made and when, and thus the scope of the people’s power.  
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Scholars argue that the assembly is not sufficient for democracy. Deliberative 
democratic theory and post-modern approaches to democracy relocate 
democracy to ‘the informal public sphere’.285 Within the public sphere, people 
take part in informal discussions, which have been described as ‘unorganised’ 
and ‘decentered’.286The public sphere can be a ‘sounding board for problems’287 
as it can detect and identify concerns, but it also have to generate solutions and 
convince institutionalised politics to engage with the problems.288The public 
sphere does not adopt authoritative decisions, but rather the opinions generated 
within the sphere should inform formal decision-making processes. Moreover, 
post-modern conceptions of democracy have spoken about the role of public 
spaces, such as squares.289 Recent discussions on democracy in Ancient Athens 
have adopted this shift in favour of informal locations, and have highlighted the 
role of the Agora.290 The Agora was akin to the market place; people gathered 
there to discuss business and commerce. This was an additional space of 
discussion, for news and the construction of public opinion.291 Within classical 
democracy, there was no concept of the public/private divide, rather as the Agora 
demonstrates, they were intertwined.292 The role of the public sphere, as 
envisioned in deliberative democracy, and public spaces in global 
constitutionalism fall outside the scope of this thesis, but the use of a market place 
as a potential location of democracy raises the question of the role of the 
public/private divide, which is discussed next.  
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Public/Private  
 
The public/private divide is a cornerstone of liberal constitutionalism, where 
exercises of public power should be democratically legitimate293 but private 
power is not subject to the same standards.294 Liberals use this divide as a means 
of protecting the private autonomy of individuals. For liberals, democracy takes 
place in the public realm, but Teubner, within his societal constitutionalism, 
attempts to discuss democracy within the private realm.295 What side of the 
public/private divide democracy is located is an important question given the 
competing approaches within global constitutionalist literature. 
 
What amounts to the public and the private sphere is contested; the private 
sphere can be the market, the home, and at its broadest conceptualisation, that 
which is non-state.296 One way of distinguishing between public and private, 
derives from life in the Roman republic: the public concerns matters of collective 
concern and the private refers to individual concern.297 These differences show 
that what is meant by ‘public’ and thus what should be subjected to democratic 
legitimacy is contested. Approaches to democracy demarcate the public realm 
differently; whilst the liberal model of democracy has a narrow understanding of 
the public realm, social-democracy approaches highlight the role of regulation as 
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a way to extend the public realm.298 If democracy is only located within the public 
realm, it matters how broadly this is defined.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the Where of democracy raises three issues: 
whether democracy is possible at different levels of governance; the types of 
institutions associated with democracy, and in particular the role of assemblies; 
and, how the public/private divide is constructed and on which side of the divide 
democracy is located. These issues are chosen because as demonstrated 
previously, within global constitutionalist literature there is a lack of consistency 
as to the Where of constitutionalism and democracy.299  
 
2.4 How 
 
Democracy is manifested through different political arrangements, institutions, 
and processes. For example, whilst some models prioritise voting, others focus 
on deliberation. These processes institutionalise democracy, but there is a risk 
that such processes become synonymous with democracy and questions as to 
the power of the people are side-lined. Within the Circumstances matrix, How 
does two things; it highlights the tendency to focus on particular processes, and 
it demonstrates how the other Circumstances interrelate. In this section, three 
modalities are discussed as potential Hows. These are accountability, 
representation and participation. As part of the discussion on participation, this 
section considers the role of voting and referenda. These modalities all play a 
part within democracy, and they intersect with one another. This section uses 
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these to explore how the Circumstances interact, and to highlight where gaps can 
arise if the Circumstances are not considered in turn.  
 
2.4.1 Accountability 
 
Accountability is an amorphous term that can encompass a variety of meanings 
and mechanisms. Accountability can be legal, political or regulatory.300 The 
mechanisms of accountability can be ex ante and ex post facto. For example, 
Harlow argues that accountability is about giving an account and thus it is 
retrospective,301 but others place more emphasis on the ex ante mechanisms of 
accountability.302 Bovens argues that ex ante measures include consultation and 
participation.303 Accountability also has many functions within good governance; 
it can be used to provide objectivity and to verify, as well as to provide an 
account.304 This complexity makes the relationship between accountability and 
democracy difficult to identify.  
 
Arguments that insinuate that democracy is synonymous with accountability need 
further unpacking. Legal accountability mechanisms have an important role within 
constitutionalism, and as such sit in tension with political accountability 
mechanisms.305 Judicial review, as an accountability mechanism, can place 
appropriate limits on democratic decision-makers. This is part of the complex 
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relationship between constitutionalism and democracy outlined above.306 
Distinctions need to be draw then between legal and political accountability. 
 
Political accountability mechanisms can be divided into ex post facto and ex ante. 
Ex ante mechanisms include giving reasons, taking into account the interests of 
constituents, and facilitating the participation of individuals. One form of ex ante 
mechanism is the requirement that reasons are given and whilst transparency in 
decision-making and reasoned decision-making are indicators of good 
governance, and might happen within a democracy, that does not make them 
indicators of democracy. If the What question is asked, there are differing extents 
of power being incorporated into these ex ante mechanisms. For example, if ex 
ante means mechanisms that take into account the interests of individuals, then 
accountability plays a role in the formation of the general will, but it is not then 
clear that these interests have to be incorporated into the decision. 
 
The What question can also be put to the ex post facto mechanisms. An ex post 
facto mechanism can be the removal of decision-makers. For Schumpeter that is 
the definition of democracy.307 Within this minimalist conception of democracy, 
accountability and democracy are conflated. For Przeworski, in defending the 
Schumpeterian conceptualisation of democracy, the act of ex post facto 
accountability is a measure of representation because as representatives risk 
losing power, they engage with their constituents.308 Whilst this might construct 
responsive representatives, with respect to What it does not necessitate a great 
amount of power in decision-making and policy-making. Moreover, asking the 
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When question highlights the limits of using accountability as an indicator of 
democracy. Limiting the role of the people to ex post facto accountability ignores 
the other aspects of decision-making where the people could have control, such 
as policy-making and constitution-making. 
 
This discussion on accountability shows how using the Circumstances of 
Democracy exposes the types of questions that should be asked when debating 
democracy. Rather than relying on a modality or process, such as accountability, 
scholarship should be interrogating the What and When.  
 
2.4.2 Representation 
 
Within the Western liberal model of democracy, representation is paramount. 
Loughlin notes that the meaning of representation in modern democracies is 
assumed and therefore fundamental questions are overlooked.309 It is assumed 
that the people are the object of representation.310 Yet, representation is an 
indirect method of self-government and one that was originally considered 
antithetical to democracy.311 Hobbes, for example argued that the sovereign was 
the representative of the people, but he was not presenting the idea of a 
representative democracy.312 Moreover, theorists have relied on representation 
as a way of refining the will of the people.313 This means that the notion of 
representation and its relationship with democracy needs to be unpacked. This 
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sub-section considers how different approaches to representation can construct 
varied ideas of Who and change the What of democracy.  
 
Political debate from England in the 17th century can help to show the different 
ideas of representation. Parker argues that Parliament is a representation of the 
‘reall body of the people’.314 But, the people referred to ‘the kingdom, nation or 
people at large’,315 rather than referring to the needs of individuals. This meant 
Parliament ‘has authority to speak and act in their name’.316 The people 
themselves had little power over decision-making within this model of 
representation. Though Hobbes argued that there was not a unified people that 
could be represented, he did concede that representatives from different parts of 
the territory of the state could be brought together as ‘a body politic, representing 
every subject of that dominion’, which would act to inform the king of the condition 
of his subjects.317 Asking the Who and What question here exposes the problems 
with these models of representation. In the first model, the Who is a constructed 
notion of the people or the nation, and as the parliament acts on their behalf the 
individuals that make up the people are given little power. In the second model, 
the representative still acts on behalf of the people, but the people are 
demarcated into regions and their identity is constructed according to their 
association with that region. This 17th century debate highlights how referring to 
representation, without interrogating the Who and What, can miss important 
aspects of how democracy is constructed. 
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Within the literature there is a debate on whether representation should be 
reflective of society. In Federalist Letter No 35, Hamilton argues that ‘[t]he idea 
of an actual representation of all classes of the people by persons of each class 
is altogether visionary’.318 For Hamilton, there is no need for representatives to 
be appointed with respect to the interests of different classes. This is because 
the representative is held accountable by the people, and thus, Hamilton argues, 
will have to ‘take care to inform himself of their dispositions and inclinations’.319 
In contrast, in 1789, Dufpurney de Villiers, as part of the debates on the 
Constituent Assembly in France, argues ‘[w]hy is this enormous class of day 
laborers, of wage-earners and of the unemployed, […] rejected from the bosom 
of the nation? Why does this class not have its own representatives?’320 The 
debate on whether representatives should be reflective of society raises 
questions about the Who of democracy; people are excluded from the demos, 
and in other cases their inclusion in the demos is predicated on an assigned 
identity (such as a class-based or professions-based identity).  
 
Within contemporary debates, there are two approaches to representation; the 
trustee and the delegate models. The idea that representatives act on behalf of 
the represented is called the trustee model. In this model, representatives work 
for what is best for the people.321 The idea that representatives collect the will of 
the represented and act on that, is known as the delegate model. This second 
approach is a more challenging model; it requires genuine, multidirectional 
                                                          
318 Alexander Hamilton, ‘Letter No XXXV: The Same Subject Continued’ in Isaac Kramnick (ed), 
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay: The Federalist Papers (Penguin 1987) 233. 
319 ibid 235. 
320 Dufpurney de Villiers, ‘Grievances of the Fourth Order’ (1789) in Marc Allan Goldstein (trans 
and eds) Social and Political Though of the French Revolution 1788-1797 (An Anthology of 
Original Texts) (Peter Lang 2001) 51, 54. 
321 see, Przeworski (n 1) 33. 
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connections between represented and representative. The representative must 
gather the will of the people and the represented can hold them to account.322 
This second approach to representation requires responsiveness from the 
representatives.323 Again, asking the What question exposes that the models of 
representation give rise to different understandings of democracy. Whilst the first 
model has little space for the interests of the people, the second gives much more 
power to the people.  
 
The different models and approaches to representation show that it is not 
sufficient to argue that representation is somehow synonymous with democracy. 
Rather, nuance needs to be shown to the different approaches and the way they 
construct the Who and What of democracy. Using the Circumstances of 
Democracy to ask the Who and What questions, this sub-section highlighted how 
persons can be excluded or their individual interests ignored at the expense of a 
constructed collective identity and the variations in power.  
 
2.4.3 Participation 
 
One popular model of democracy is participatory democracy. This model invokes 
a more direct method of democracy, where individuals participate in consultations 
and deliberations, and individuals have more of a role in policy-making.324 This 
specific model of democracy should be differentiated from participation,325 which 
                                                          
322 Hamilton argues that the representative should inform himself of the views of the represented. 
See, Alexander Hamilton, ‘Letter No XXXV: The Same Subject Continued’ in Isaac Kramnick (ed), 
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay: The Federalist Papers (Penguin 1987) 235. 
323 For a discussion on responsiveness, see Lisa Disch, ‘Democratic Representation and the 
Constituency Paradox’ (2012) 10(3) Perspectives on Politics 599. 
324 Held, Democracy and the Global Order (n 231) 209. 
325 Swift notes the distinction between participation and participatory democracy. Swift (n 6) 193-
194. 
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might include responses to consultations, but also taking part in elections as well 
as voting in referenda and plebiscites. This sub-section considers one such 
manifestation of participation, which is voting in referenda and plebiscites.  
 
Voting in a referendum or plebiscite is an example of a more direct form of 
democracy. As discussed briefly above, voting allows for persons to have a say 
in or contribute to a decision on a policy, a constitutional amendment, or even the 
signing of a treaty.326 Closer inspection of referenda and plebiscites shows the 
nuances with respect to the Who, What, and When. Referenda can be criticised 
for being anti-democratic due to the tendency to homogenise the demos,327 or 
the role of a political elite in shaping the questions put to the population.328 This 
sub-section uses Tierney’s discussions of referenda to demonstrate the 
importance of asking the Circumstances.  
 
Tierney draws a distinction between two types of referenda, those referenda that 
refer to first-order questions, such as legislative decisions, and those that refer to 
second-order questions or, in other words, constitutional referenda.329 This 
reflects the distinction drawn between constitutional and everyday governance in 
When.330 Using the example of referenda shows that focusing merely on the 
process of participating in a referendum, risks overlooking the subtle differences 
as to When the people are given the power to participate.  
 
                                                          
326 See above section 3.3.3. 
327 For a discussion see, Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice 
of Republican Deliberation (OUP 2012). 
328 ibid 23-25. 
329 Stephen Tierney, ‘Constitutional Referendums: A Theoretical Enquiry’ (2009) 72(3) MLR 360. 
330 See above, section 3.3.4. 
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Tierney further divides constitutional referenda into four distinct questions: the 
creation of new states, changes to constitutions, the establishment of sub-state 
autonomy, and the transfer of sovereign power to supranational or international 
organisations.331 For Tierney, these questions form a spectrum of popular 
sovereignty: ‘those which found new states or create constitutions are the most 
obvious manifestations of popular sovereignty’.332 This spectrum of popular 
sovereignty suggests that by asking the What of democracy, these different types 
of referenda give varying degrees of power to the people. Furthermore, there is 
a distinction between plebiscites and referenda. Whilst, the outcomes of 
plebiscites are optional, referenda are binding.333 Again this is an example of the 
need to reflect on the What of democracy. Though similar processes, ultimately 
a binding referendum gives more decision-making power to the people, where 
the non-binding nature of the plebiscite means that the people do not have power 
over whether the government accepts the decision. 
 
The facilitation of people participating in decision-making is often invoked as a 
method of democracy and voting in referenda or plebiscites is just one 
manifestation of such participation. What this section demonstrates is that it is not 
sufficient to rely on the process alone. This section on referenda and plebiscites, 
with the subtle changes as to the What and When, highlights the importance of 
asking about the Circumstances.  
 
                                                          
331 Tierney, ‘Constitutional Referendums’ (n 329) 360. 
332 ibid 364. 
333 See J Patrick Boyer, Lawmaking by the People: Referendums and Plebiscites in Canada 
(Butterworths 1982) 12-13 cited in Russell A Miller, ‘Self-Determination in International Law and 
the Demise of Democracy? (2003) 41 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 601, 626. 
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This section used the modalities of accountability, representation and 
participation to demonstrate the importance of not merely relying on a process as 
an indicator of democracy, but that asking the Who, What, When, and Where can 
expose the scope of the people’s power. In the other chapters, a relevant modality 
will be highlighted to explore how some of the Circumstances can be overlooked 
or become conflated.  
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter interrogates the wealth of democratic theory from the various 
positions that are taken on the composition of the demos, what power people 
have in democracy, when the people have power, where democracy is located, 
and how democracy is operationalised. Adapted from classical rhetorical devices, 
these Circumstances are structured around the Who, What, When, Where and 
How. They are a series of questions to probe more specifically at concerns within 
democratic scholarship, such as the role of the individual in the collective, and 
the relationship between constitutional decision-making and everyday 
governance.  
 
Who conjures up questions about the polity, the people, or the demos. It points 
to the discussion on the demarcation of a demos within democratic theory, but it 
is broader than this. Who considers whether the people is a section of the 
population or the populace as a whole. Part of the discussion on Who, is the roles 
of individuals in democracy and their relationship with the collective. If democracy 
is to be about collective decision-making, then democracy, working with other 
norms of constitutionalism (such as human rights), must manage the tension 
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between individual and collective. Using the Circumstance of Who, rather than 
merely reverting to labels such as demos, facilitates a broader discussion on how 
a people is demarcated and on the role of those people.  
 
The Who encompasses the question of constituent power in constitutionalist 
scholarship. This conceptualisation of Who facilitates important discussions on 
the distinct roles and powers of the demos and constituent power holders. There 
is a differentiation between the power of the demos and the power of the 
constituent power holders. The scope of constituent power is contested, but is 
often presented as establishing the constitutional system. Constituent power can 
be said to remain dormant both as a threat to the establishment, but also to cause 
radical constitutional change. In contrast, the powers of the demos are outlined 
within the constitution; rules on amendments to constitutions, voting and election 
rights, and participatory rights, are often laid out in the constitutional frame. The 
difference between the powers needs to be clear.  
 
The What Circumstance refers to kratos. Not only is kratos contested, but the 
history of democracy demonstrates the extent to which the concept of people’s 
power evolves over time: from the direct democracy of Ancient Athens, to 
Schumpeter’s modern democracy where the only power of the citizens is to 
choose a party manifesto and remove a party from office. Here, What invokes 
questions about popular sovereignty, the type of decisions, and whether people 
have the power of the agenda. 
 
When refers not just to the frequency of elections or other processes, but also to 
the distinction between fundamental (or constitutional) decisions and everyday 
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governance. Democracy is often conceptualised as located in everyday 
governance, with emphasis placed on elections, consultations, and participatory 
practices. But discussions on popular sovereignty and constituent power have 
situated democracy within the constitutional decisions. As this chapter 
highlighted, the complex relationship between constitutional and everyday is 
exacerbated by the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism. 
Democracy can be said to encompass the power of the people over constitutional 
change as well as everyday governance, and this thesis asks the When question 
to highlight how scholarship can prioritise one aspect of decision-making over the 
other.  
 
Where within this thesis invokes three questions: scale, institutions, and the 
public/private divide. The previous chapter highlighted the inconsistent approach 
to Where within global constitutionalist scholarship and this chapter highlighted 
the need to ask a slightly different set of questions about institutions and the 
public/private divide. The Where of democracy is closely associated with the 
Who, What and When. For example, shifting decision-making beyond the state 
calls for a reformation of how the demos is demarcated and if democracy is 
predominantly located within a narrowly defined public sphere, then people have 
no or limited power over the decisions of powerful private actors.  
 
The Circumstances of Democracy are interconnected. The How of democracy 
should ensure that the Who, What, When and Where are aligned. This chapter 
used the modalities of accountability, representation and participation to explore 
the interconnected nature of the Circumstances. Asking How can highlight where 
Circumstances are ignored or conflated. This chapter demonstrated that 
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processes, such as voting, can be conflated with the What of democracy. 
Throughout the thesis, the modalities of accountability, representation and 
participation are used to demonstrate the ways in which the Circumstances 
interrelate.  
 
This chapter provides fact-finding avenues based on the Who, What, When, 
Where and How that can be used to analyse democracy in global constitutionalist 
literature. The matrix offers a coherent structure that will both demonstrate what 
is overlooked while also setting out a path for global constitutionalist scholarship. 
The Circumstances constructs and deconstructs and in doing so allows for a 
penetration of democracy beyond mere platitudes.
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Chapter 3: International Legal Scholarship and Democracy 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As an intra-disciplinary project, global constitutionalist literature weaves together 
international law, international legal scholarship, and constitutionalist thought. 
Global constitutionalist discussions on democracy at international organisations 
are informed by the scholarship on an international legal norm of democracy.1 To 
analyse how global constitutionalist literature discusses democracy, it is first 
necessary to understand the international law literature on democracy.  
 
From 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the proclaimed ‘End of History’, there 
has been an intensification in the literature on democracy in international law.2 
Franck investigates the emerging norm of democratic governance in international 
law.3 Referring to the wave of democratisation after 1989, Franck instigates a 
                                                          
1 Scholars refer to the emerging norm of democracy. See Anne Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ in Jan 
Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization of International Law 
(OUP 2009) 273; Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Between Myths and Norms: Constructivist Constitutionalism 
and the Potential of Constitutional Principles in International Law’ (2012) 81 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 79, 80; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘State Sovereignty, Popular Sovereignty and 
Individual Sovereignty: From Constitutional Nationalism to Multilevel Constitutionalism in 
International Economic Law?’ (2006) EUI Law Working Paper 2006/45, 24-25 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/6446> accessed 9 September 2017; Erika de Wet, ‘The 
International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55(1) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 51, 
63. See also Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the 
International Community (BRILL 2009) 93-94 
2 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Penguin 1992) xi. Gregory H Fox 
and Brad R Roth, ‘Introduction: the spread of liberal democracy and its implications for 
international law’ in Gregory H Fox and Brad R Roth (eds) Democratic Governance and 
International Law (CUP 2000) 1. There were discussions on international law and democracy 
prior to the 1990s, see Elihu Root, ‘The Effect of Democracy on International Law’ (1917) 11 
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at its Annual Meeting 2; Wallace 
McClure, ‘International Law and Democracy’ (1939) 15 Tennessee Law Review 541. 
3 For a discussion on the Manhattan School, see David Kennedy, ‘Tom Franck and the Manhattan 
School’ (2003) 35 International Law and Politics 397. 
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discussion on democracy as a norm in international law.4 His work spawned 
discussions that cover democracy as an international human right and the 
relationship between rights and democracy,5 democracy as a criterion for 
statehood,6 its role in government recognition,7 as well as in relation to 
intervention and security.8 This literature on democracy and international law from 
the early 1990s, built on international legal practices engaged in promoting 
democracy; elections monitoring, international human rights instruments and 
organisations, democracy as a membership criterion for the EU, Organization of 
American States (OAS) and The Common Market of the Southern Cone 
(MERCOSUR),9 and the speeches of UN political actors, such as the Secretary 
General. It is this ‘American literature’ and the debates it sparked that are dealt 
with in this chapter.10 
 
                                                          
4 Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Clarendon Press 1995) 85. 
Crawford places the starting point at 1986. See James Crawford, ‘Democracy and International 
Law’ (1993) 64(1) The British Year Book of International Law 113, 121. 
5 Christina M Cerna, ‘Universal Democracy: An International Legal Rights or the Pipe Dream of 
the West?’ (1995) 27 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 289, 329; 
Steven Wheatley, Democracy, Minorities and International Law (CUP 2005). 
6 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda’ 
(1993) 87 AJIL 205, 236; Sean D Murphy, ‘Democratic legitimacy and the recognition of States 
and governments’ in Gregory H Fox and Brad R Roth (eds) Democratic Governance and 
International Law (CUP 2000) 123-139. See James Crawford, The Creation of States in 
International Law (OUP 2006) 150. Cf Dame Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Democracy and the United 
Nations’ (2015) 4(2) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 215, 217. 
7 Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy’ (2006) 28 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 878; Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Post-Conflict 
Administrations as Democracy-Building Instruments’ (2008) 9(1) Chicago Journal of International 
Law 1. 
8 James Crawford, Democracy in International Law: Inaugural Lecture (CUP 1994) 4; Thomas 
Carothers, ‘Empirical Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of Democracy in International Law’ 
(1992) Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 261, 266.  
9 European Council, ‘Conclusions of the Presidency’ (Copenhagen Criteria) (1993) SN 180/93; 
Organization of American States, ‘Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of 
American States’ (Protocol of Washington) (approved 14 December 1992, entered into force 25 
September 1997); MERCOSUR, ‘Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic Commitment in MERCOSUR’ 
(24 July 1996). See Fox and Roth, ‘Introduction’ (n 2) 9. 
10 D’Aspremont classifies this scholarship as ‘American literature of the early 1990s on the 
democratic entitlement’. See, Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Rise and Fall of Democracy in International 
Law: A Reply to Susan Marks’ (2011) 22(2) EJIL 549, 550. 
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The international legal scholarship on democracy is criticised for constructing a 
procedural, liberal conceptualisation of democracy.11 This chapter considers the 
Who and What Circumstances to explore how international law constructs this 
particularly narrow approach to democracy. The reliance on a state-defined 
demos and the mythologization of elections means the Who and What are the 
most pertinent Circumstances to consider. 
 
The scholarship adopted self-determination as a starting point, and uses 
evidence of elections-monitoring and Article 25 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to build a norm of democracy in international 
law. In relation to Who, this chapter investigates the role of self-determination, 
human rights, and elections in the approach to democracy. This chapter 
considers the extent to which these topics construct an idea of the demos that is 
bounded to the state. Similarly, with respect to What, this chapter investigates the 
use of self-determination and elections-monitoring to consider the extent of the 
people’s power. In particular, this chapter considers how the amalgamation of 
self-determination and elections can contribute to the dissociation of the people 
from decision-making.  
 
Prior to an investigation into the two Circumstances, it is beneficial to reflect on 
the nature of the scholarship and the key debates within this literature. Tensions 
in the approach to these two Circumstances can arise from the different 
perspectives adopted by scholars within this field of international law. What 
                                                          
11 For an acknowledgement that it is a procedural conceptualisation of democracy, see Gregory 
H Fox, ‘The right to political participation in international law’ in Gregory H Fox and Brad R Roth 
(eds), Democratic Governance and International Law (CUP 2000) 48, 49; Jure Vidmar, 
‘Democracy and Regime Change in the Post-Cold War International Law’ (2013) 11 The New 
Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 349, 350; d’Aspremont, ‘Legitimacy of 
Governments in the Age of Democracy’ (n 7) 891. 
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follows then is a brief summary of the literature on international law and 
democracy.  
 
3.2 International Legal Scholarship and Democracy 
 
There are elements of international law that are not democratic and traditionally, 
international law was not concerned with the nature of domestic governance. For 
example, international law assumes that the executive of a state has the power 
in international affairs, and that the government can bind the state for the future.12 
Further, the existence of a contradictory national law is not an excuse for failing 
to comply with an international obligation; even if the national law is 
democratically established, international law prevails.13 Moreover, international 
law looks at relations between states, and not at the nature of the government 
within states. The statism of the 18th and 19th centuries meant that international 
law accepted the sovereign nature of states and did not investigate the states’ 
systems of government.14  
 
Franck discusses the idea of an emerging norm of democratic government in 
international law. His theory of democratic entitlement is premised on three 
stages; self-determination, the protection of human rights, such as freedom of 
expression, and the creation of a right to vote and elections monitoring.15 He then 
uses international legal and political documents, as well as state practice, to 
collect evidence of an emerging norm of democracy. He places emphasis on the 
                                                          
12 Crawford, ‘Democracy and International Law’ (n 4) 117-118; Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Democracy 
and International Law’ (2014) 371 Recueil Des Cours 43, 71  
13 Crawford, ‘Democracy and International Law’ (n 4) 117; Charlesworth (n 12) 71  
14 Fox, ‘The right to political participation in international law’ in Fox and Roth (n 11) 51 
15 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 4) 91. 
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tide in favour of democracy in states, with states requesting elections monitoring 
more frequently in the late 1980s and early 1990s,16 as well as states adopting 
texts on democracy.17 For Franck, ‘[t]he right to democracy is the right of people 
to be consulted and to participate in the process by which political values are 
reconciled and choices made.’18 Participation, for Franck, means ‘meaningful 
participation’ and consultation refers to elections and plebiscites, where the 
people’s opinions are collected.19  
 
In contrast, Fox discusses a right to political participation. Unlike Franck, who 
argued that the norm was emerging, Fox argues that the right is confirmed.20 
Using international and regional human rights treaties, Fox derives a right to 
political participation that protects the right to vote in multi-party elections.21 He 
uses interpretations of these rights documents to argue that elections must have 
universal and equal suffrage and secret ballots, they must happen at frequent 
intervals, and there must be no discrimination.22 Fox argues that there are two 
distinct sources for a right to political participation; the human rights documents 
and standards of elections monitoring. Though these sources are distinct, they 
produce similar standards for elections.23 From this state practice, Fox then 
                                                          
16 ibid 108. 
17 ibid 111-115 (discusses for example: the UNGA, Res 46/137 ‘Enhancing the effectiveness of 
the principle of periodic and genuine elections’ (17 December 1991) UN Doc A/RES/46/137; 
Organization of American States, Resolution on Representative Democracy (adopted 5 June 
1991) OEA/Ser P/AG/RES.1080 (XXI-o/91); Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Charter of Paris For a New Europe and 
Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter 21 Nov 1990, 
reprinted in (1991) 30 ILM 190).  
18 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 4) 83. 
19 ibid 84, 92. 
20 Fox, ‘The right to political participation in international law’ in Fox and Roth (n 11) 50. 
21 ibid 50, 55. 
22 ibid 69. 
23 ibid 85. 
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argues that there is now an agreement that ‘an electoral mandate bestows 
legitimacy upon governments’ and that elections require multiple parties.24  
 
Marks criticises the procedural understanding of democracy that arises from 
Franck and Fox. In Riddle of all Constitutions, she proposes an alternative 
solution to the contested emerging norm of democratic governance; the ‘principle 
of democratic inclusion’.25 Whereas the norm appears to propose a ‘low-intensity’ 
electoral democracy, the ‘principle of democratic inclusion’ includes ‘an ongoing 
call to enlarge the opportunities for popular participation in political processes and 
end social practices that systematically marginalize some citizens whilst 
empowering others.’26 Marks has a radical notion of democracy; for her, 
democracy addresses inequalities (in particular, inequalities of class), and 
democracy ‘demands change of transformative proportions’.27 Marks’ 
conceptualisation of democracy is very different to the procedural democracy that 
Franck and Fox outline. She infuses democracy with values, such as 
redistribution, that could be said to be ‘defining up’ democracy.28 These 
competing approaches to democracy calls for a systematic unpacking of the 
foundational questions, hence the use of the Circumstances within this thesis. 
 
There is increasing involvement by international actors in questions of democracy 
within states. For example, international actors have played a leading role in the 
constitution-building of post-conflict states.29 At the UN there is the United 
                                                          
24 ibid 89. 
25 Susan Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique 
of Ideology (OUP 2000) 109. 
26 ibid 109. 
27 ibid 95. 
28 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.1. 
29 This role is criticised. See for example, Matthew Saul, ‘Local Ownership of Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction in International Law: The Initiation of International Involvement’ (2011) 16(1) 
Journal of Conflict and Security 165. 
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Nations Democracy Fund and the Electoral Assistance Division.30 There is 
continued elections monitoring by the EU, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) and sometimes the UN.31 There are contemporary 
international political commitments as well as regional commitments.32 These 
political developments, acknowledge a tripartite relationship between democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law.33 Nevertheless, the procedural 
conceptualisation of democracy that dominated in the 1990s literature is still 
prevalent.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to exploring the nature of this 
procedural conceptualisation of democracy. Using the Who and What, this 
chapter investigates how the international legal scholarship, which builds on the 
1990s tradition, approaches democracy. Using these Circumstances of 
Democracy can uncover some of the limitations in the international legal debates. 
This thesis is concerned with the extent to which the limitations of Franck and 
Fox’s debate on democracy feed into the global constitutionalist discourse.34  
 
                                                          
30 For a discussion on the United Nations’ agenda on democracy, see Kirsten Haack, The United 
Nations Democracy Agenda: A Conceptual History (OUP 2011). 
31 Franck notes the role of Emissaries of the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government of 
the Carter Centre in Atlanta and the US National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. 
Thomas M Franck, ‘Legitimacy and the democratic entitlement’ in Gregory H Fox and Brad R 
Roth (eds) Democratic Governance and International Law (CUP 2000) 25, 38. Binder gives the 
example of the European Network of Election Monitoring Organization. See, Christina Binder, 
‘International Election Observation by the OSCE and the Human Right to Political Participation’ 
(2007) 13(1) European Public Law 133, 136. 
32 For a discussion democracy in membership criteria and conditionality, see Roland Rich, 
‘Bringing Democracy into International Law’ (2001) 12(3) Journal of Democracy 20. 
33 Higgins argues that democracy has to be understood alongside the rule of law and human 
rights. Though she does not endorse a legal rule on democracy. See, Higgins, ‘Democracy and 
the United Nations’ (n 6). Cf Fox who argues that these more substantive approaches to 
democracy are too broad. Gregory H Fox, ‘Democracy, Right to, International Protection’ in Max 
Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (OUP 2008); Susan Marks, ‘What has Become 
of the Emerging Right to Democratic Governance?’ (2011) 22(2) EJIL 507, 512. 
34 See below, sections 4.2.1 and 5.2.2 
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3.3 The Circumstances of Democracy and International Legal Scholarship 
 
3.3.1 Who 
 
International legal scholarship discusses democracy within states,35 but there are 
questions about how international law constructs the people within a state. The 
discussions on democracy in this tradition of international legal scholarship use 
self-determination and citizens participating in elections as starting points. Yet 
this leads to ambiguity around the unit of democracy. External self-determination 
refers to a people, internal self-determination encompasses persons in a territory, 
and it is only citizens that have a right to participate in elections. There is then 
uncertainty around the construction of the Who for the purposes of international 
law. This section considers self-determination and elections, to show how 
international law constructs the Who of democracy. Due to the controversy about 
the relationship between self-determination and democracy, this section does not 
seek to give a comprehensive assessment of self-determination, nor to determine 
whether self-determination is democracy, but rather it explores the impact that 
the use of self-determination as a point of reference for the discourse on 
democracy in international law has on the meaning of Who.36 
 
                                                          
35 The emphasis placed on states by this tradition of scholarship can be contrasted with the 
approach of others. For example, the Global Public Authority and Global Public Law traditions; 
Devika Hovell, ‘Due Process in the United Nations’ (2016) 110 (1) AJIL 9; See Armin von 
Bogdandy, Matthias Goldmann, Ingo Venzke, ‘From Public International to International Public 
Law: Translating World Public Opinion into International Public Authority’ (2016) Max Planck 
Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law Research Paper No. 2016-2 < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2770639> accessed 19 September 2017. 
36 For a discussion on whether self-determination and democracy are related, see Vladyslav 
Lanovoy, ‘Self-determination in International Law: A Democratic Phenomenon or an Abuse of 
Right?’ (2015) 4(2) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 388; Jure Vidmar, 
‘The Right of Self-determination and Multiparty Democracy: Two Sides of the Same Coin?’ (2010) 
Human Rights Law Review 239, 259. 
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Self-determination: Peoples  
 
Self-determination is protected in international law.37 Article 1 of the ICCPR and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, provides for 
the right of self-determination: ‘[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. 
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development’.38 There are two issues that 
arise from this, the first is the meaning of ‘all peoples’ and the second is the scope 
of the right of self-determination. The first issue is a question of Who, which will 
be discussed here, and the second is a question of What, discussed below.  
 
Self-determination is a collective right of ‘peoples’, but the meaning of a people 
is disputed. A people could be demarcated by common tradition, race, ethnicity, 
linguistic unity, religion, or territorial connection.39 After the UN Charter, self-
determination referred to the rights of peoples under colonial rule,40 but it has 
evaded its decolonialisation function and has a broader application, so it is now 
applicable to non-self-governing territories,41 as well as people subject to foreign 
                                                          
37 The UN Charter refers to the principle of self-determination of peoples. Charter of the United 
Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Article 1(2) and 
Article 55. Though Higgins argues that in the Charter this principle of self-determination refers to 
equal rights of states and is concerned with non-interference. See Rosalyn Higgins, Problems 
and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press 1995) 112. 
38 See also the UNGA, Res 2625 ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations’ (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/Res/2625(XXV). 
39 Robert McCorquodale, ‘Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach’ (1994) 43 International 
and Comparative Law 857, 866; Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz and Melissa Castan (eds), The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (OUP 
2004) 142. 
40 UNGA, Res 1514 (XV) ‘Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and 
peoples’ (14 December 1960) UN Doc A/RES/1514(XV) [2]. 
41 Legal Consequences for states of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 
16 [52]. See, Higgins, ‘Democracy and the United Nations’ (n 6) 218. 
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and alien domination.42 This suggests that peoples for the purposes of self-
determination is restricted to these specific groups.43 
 
A distinction must be drawn between external and internal self-determination. 
External self-determination refers to determining the status of a territory. Internal 
self-determination concerns self-government within a state.44 This requires: ‘a 
people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within 
the framework of an existing state’;45 political participation by minority groups 
within the mechanisms of the state;46 and that ‘free choice be afforded to peoples 
on a continuing basis’.47 Where external self-determination refers to relations 
between states, internal self-determination captures the relations between a 
population and its state. These two forms of self-determination influence the 
construction of the Who of democracy in international law.  
 
External self-determination can be understood in international law in terms of a 
link to territory.48 For example, non-self-governing territories are defined by their 
relationship to a territorially demarcated political unit (a state), rather than shared 
characteristics.49 Crawford argues that ‘self-determination is not about a self-
defined “people” creating its own state’, it is instead about ‘predetermined “units” 
                                                          
42 UNGA, Res 2625 ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ (24 October 
1970) UN Doc A/Res/2625(XXV). 
43 Cf McCorquodale (n 39) 868 (argues that ‘State practice is not conclusive as a recognition of a 
people’). 
44 Lanovoy (n 36) 392. 
45 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217 [126]. 
46 Arbitration Commission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Opinion No 
2 (1997) 31 ILM 1497, 1498-99. 
47 Higgins, ‘Democracy and the United Nations’ (n 6) 219; UNGA, ‘Report of the Human Rights 
Committee’ UN GAOR 51st Session Vol I Supp No 40 (1997) UN Doc A/51/40, annex V, [2]. 
48 McCorquodale draws a distinction between a people’s approach and a territory approach. 
McCorquodale (n 39) 866-870. 
49 See Benedict Kingsbury, ‘“Indigenous peoples” in international law: a constructivist approach 
to the controversy’ (1998) 92 AJIL 414, 438; Wheatley, Democracy, Minorities and International 
Law (n 5) 76. 
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which are “in general those territories established and recognised as [being] 
separate”’.50 In other words, international law looks first at the territory, rather than 
at the people. McCorquodale criticises this focus on territory as it side-lines the 
people and denies the arbitrary drawing of state-boundaries.51 This can have the 
impact of obscuring certain types of groups of people. For instance, Roth shows 
how the Badinter Commission credited the democratic will of the ‘pre-established 
territories’ but not the Serb populations.52 Though these scholars acknowledge 
the limitations, they demonstrate the conservative approach in international law 
to construct the people using a link to territory.  
 
Oklopcic argues that international law sees a particular function for the people 
within external self-determination. The people are used as ‘an intermediary 
construct that assumed a role akin to a “political elevator”’.53 In other words, the 
role of the people is to help determine the ‘political status of a designated 
territory’.54 The people are a ‘terminus technicus’, which is used in international 
law ‘to describe a phase in a process of polity formation’.55 If the people are seen 
only at the moment of self-determination, it suggests international law has a 
functional approach to the people and it raises questions about the role 
international law has in everyday politics, which will be discussed below. 
 
                                                          
50 Crawford, The Creation of States (n 6) xi. 
51 McCorquodale (n 39) 869-870. 
52 See Brad Roth, ‘Vidmar’s Democratic Statehood Thesis in Light of the Yugoslavia Dissolution’ 
(EJIL Talk, 7 August 2013) < https://www.ejiltalk.org/vidmars-democratic-statehood-thesis-in-
light-of-the-yugoslav-dissolution/> accessed 19 September 2017.  
53 Zoran Oklopcic, ‘Populus Interruptus: Self-Determination, the Independence of Kosovo, and 
the Vocabulary of Peoplehood’ (2009) Leiden Journal of International Law 677, 690. 
54 ibid 690. 
55 James Crawford, ‘Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future’ 
in Philip Alston (ed.), Peoples’ Rights (OUP 2001) 7. 
 
134 
The meaning of ‘peoples’ in internal self-determination is challenged. For the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Secession of Quebec, when 
discussing internal self-determination, a people could refer to a portion of the 
population, provided they met certain criteria.56 The Badinter Commission 
referred to the right of ‘communities’ within a state.57 This reference to ‘a people’ 
and ‘communities’ would seem to suggest internal self-determination is limited to 
a people, demarcated by common characteristics.58 Yet, the Human Rights 
Committee investigates the self-determination of the whole population.59 Given 
these inconsistencies, the Who of internal self-determination is unclear. 
 
Internal self-determination has been constructed from a relationship between 
Article 1 and Article 25 of ICCPR. Article 25 provides for rights of political 
participation. This includes; the right to ‘take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives’ and the right to vote in genuine 
periodic elections.60 Higgins argues that it is through Article 25 that Article 1 is 
protected.61 In other words, participation in elections is a means of ensuring 
internal self-determination. Article 1 refers to peoples, which has been interpreted 
as population,62 and Article 25 specifically refers to all citizens.63 This gives rise 
                                                          
56 Reference re Secession of Quebec (n 45) [124] – [125]. 
57 ‘Opinion No 2’ (n 46) 1498-99. 
58 In this respect self-determination in international law is different from Preuss’ discussion on 
constituent power as self-determination in constitutional law. See, Ulrich K Preuss, ‘Constitutional 
Powermaking for the New Polity: Some Deliberations on the Relations Between Constituent 
Power and the Constitution’ (1992-1993) 14 Cardozo Law Review 639, 652. 
59 UNCHR, ‘General Comment No 12 – Article 1 (The right to self-determination of peoples)’ (12 
April 1984) [4]; Higgins, Problems and Process (n 37) 116-117 and 120. 
60 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1996, entered into 
force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTA 171, Article 25. 
61 Higgins, Problems and Processes (n 37) 120. See also Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, ‘General Recommendation 21 on the right to self-determination’ (15 March 1996) 
UN Doc A/51/18, [4]. Joseph et al., (n 39) 148. 
62 UNCHR, ‘General Comment No 12 (n 59) [4]; Higgins, Problems and Process (n 37) 116-117 
63 UNCHR, ‘General Comment No 25 –The Right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and 
the right of equal access to public service (Article 25)’ (27 August 1996) UN Doc CCPR/C/Rev 
1/Add 7, [3]. 
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to a disconnect between population and citizenry. Although the Human Rights 
Committee states that how citizenship is determined should not be 
discriminatory,64 and that restrictions on the right to vote should be ‘based on 
reasonable and objective criteria’,65 the citizenry of a state will be at once a more 
limited franchise than the population as a whole, but also if there are citizens 
beyond the territory of the state, they will enjoy the franchise over the non-citizen 
parts of the population. This disconnect between population and citizenship, 
makes ambiguous the Who of internal self-determination.  
 
Democracy within international legal scholarship is closely associated with self-
determination.66 Franck uses self-determination as a starting point for his 
discussion on the ‘emerging norm of democratic governance’. He argues that 
self-determination, though not necessarily democratic per se, is evidence of 
international law requiring the participation of people.67 The processes of self-
determination provide evidence for the consultation of the people on the changing 
status of a territory. Such consultation takes place through elections and 
plebiscites.68 Franck draws a distinction between the individual rights to 
participate, which he calls democracy and the collective right to constitute a 
nation state, which he labels self-determination.69 In essence, the distinction he 
draws between democracy and self-determination follows the distinction between 
internal and external self-determination. His argument is that as internal self-
determination ‘entitles peoples in all states to free, fair and open participation in 
                                                          
64 ibid [3]. 
65 ibid [4], [10]. Joseph et al., (n 39) 659. 
66 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 4) 91. See also Crawford, ‘Democracy 
and International Law’ (n 4) 116. 
67 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 4) 92. Cf Fox who rejects the idea that 
pre-UN monitoring generated standards for participation and consultation. Fox, ‘The right to 
political participation in international law’ in Fox and Roth (n 11) 70. 
68 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 4) 92. 
69 ibid 92. 
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the democratic process of governance freely chosen by each state’, there is 
evidence of democracy in international law.70  
 
If internal self-determination is a basis for democracy as a right or principle in 
international law, then it influences the Who of democracy. Within internal self-
determination, the use of peoples can refer to the population, its citizenry, or a 
section of the population. Even at its broadest conceptualisation, as the 
population, this still ties democracy to a state territory. If only citizens have the 
rights to participate, then the franchise can be limited by the state’s approach to 
citizenship. Persons can be excluded, though human rights frameworks protect 
against using citizenship criteria as discrimination.71  
 
External self-determination also shapes the Who of democracy. Though Franck 
argues that external self-determination is not democracy, he uses it as evidence 
of a norm of democracy in international law.72 But, there are concerns about the 
role of democracy in external self-determination.73 External self-determination is 
underpinned by a complex relationship between territory and nationhood, in 
which international law prioritises a link to territory. This tension between 
nationhood and territory predetermines, to a certain extent, the way in which the 
Who of democracy is conceptualised. As Crawford’s discussion on the role of 
territory demonstrates, the state territory forms the ‘container’ of the demos,74 so 
democracy is tied to the state territory. 
                                                          
70 Franck ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (1992) 86(1) AJIL 46, 59. Though note 
in Fairness in International Law it is an associational right.  
71 General Comment No 25 (n 63) [3], [4], [10]. Joseph et al., (n 39) 659. 
72 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 4) 92. 
73 Vidmar, ‘Democracy and Regime Change in the Post-Cold War International Law’ (n 11) 370 
(‘the right of self-determination requires a democratic expression of the will of the people at 
independence referenda’). 
74 Marks uses the image of a container, which is found in Anthony McGrew, ‘Globalization and 
Territorial Democracy: An Introduction’ in A McGrew (ed), Transformation of Democracy? 
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The state, its boundaries, and its assumed homogeneity, guide the demarcation 
of peoples for the purposes of self-determination. Centring a discussion on 
democracy in the law on self-determination limits the meaning of Who. Whilst 
internal self-determination seeks to move away from these connotations of 
peoples, and attempts to shift to encompassing populations, it is still predicated 
on the state.  
  
Elections and International Human Rights: Citizens 
 
Franck and other scholars use elections monitoring and specific international 
human rights as evidence of an emerging norm of democracy. This form of 
evidence shows a bias towards the meaning of Who in democracy. Traditionally, 
international human rights are held by individuals against a state75 and the 
elections being monitored take place within a state.76 This sub-section discusses 
how Article 25 of the ICCPR on political participation can shape the meaning of 
Who in democracy.  
 
In moving from self-determination as evidence of democracy, to international 
human rights on political participation, Franck notes that this demonstrates a shift 
away from ‘a people’ towards all individuals.77 This would seem to suggest that 
the unit of democracy, for Franck, is individuals. Yet, using human rights means 
                                                          
Globalization and Territorial Democracy (Polity Press 1997) 5. Marks, The Riddle of all 
Constitutions (n 25) 81. 
75 For a discussion on the accountability of non-state actors for human rights abuses see, Olivier 
de Schutter, ‘Human Rights and the Rise of International Organizations: The Logic of Sliding 
Scales in the Law of International Responsibility’ in Jan Wouters, Eva Brems (eds), Accountability 
for Human Rights Violations by International Organizations (Intersentia 2011) 55. 
76 See, Binder (n 31) 146 (primarily observations of elections at the national level). 
77 Or as he called it ‘from “peoples” to persons’. Franck, ‘Legitimacy and the democratic 
entitlement’ (n 31) 34. 
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that the demos is still tied to state and not all individuals. The Universal 
Declaration, for example, states that ‘everyone has the right to take part in the 
government of his country’,78 which limits the demos to people with a connection 
to a state. It separates the national governance level from the international 
governance level,79 and locates democracy firmly within the national domain.  
 
As discussed above, the ICCPR in Article 25 refers only to the right of ‘every 
citizen’.80 Citizenship is a bond between persons and the state. As the state 
defines the criteria for citizenship, it is not open to everyone. Certain persons that 
have relations with that state (whether this be some form of residence or affected 
by decisions of that state) will be excluded from citizenship. Moreover, as was 
discussed above, the right to vote can be restricted through additional criteria.81 
The American Convention on Human Rights allows for restrictions to the right to 
vote based on ‘age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil and mental 
capacity […].’82 Similarly, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
places a restriction on the right to vote where it states that it will be ‘enjoyed “in 
accordance with the provisions of the law”’.83 To suggest, as Franck does, that 
individuals are now the unit of democracy in international law is too optimistic. 
This is because some individuals are excluded from participation rights through 
the idea of citizenship; to place emphasis on individuals ignores that the 
scholarship constructs the demos using citizenship. Furthermore, as discussed 
                                                          
78 Ludwig Beckman, ‘The Right to Democracy and the Human Right to Vote’ (2014) The Journal 
of Human Rights 381, 384 (emphasis added by Beckman). 
79 See Ian Clark, ‘Beyond the Great Divide: Globalization and the theory of International Relations’ 
(1998) 24(4) Review of International Studies 479. 
80 ICCPR Article 25. For a discussion on citizenship see Joseph et al., (n 39) 651. 
81 General Comment No 25 (n 63) [4], [10]. 
82 Organization of American States, ‘American Convention on Human Rights’ (adopted 22 
January 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978), Article 21. 
83 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 
October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58, Article 13. 
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previously, the emphasis placed on individuals can contradict the idea of common 
decision-making within democracy.84 
 
Even where there is not an explicit focus on the question of self-determination, 
the state is seen as the bounded space within which democracy takes place. As 
such, the demos is constructed through the state. Whilst there is an acceptance 
of the needs for human rights to protect the interests of minorities within states,85 
in the mainstream literature on international law and democracy there is little 
discussion on other types of groups of people: for example, diaspora and 
stateless persons, who might be excluded from citizenship. This discussion on 
Who demonstrates the biases in favour of citizens, rather than humanity, at the 
expense of other groups of persons. Democracy constructed this way excludes 
certain groups of people. 
 
The rights associated with democracy, such as freedom of expression and 
freedom of association, are not restricted to citizens.86 Marks argues that building 
democracy upon human rights foundations can facilitate a cosmopolitan shift; as 
human rights are universal in nature, and as they ‘are enjoyed by virtue of 
humanity, rather than citizenship’, they can transcend the state-boundary.87 
However, this conflicts with Article 25 ICCPR, which is restricted to citizenship. 
The state defines citizens and it demarcates the demos. Building a norm of 
democracy from Article 25 of ICCPR can curb a cosmopolitan shift.  
 
                                                          
84 Chapter 2, section 2.3.2. 
85 Wheatley, Democracy, Minorities and International Law (n 5).  
86 ICCPR Articles 19(1) and 22(1). 
87 Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions (n 25) 106-107. 
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Furthermore, the Circumstances matrix demonstrates the importance of asking 
the Who question. Franck argues that self-determination is used as a starting 
point in the thesis on the emerging democratic norm because of the processes it 
involves.88 In other words, he relies on it for the How of democracy. Although 
Franck notes the shift from peoples to individuals when the focus is on Article 25 
ICCPR, neither he, nor Fox, reflect on the role of human rights in the construction 
of a citizen-based conceptualisation of the Who. The focus on How is at the 
expense of a reflection on the impacts of self-determination and human rights on 
Who. This is inadequate because it constructs a citizen-based and state-centric 
idea of the demos. If global constitutionalist scholarship is to be informed by this 
approach, it must ask the Who question to move away from the narrow definition 
of demos. Conflations between the How and the Who demonstrate why each 
Circumstance should be taken in turn to ensure proper reflection on the meaning 
of democracy.  
 
Asking how international scholarship conceptualises the Who, exposes the 
limitations of that legal framework. It demonstrates that Who is tied to the state. 
Whether one looks to discourses on self-determination or to Article 25 ICCPR, 
the demos is constructed through a relationship of people, territory, and state. 
Democracy as formulated in international legal scholarship is not easily 
disassociated from the state, and therefore less easy to conceive of in non-state 
systems of governance.  
 
3.3.2 What 
 
                                                          
88 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 4) 92. 
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Within the ‘democratic entitlement’ debate, much emphasis is placed on 
mechanisms of democracy. In particular, scholars discuss at length the 
importance of elections, referenda, and plebiscites. Within this discussion on 
mechanisms the question of the scope of the people’s power is left open. Though 
scholars claim to advocate a shift towards popular sovereignty, at the core of this 
debate there is a concern about the relationship between popular sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. This section considers whether such a tension has the 
potential to place limits on the What of democracy. This section looks at the role 
of self-determination and elections in how the What of democracy is 
conceptualised and it considers what the people have power to do.  
 
Self-Determination 
 
The scope of self-determination is contested; there are debates on the legality of 
unilateral declarations of independence, on the right of secession, and the role of 
democracy. The referenda in Crimea in March 2014 and Catalonia in October 
2017 have sparked fresh discussions on the role of democracy in changes of 
territory. This sub-section will not offer a comprehensive assessment of the law, 
but rather an investigation of how scholarship interprets the role of democracy. In 
developing an understanding of the tie between self-determination and the What 
of democracy, the role of plebiscites and referenda, the legitimacy of 
independence declarations, and the role of democracy in secession are all 
considered.  
 
Plebiscites and referenda are part of the process of self-determination. Vidmar, 
pointing to the views of the ICJ in Western Sahara, argues that the fulfilment of 
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the right to self-determination necessitates a referendum.89 The court states that 
the ‘application of the right of self-determination requires a free and genuine 
expression of the will of the peoples concerned’.90 Whether this amounts to the 
power to decide the fate of the territory, is left open. But, as Vidmar goes on to 
argue, the expression of the will of the people is a necessary but not sufficient 
‘condition for a successful change of the legal status of a territory’.91  
 
Franck uses this requirement of consultation and the ensuing processes as 
evidence for an emerging norm of democracy. But, what is missing is an 
investigation as to the scope of the people’s power. Plebiscites can be defined 
as optional, and can be considered to be akin to opinion polls.92 In contrast, 
referenda are considered to be binding.93 In relation to What, the referenda places 
more decision-making power in the hands of the people, where the plebiscite 
distances the people from the ultimate decision. Alternatively, plebiscites can be 
thought of as referenda that are directed towards a question of territory.94 In 
international law, plebiscites, which refer to territorial questions, and referenda 
are used interchangeably, and there is a suggestion that referendum is now the 
adopted term.95 Some international scholars have noted that there are binding 
and non-binding forms of referenda. For example, Vidmar points to the binding 
                                                          
89 Vidmar, ‘Democracy and Regime Change in Post-Cold War International Law’ (n 11) 370. 
90 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 12 [55]. 
91 Vidmar, ‘Democracy and Regime Change in Post-Cold War International Law’ (n 11) 370. 
92 See J Patrick Boyer, Lawmaking by the People: Referendums and Plebiscites in Canada 
(Butterworths 1982) 12-13 cited in Russell A Miller, ‘Self-Determination in International Law and 
the Demise of Democracy? (2003) 41 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 601, 626 
93 Ibid 626. 
94 See Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican 
Deliberation (OUP 2012) 62 fn 8. 
95 Yves Beigbeder, ‘Referendum’ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 
2011) <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1088> accessed 19 September 2017. 
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nature of referenda in Montenegro, South Sudan, East Timor.96 Drawing such a 
distinction would indicate the scope of the people’s power in decision-making. 
But, in the discussion on democracy, there is little consideration as to the binding 
or non-binding form of referenda. In other words, there is little reflection on the 
What of democracy. 
 
Referenda and plebiscites are used as evidence of a developing norm of 
democracy. How many have taken place and how the UN and other international 
actors monitored these events are collated. This concern for processes focuses 
on How. Critically, there is a failure to distinguish between referenda and 
plebiscites, thus overlooking the question of the scope of the people’s power. 
Furthermore, the monitoring of referenda and elections is treated as 
interchangeable. Where referenda are evidence of direct democracy, elections 
are an aspect of representative democracy. Using them interchangeably 
conflates them and thus a shift from representative to a direct form of democracy, 
a key moment, goes unacknowledged. The focus on process and evidence 
collection are prioritised, rather than considering the changing scope of the 
people’s power. 
 
The value of democracy with respect to independence declarations is informative 
for the What of democracy in international law. In the Kosovo advisory opinion, 
the Court suggests that international law is silent on the legality of a unilateral 
declaration of independence.97 It is not illegal to make a unilateral declaration of 
independence, but it might be illegal ‘if conjoined with illegal uses of force or [the 
                                                          
96 Jure Vidmar, ‘South Sudan and the International Legal Framework Governing the Emergence 
and Delimitation of New States’ (2011-2012) 47 Texas International Law Journal 541, 546-553. 
97 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403, [81]. 
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violation of] other peremptory norms’.98 This leaves open whether the territorial 
integrity of the parent state can trump the will of the people. Vidmar argues that 
the ICJ claimed state practice demonstrates successful independence claims 
against unwilling parent states,99 and it concluded that territorial integrity ‘is 
confined to the sphere of relations between States’.100 This does suggest that the 
will of the people can trump the parent state. In the Reference re Secession of 
Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada states that the will of the people, as 
expressed in a declaration, cannot be ignored entirely (rather it should be given 
some weight).101 Whilst the Supreme Court is clear that this does not necessarily 
lead to independence,102 it protects the people’s expression. However, scholars 
have suggested that independence claims are ineffective as they are not binding 
on the parent state.103 Vidmar contends that declarations of independence have 
no ‘self-executing legal effects’, as the parent state needs to adopt the result of 
such an independence claim,104 and where the parent state refuses, the will of 
the people can be frustrated. The international legal scholarship wrestles with the 
tension between territorial integrity and popular sovereignty; the power of the 
people alone is not sufficient.105 In essence, democracy is facilitated within 
international law provided it does not challenge the integral structures of the state. 
 
                                                          
98 ibid [20]. 
99 ibid [79]. 
100 ibid [80]. Vidmar argues that the Advisory Opinion on Kosovo is evidence that the principle of 
territorial integrity does not prohibit declaring independence. Jure Vidmar, ‘Unilateral declarations 
of independence in international law’ in Duncan French (ed), Statehood and Self-Determination: 
Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law (CUP 2013) 69. 
101 Reference re Secession of Quebec (n 45) [87]. 
102 ibid [91]. 
103 Jure Vidmar, ‘The Annexation of Crimea and the Boundaries of the Will of the People’ (2015) 
16 German Law Journal 365, 379. 
104 ibid 379. 
105 See Crawford, ‘Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future’ 
(n 55) 7. 
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If the integrity of the state is prioritised, thus frustrating the will of the people, this 
suggests that the What of democracy is compromised in favour of the state. The 
democratic and constitutionalist literature outlines a broad swathe of powers for 
the people, including the constituent power to construct their constitutional 
system.106 But, the international legal discourse generates a narrow role for the 
people.  
 
Secession remains controversial, but the debates on the role of democracy 
provide an important perspective on the What of democracy. Secession brings 
into sharp focus the tension between territorial integrity and popular sovereignty. 
Crawford states that ‘there is no recognition of a unilateral right to secede based 
merely on a majority vote of the population of a given sub-division or territory’.107 
In other words, democracy alone is not sufficient to change the territorial integrity 
of the state. But, there are other readings of key secession texts, which might 
facilitate a larger role for democracy. 
 
The ‘safeguard clause’, which is a clause in the Friendly Relations Declaration 
1970, provides protection for democratic governments;   
nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, 
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of 
a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory 
without distinction as to race, creed, or colour.108  
 
                                                          
106 Chapter 2, section 2.3.3. 
107 James Crawford ‘State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession’ (1999) 69(1) 
The British Yearbook of International Law 85, 116. 
108 UNGA, Res 2625 ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ (24 October 
1970) UN Doc A/Res/2625(XXV), principle 5 [7]. 
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In cases of potential secession in a democracy, the will of the people is in 
opposition to the democratic nature of the government, and the territorial integrity 
of the state defeats the will of the people. Crawford places the right of external 
self-determination against the right of internal self-determination, and argues that 
in a state where the government is representative of the whole population, the 
people ‘exercise the right of self-determination through their participation in the 
government system of the State on a basis of equality’.109 For Crawford, the What 
of democracy is restricted to processes of political participation within the state. 
Democracy is confined to internal, state-based processes.  
 
The meaning of ‘representative’ is pertinent for investigating the What of 
democracy. The Declaration on Friendly Relations refers to a ‘government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to 
race, creed, or colour’. In contrast, the Declaration of the Vienna World 
Conference on Human Rights 1993, invoking the ‘safeguard clause’ states; 
‘Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction of any kind’.110 The difference between these two manifestations of the 
‘safeguard clause’ raises questions about the meaning of ‘representative’ and 
how it is used in the scholarship. Crawford points to representation of ‘the whole 
people of its territory on a basis of equality’.111 Connecting Article 1 and Article 
25 of ICCPR, some scholars suggest that representative government is 
manifested through a participation in public affairs and the right to vote.112 
                                                          
109 Crawford ‘State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession’ (n 107) 117. See also, 
Reference re Secession of Quebec (n 45) [126]. 
110 UNGA, ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ (1993) UN Doc A/CONF 157/23, [2]. 
111 Crawford, ‘State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession’ (n 107) 117. 
112 Crawford argues that self-determination is connected to individual rights such as freedom of 
speech, freedom of association and the right to vote. See, Crawford, ‘The Right of Self-
determination in International Law: Its Development and Future’ (n 55) 21. 
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However, Vidmar argues that this is not necessarily the case. He contends that 
representation can be tied to issues of identity, for example race, creed or 
colour.113 Drawing on the theories of representation extrapolated in the previous 
chapter, it can be seen that international law for Vidmar, builds on a ‘trustee 
model’ of representation, where the state is not responsive but acts on behalf of 
its citizens.114 There is, then, a lack of clarity around the meaning of 
‘representative’ in international legal scholarship. Without clarification, the state 
can be labelled representative, but the What of democracy falls short of people 
participating in and making decisions.  
 
With respect to secession, a reverse reading of the ‘safeguard clause’ is possible. 
Where the government is not representative without distinction on race, creed or 
colour, external self-determination is legitimised.115 This has been called remedial 
secession. If there is a right to remedial secession, it remains controversial,116 
reserved for ‘the most extreme of cases’,117 and is linked to the gross or 
systematic violation of human rights and not merely to a negation of or call for 
democracy.118 Given this reading of the safe-guard clause, democracy has little 
purchase with respect to secession. The discussion on secession demonstrates 
the limits of democracy as conceptualised in international legal scholarship: 
                                                          
113 Vidmar points to the Declaration on Principles of International Law. Vidmar, ‘The Right of Self-
determination and Multiparty Democracy’ (n 36) 249. 
114 Chapter 2, section 2.4.2.  
115 See Crawford, The Creation of States (n 6) 119; Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of 
Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (CUP 1995) 120. 
116 In a Separate Opinion in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, Judge Cançado Trindade argued that 
‘The principle of self-determination applies in new situations of systematic oppression, 
subjugation and tyranny’. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) (Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado 
Trindade) [2010] ICJ Rep 523, [175]. Weller argues that rights violations might constitute a right 
to self-determination. See, Marc Weller, Escaping the Self-determination Trap (Brill 2008) 59-60. 
For a discussion on remedial secession see, Katherine Del Mar, ‘The myth of remedial secession’ 
in Duncan French (ed), Statehood and Self-Determination: Reconciling Tradition and Modernity 
in International Law (CUP 2013) 79-80. 
117 Reference re Secession of Quebec (n 45) [126]. 
118 Del Mar (n 116) 79. 
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democracy alone does not include the power to change state territory nor to 
challenge the integrity of the state. 
 
Investigating the relationship between democracy and self-determination, shows 
that in international legal scholarship, the What of democracy does not extend to 
changing the territory’s legal status.119 Furthermore, it highlights that there are 
instances, such as plebiscites and the construction of representation, where the 
scope of the power of people falls short of decision-making. Applying the 
Circumstances matrix to this strand of scholarship demonstrates to the need to 
reflect on the What of democracy. Franck and Fox, in using the monitoring of 
referenda and plebiscites focus on the How of democracy, at the expense of the 
other Circumstances. In particular, the failure to draw a clear distinction between 
plebiscite and referenda – or binding and non-binding referenda – demonstrates 
a lack of concern for the What of democracy.  
 
Elections  
 
Within the international legal debate on democracy, elections take prominence. 
The scholarship collects examples of elections taking place and the monitoring 
of those elections.120 Whilst there are debates as to the meaning of elections, the 
impact of elections on the scope of democracy needs to be considered.  
 
Article 25(b) of the ICCPR provides that: 
Every citizen shall have the right and opportunity, without any 
discriminations mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable 
                                                          
119 Vidmar states that democratic will cannot give a right to secession. Vidmar, ‘The Annexation 
of Crimea’ (n 103) 375-376. 
120 For example, Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 4) 108; Fox, ‘The right 
to political participation in international law’ in Fox and Roth (n 11) 85. 
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restrictions […] To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections 
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret 
ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.121  
 
From this it is clear that elections have to have a secret ballot and universal 
suffrage, but scholars have analysed this provision to consider the meaning of 
‘genuine’. Their discussions on the requirements for elections give a perspective 
on the meaning of the What of democracy.  
 
The meaning of a ‘genuine election’ is not elaborated upon in the Covenant. 
Under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the travaux 
preparatoires can be used as a subsidiary resource of interpretation if the 
meaning of the text cannot be discerned.122 In the travaux preparatoires of the 
ICCPR, a Chilean delegate states: ‘the adjective “genuine” has been used to 
guarantee that all elections of every kind faithfully reflected the opinion of the 
population and to protect the electors against government pressures’.123 
Arguably, the Chilean delegate confirms the plain reading of the text, which is 
that genuine means effectivity. For Fox, a ‘genuine election’ is one that 
guarantees the expression of the people.124 One question is whether ‘genuine’ is 
a comment on the need for multi-party elections.125 The ICCPR does not provide 
for multi-party elections.126 As Fox notes, during the Cold War socialist states 
would not agree to party pluralism.127 Vidmar points to UN General Assembly 
                                                          
121 ICCPR, Article 25. 
122 UN, ‘Vienna Convention on the law of treaties’ (concluded at Vienna on 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980) UNTS 115 331, Article 32. 
123 UNGA, ‘Third Committee at 16th Session, 1096th Meeting’ (1961) 180 cited in Fox, ‘The right 
to political participation in international law’ in Fox and Roth (n 11) 56-57.  
124 Fox, ‘The right to political participation in international law’ in Fox and Roth (n 11) 57. 
125 See Gregory H Fox, ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’ in National 
Sovereignty Revisited: Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of Democracy in International Law 
(1992) 86 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 249, 251. 
126 Vidmar, ‘The Right of Self-determination and Multiparty Democracy’ (n 36) 241. 
127 Fox, ‘The right to political participation in international law’ in Fox and Roth (n 11) 55-56. 
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resolutions that do not proclaim that elections have to ‘take place in a multiparty 
setting’, and he argues that international law does not provide for multi-party 
elections, thus restricting the scope of the people’s choice.128 Yet, multi-party 
elections are the requisite standard proffered in the scholarship. Franck demands 
multi-party elections129 and scholars have engaged with human rights documents 
to demonstrate a commitment to party pluralism.130 For example, Higgins points 
to the Human Rights Committee, which said that the principle of self-
determination is impossible to meet without multiparty elections.131 In general the 
scholarship conceives of democracy as requiring multi-party elections, and thus 
the dominant approach within this strand of international legal scholarship is that 
democracy includes the people’s power to choose representatives.  
 
Though elections are a key aspect of the discourse, it is not clear what functions 
they serve. Within the scholarship, elections are offered as aggregative of the 
common will, as indicative of opinion, as well as evidence of consent. Franck 
argues that the voting booth is ‘[t]he most important instrument for developing 
overlapping consensus’.132 This idea of consensus is suggestive of an 
aggregative model, but it falls short of consenting to government. This idea of 
garnering opinion and consensus aligns with Franck’s definition of democracy; it 
‘concerns the role of people in governance’.133 For Franck, the people only have 
a role. Fox, however, argues that democracy concerns ‘popular sovereignty’, 
which he argues means ‘the notion of citizen consent to the exercise of coercive 
                                                          
128 Vidmar, ‘The Right of Self-determination and Multiparty Democracy’ (n 36) 267. 
129 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 4) 49. 
130 Fox points to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the European Commission 
on Human Rights and the work of the UN Human Rights Committee. See, Fox, ‘The Right to 
Political Participation in International Law’ in National Sovereignty Revisited (n 125) 251.  
131 Higgins, ‘Democracy and the United Nations’ (n 6) 219; UNGA, ‘Report of the Human Rights 
Committee’. 55th Session vol II Supp No 40 (2000) UN Doc A/55/40, [291]. 
132 Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 4) 83. 
133 ibid 83. 
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power within a state’.134 For Fox, ‘popular consent is made manifest through 
competitive elections’.135 The people have a larger role in democratic government 
within Fox’s approach than in Franck’s, but it is still a liberal idea of popular 
sovereignty.136 The difference in approach is problematic because elections are 
invoked as evidence of democracy without explicitly stating the role of the people. 
In essence, international law is ambiguous as to the scope of the people’s power.  
 
A further question is the scope of the right to political participation. Vidmar argues 
that the right to political participation does not necessarily ensure multi-party 
elections.137 For the Human Rights Committee direct participation can take the 
form of consultation, ‘influence through public debate’, or individuals’ ‘capacity to 
organise themselves’, which is at a distance from the decision-making.138 Indirect 
participation is conceptualised through elections. The Human Rights Committee 
in General Comment 25 states that indirect participation is through a process of 
elections.139 On the one hand the right to political participation, could be distant 
from decision-making, and on the other hand, with respect to indirect participation 
it buttresses the elections-based conceptualisation of democracy.  
 
Within international law, democracy is referred to as a right or ‘norm of democratic 
governance’,140 a ‘right to political participation’141 and the ‘right to free and open 
                                                          
134 Fox, ‘The right to political participation in international law’ in Fox and Roth (n 11) 49. 
135 Franck, ‘Legitimacy and the democratic entitlement’ (n 31) 25; Fox, ‘The right to political 
participation in international law’ in Fox and Roth (n 11) 49. 
136 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Three Normative Models of Democracy’ (1994) 1(1) Constellations 1, 9. 
137 Vidmar, ‘The Right of Self-Determination and Multiparty Democracy’ (n 36) 259. Charlesworth 
argues that Article 25 falls short of a right to democracy because it is limited to political 
participation and political accountability. See also Charlesworth (n 12) 83 
138 General Comment No 25 (n 63) [6], [8]. Joseph et al., (n 39) 658 
139 General Comment No 25 (n 63) [7]. Joseph et al., (n 39) 655 
140 See Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (n 70) 46.  
141 See Gregory H Fox, ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’ (1992) 17 Yale 
Journal of International Law 539. 
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elections’.142 There is also an alternative ‘principle of democracy’.143 These 
different labels are used ‘with relative interchangeability’.144 The labels signify 
different legal statuses and legal obligations, and in particular, there is a 
difference in the obligations between a right to political participation and a right to 
free and fair elections. The plethora of labels risks scholars talking past each 
other without clarifying the scope of the obligations they are equating with 
democracy. Asking about the What Circumstance helps to unpack these differing 
obligations.  
 
These various labels illustrate that the question for international legal scholars in 
the 1990s (and today145) is the legal status of democracy.146 In order to debate 
the legal status, scholars collect evidence from elections monitoring and human 
rights instruments. There is a preoccupation with collecting evidence to prove a 
norm or to negate the norm.147 The project of collecting examples of elections 
and of states agreeing to international monitoring of elections, suggests that 
elections act as a measurable indicator.148 The legal status debate means that 
the scholarship prioritises evidence collection, at the expense of revisiting the 
scope of power or what democracy could mean. 
 
                                                          
142 See Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ (n 70) 52. 
143 Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions (n 25) 40. 
144 ibid 40. 
145 Higgins, ‘Democracy and the United Nations’ (n 6). 
146 Fox, ‘The right to political participation in international law’ in Fox and Roth (n 11) 48; Fox, 
‘Democracy, Right to, International Protection’ (n 33); Marks, ‘Emerging Right to Democratic 
Governance?’ (n 33) 512; d’Aspremont, ‘Post-Conflict Administrations as Democracy-Building 
Instruments’ (n 7) 6; cf. Fox, ‘The right to political participation in international law’ in Fox and 
Roth (n 11) 69. 
147 For a discussion that uses empirics to negate the norm, see Carothers (n 8) 262-263. For a 
discussion on proving and negating the norm see, Gregory H Fox and Brad R Roth, ‘Democracy 
and international law’ (2001) 27 Review of International Studies 327, 344 and 346. D’Aspremont 
engages in an exercise of collecting evidence to prove and disprove the norm, see d’Aspremont, 
‘The Rise and Fall of Democracy’ (n 10) 554. 
148 See Carothers (n 8) 264. 
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Within the international law debate on democracy the scope of democracy is 
contested. There are grand claims of popular consent and popular sovereignty, 
which are then mitigated by later discussions on elections and self-determination 
that place restrictions on the role of the people. This section highlights the need 
to reflect more convincingly on the scope of democracy. Asking the What 
question, facilitates a debate on the extent of the power of the people within 
democracy.  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter used the Who and What from the Circumstances of Democracy, to 
explore the ways in which democracy is discussed in international legal 
scholarship. The chapter demonstrates that the research methods and chosen 
fields of debate have structured the examinations of democracy. Collecting 
evidence from self-determination, elections and human rights, shapes the Who 
of democracy as international law constructs a Who bounded to the state. This 
makes it difficult to disassociate democracy from the state. Later chapters 
consider the extent to which global constitutionalist scholarship challenges this 
state-based limitation in international law.  
 
In relation to the question of What, international law prioritises a thin, procedural 
conceptualisation of democracy. The discussion on self-determination showed 
how the people’s power is curtailed in relation to the territorial integrity of the 
state. Using the Circumstances, this chapter exposed the emphasis on elections 
as a signifier of democracy and how this is prioritised at the expense of reflecting 
on the scope of people’s power. The international legal project concerns 
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determining the legal status of democracy, it therefore collects evidence of the 
norm of democracy. Evidence of the How of democracy (i.e. elections and 
elections monitoring) is more ascertainable than investigating the What of 
democracy.  
 
The Circumstances of Democracy are contested and the sub-disciplines 
approach them differently. The democratic and constitutional theory that was 
explored previously, raised several questions about the role of the people and 
their respective powers, which are not focal points within the international legal 
scholarship.149 This international scholarship builds on a select idea of 
democracy, as it has prioritised a liberal model, predicated on elections and the 
state. The international law scholarship explored in this chapter offers a potential 
starting point for further discussions of democracy in international law. Whether 
the global constitutionalist literature builds on this international legal debate or if 
it develops an approach from the constitutionalist and democratic theories will be 
explored in the next two chapters.  
 
                                                          
149 Chapter 2, sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3. 
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Chapter 4: Democracy in the Organisational Wave of Global 
Constitutionalism 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Global constitutional scholarship has a multiplicity of approaches, and one of the 
waves within this literature is dedicated to international organisations. Indeed, 
international organisations have been considered the starting point for global 
constitutionalist scholarship;1 they are both a source of constitutionalism and 
subject to constitutionalisation processes. As a source of constitutionalism, the 
constitutive treaties of international organisations are re-read as constitutions or 
seen to facilitate participation and accountability within international decision-
making.2 Some key authors even argue that the creation of new international 
organisations is also construed as constitutionalisation.3 As a subject of 
constitutionalisation, ‘limits [are placed] on the activities of international 
organisations’.4 This chapter considers how democracy is constructed within this 
wave of global constitutionalist scholarship.  
 
                                                          
1 Anne Peters, ‘Global Constitutionalism’ in Michael T Gibbons (ed), The Encyclopaedia of 
Political Thought (Wiley-Blackwell 2015). Paulus who argues that ‘[i]nternational lawyers have 
often construed international constitutionalism as an offspring of the institutionalization of 
international law’. Andreas L Paulus, ‘The International Legal System as a Constitution’ in Jeffrey 
L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and 
Global Governance (CUP 2009) 69. 
2 See Chapter 1, section 1.1. Cf Jan Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism Lite’ (2004) 1 International 
Organisations Law Review 31-58. 
3 Neil Walker, ‘Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State’ (2008) 56 Political Studies 519, 519; 
Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Between Myths and Norms: Constructivist Constitutionalism and the Potential 
of Constitutional Principles in International Law’ (2012) 81 Nordic Journal of International Law 79, 
84. Cf Erika de Wet who criticises the lack of judicial review. See, Erika de Wet, ‘The 
Constitutionalization of Public International Law’ in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2012) 1213 and 1219. 
4 Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism Lite’ (n 2) 32. 
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International relations scholars and scholars researching international 
organisations have discussed the potential for ‘Global Democracy’.5 These 
‘Global Democracy’ debates centre on the institutionalisation of democracy. 
Solutions range from creating parliamentary assemblies,6 introducing 
membership criteria for states,7 facilitating the participation of NGOs and other 
civil society actors,8 as well as reforms to voting procedures.9 In particular, there 
are discussions on the necessity of a global demos and on the creation or reform 
of particular institutions.10  
 
In contrast, the literature on the constitutionalisation of international law that 
developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s was less concerned with 
democracy.11 As noted previously, the role of democracy in legitimatising 
                                                          
5 ‘Global Democracy’ is considered here as a term of art and a label of a disciplinary discourse. 
Global Democracy, in all its institutional manifestations, is a ‘vision of a system of global 
governance that is responsive and accountable to the preferences of the world’s citizens’. See, 
Daniele Archibugi, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi and Raffaele Marchetti (eds), Global Democracy: 
Normative and Empirical Perspectives (CUP 2012) 6. 
6 Examples include: Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, ‘On the Creation of a Global Peoples 
Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty’ (2000) 36 Stanford Journal of 
International Law 191; Andreas Bummel, Developing International Democracy. For a 
Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations (Lulu 2010); John S Dryzek, André Bächtiger and 
Karolina Milewicz, ‘Toward a Deliberative Global Citizens’ Assembly’ (2011) 2(1) Global Policy 
33.  
7 For a discussion on parliamentary assemblies, see Robert Dahl, ‘Can International 
Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View’ in Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón 
(eds), Democracy’s Edges (CUP 1999) 31. See also, Thomas M Franck, Fairness in International 
Law and Institutions (Clarendon Press 1995) 483. For a discussion on membership, see Steven 
Wheatley, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law (Hart 2010) 223; Alison Duxbury, The 
Participation of States in International Organisations: The Role of Human Rights and Democracy 
(CUP 2011) 20 and 40.  
8 For example: Steve Charnovitz, ‘Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations in Global 
Governance’ in Lisa Jordan and Peter van Tuijl (eds), NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles, 
and Innovations (Routledge 2006) 21; Jan Aart Scholte, ‘Civil Society and Democratically 
Accountable Global Governance’ (2004) Government and Opposition 211, 217. 
9 José E Alvarez, ‘International Organisations: Then and Now’ (2006) 100 AJIL 324, 341; Joel P 
Trachtman, The Future of International Law: Global Government (CUP 2013) 282. 
10 See J H H Weiler, ‘The Geology of International Law – Governance, Democracy and 
Legitimacy’ (2004) 64 ZaöRV 547, 560. 
11 See Kumm’s distinction between ‘Big C’ constitutionalism and ‘small c’ constitutionalism. 
Mattias Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between 
Constitutionalism in and beyond the State’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling 
the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 260. See 
also Wheatley in his discussion on democracy and international constitutionalism, as he 
discusses the rule of law and human rights but not democratic mechanisms. See Wheatley, The 
Democratic Legitimacy of International Law (n 7) ch 4. 
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international law was not a priority, when the focus was on re-reading the 
constitutive documents of international organisations as constitutions or on the 
normative values of an international community.12  
 
There is a shift in global constitutional scholarship towards a discussion on 
democracy.13 But the extent of that discussion varies. On the one hand, scholars 
such as Peters, Petersmann, and Dunoff and Trachtman have offered detailed 
proposals for the democratisation of international organisations from a global 
constitutionalist perspective.14 On the other hand, there is a tendency to invoke 
democratic legitimacy or democracy without expanding on the details. For 
example, Cass refers to the declining role of the state, globalisation, and 
changing forms of governance as a ‘procedural (democratic) transformation’, with 
little explanation.15 If this argument is considered through the Circumstances, the 
changing role of the state is a comment on the Who of democracy and the 
changing forms of governance can be suggestive of How, but more detailed 
engagement with the Circumstances of Democracy is needed. This highlights the 
                                                          
12 See Chapter 1, section 1.5.3. Erika de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 51, 71-74.  
13 Most prominently, Anne Peters, ‘Membership in the Global Constitutional Community’ in Jan 
Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization of International Law 
(OUP 2009); Anne Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein 
(eds), The Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 2009). But also, Paulus, ‘The 
International Legal System’ (n 1); Andreas Føllesdal, ‘When Common Interests Are Not Common: 
Why the Global Basic Structure Should be Democratic’ (2009) 16(2) Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 585; Joel P Trachtman, ‘Constitutional Economics of the World Trade Organization’ 
in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, 
International Law, and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 216. 
14 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘State Sovereignty, Popular Sovereignty and Individual Sovereignty: 
From Constitutional Nationalism to Multilevel Constitutionalism in International Economic Law?’ 
(2006) EUI Law Working Paper 2006/45 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/6446> accessed 9  
September 2017; Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman, ‘A Functional Approach to International 
Constitutionalization’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? 
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 19-21 and 29; 
Trachtman, ‘Constitutional Economics’ (n 13) 216-222; Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13). 
15 Deborah Z Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization: Legitimacy, 
Democracy, and Community in the International Trading System (OUP 2005) 242. 
 
158 
speed with which commentators will label something as democratic without close 
attention to the Who, What, When, Where and How. 
 
International law, global constitutionalism, international relations and international 
politics overlap. With global constitutionalist scholars building on international 
relations theorists16 the disciplinary boundaries are unclear, but this chapter 
focuses on literatures that explicitly adopt a constitutional approach to 
international organisations. To reflect the dual focus of world constitutionalism 
(which considers more than one sector of international law) and sectoral 
constitutionalism (which focuses on a particular institution, such as the World 
Trade Organization (WTO)), this chapter considers the work of Peters as an 
example of world constitutionalism, and Trachtman, Dunoff and Petersmann for 
their distinct discussions on the WTO. The Where of global constitutionalism has 
been examined previously, so this chapter will focus on the Who, What, When 
and How.17 
 
Within the organisational wave of global constitutionalist literature, there are a 
number of themes that reoccur; the role of states and their democratic nature,18 
voting practices,19 and the participations of non-state actors, which are 
                                                          
16 Across the literature there are citations to scholars such as Held (e.g. David Held, Democracy 
and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (CUP 1995)) and 
Archibugi (e.g. Daniele Archibugi, ‘From the United Nations to Cosmopolitan Democracy’ in 
Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World 
Order (Polity Press 1995)). For example, Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 355-365. Besson 
discusses scholars from international law, global constitutionalism, and international relations. 
See, Samantha Besson, ‘Institutionalising global demoi-cracy’ in Lukas H Meyer (ed), Legitimacy, 
Justice and Public International Law (CUP 2009).  
17 See Chapter 1, section 1.1. 
18 Trachtman, ‘Constitutional Economics’ (n 13) 220; Peters ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 271. 
19 See for example, Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 287-288 (on weighted voting); Trachtman, 
‘Constitutional Economics’ (n 13) 221 (majority voting at the WTO). 
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predominantly NGOs.20 Using the Who, What, When, and How Circumstances of 
Democracy, this chapter explores both the uses of these indictors of democracy 
and their limitations.  
 
This chapter considers in depth the extent to which this wave appreciates the 
different aspects of the Circumstances of Democracy and it looks at the 
disciplinary biases that influence the debate on democracy. The next section 
focuses on two aspects; a reflection on the intra-disciplinary nature of the debate 
and an exploration of the emphasis placed on the legitimacy deficit, which 
potentially shapes a particular role for democracy.  
 
4.2 Aspects of Current Discourse in the Organisational Wave 
 
4.2.1 Disciplinary Challenges 
 
The discussion on international organisations traverses international law, 
international organisations law and theory, global governance and international 
relations scholarship, as well as discussions on constitutionalism. This section 
explores how the cross-disciplinary discussion (and the lack thereof) influences 
how democracy is discussed within this wave of global constitutionalist literature. 
It considers the influence of international organisational law, looking in particular 
at the question of accountability, how international organisational law centres the 
Where of democracy on formal organisations, and the commitment to state 
sovereignty and state consent. International law and international legal 
                                                          
20 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 315; Cf Samantha Besson, ‘Ubi Ius, Ibi Civitas: A Republican 
Account of the International Community’ in Samantha Besson and José Luis Martí (eds), Legal 
Republicanism: National and International Perspectives (OUP 2009) 227. 
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scholarship are a prominent influence on the organisational wave. The section 
considers the influence of state sovereignty on the discussions of democracy 
within this wave. Then it reflects on the role of constitutionalism discourse. 
Though there is a shift towards Big ‘C’ constitutionalism, this section considers 
whether such a discussion is limited without an engagement with the relationship 
between constitutionalism and democracy.  
 
International Organisational Law Scholarship 
 
There is an intimate relationship between the scholarship of international 
organisational law and global constitutionalist literature. It can be difficult to 
discern a divide between these literatures given that some scholars participate in 
both. For example, Klabbers and Peters straddle international organisational law 
and global constitutionalist debate.21 Furthermore, there are overlapping 
concerns within these sub-disciplines, in particular with respect to the debates on 
accountability and legitimacy at international organisations. For example, both 
Peters and Christiano address a statist and an individualistic idea of democracy22 
and they both debate the plausibility of a Parliamentary Assembly.23 Wheatley 
touches upon global constitutionalist approaches in his work on deliberative 
democracy, and his discussions on democratising the UN Security Council 
overlap with how an organisational wave seeks to institutionalise democracy 
                                                          
21 Jan Klabbers, ‘Institutional Ambivalence by Design: Soft Organizations in International Law’ 
(2001) 70 Nordic Journal of International Law 403; Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism Lite’ (n 2) 31; 
Anne Peters, ‘International Organizations: Effectiveness and Accountability’ (2016) Max Planck 
Institute Research Papers Series No. 2016-01 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2770606> accessed 9 September 2017; 
Anne Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental 
International Norms and Structures’ (2006) 19(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 579. 
22 See Thomas Christiano, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’ in Samantha 
Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (OUP 2010) 129. 
23 ibid 129. 
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beyond the state.24 International organisational law places certain restrictions on 
the discussion of democracy, and this sub-section considers the extent to which 
global constitutionalist scholarship adopts these limitations. Three restrictions will 
be discussed here. The object of study remains an open question, as the meaning 
of international organisation is not clear and if defined restrictively it can exclude 
certain aspects of global governance. There is also the question of the 
relationship between the organisation and its Member States, as understood 
within international law. Further, within international organisational law there is a 
shift to investigating accountability, which has reiterations in the global 
constitutional scholarship discussion on democracy.  
 
Firstly, there is a lack of clarity on the object of study in international 
organisational law. On the one hand, international organisational law refers to a 
narrow selection of international organisations. Sands and Klein define an 
international organisation as being composed of states or international 
organisations, established by treaty, having a will distinct from the Member State, 
vested with legal personality, and capable of adopting norms.25 This definition 
includes organisations such as the UN, the EU, and the WTO. Sands and Klein 
state that membership is composed of states and/or international organisations, 
but they do not indicate whether that is exhaustive. Sands and Klein highlight that 
such a definition excludes international NGOs and inter-state enterprises.26 There 
is a preference for formal organisations within international organisational law.27 
                                                          
24 Steven Wheatley, ‘The Security Council, Democratic Legitimacy and Regime Change in Iraq’ 
(2006) 17(3) EJIL 531; Wheatley, Democratic Legitimacy of International Law (n 7) 12-13. 
25 Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (Sweet and Maxwell 
2001) 16. 
26 ibid 16. 
27 For a discussion see Klabbers, ‘Institutional Ambivalence by Design’ (n 21) 407-408. Kratochwil 
and Ruggie document a shift away from formal organisations to regimes, but they advocate a shift 
back to organisations. See Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International 
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A tendency that is reiterated in the organisational wave.28 Such a narrow focus 
on ‘formal’ international organisations excludes other forms of governance.29 For 
example, it excludes the Commonwealth, which is a sui generis inter-national 
body. Transnational networks, such as the Basel Committee, do not fall within 
this narrow approach to international organisations based on state-consent.30 On 
the other hand, Klabbers would include Conferences of the Parties and Meetings 
of the Parties as part of international organisational law.31 Teubner, in his societal 
constitutionalism, criticises the focus on formal organisations,32 because it 
excludes non-state organisations (such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers), global standards organisations and corporate 
groupings.33  
 
The problem is that it is unclear who is conceptualised as the governors and the 
governed. The organisational wave places limits on international organisations, 
as a means of constitutionalisation, but what international organisations are 
subjected to such limitations is contested. Whilst Klabbers discusses informal 
institutions or Meetings of the Parties as potential actors, and Teubner expands 
the scope of constitutionalisation further, studies on sectoral constitutionalism 
have focused on state-created institutions, such as the WTO. This lack of clarity 
                                                          
Organization: a state of the art on an art of the state’ (1986) 40(4) International Organization 753, 
759. Cf Duxbury (n 7) 15. 
28 For the most part, the focus is on formal organisations. For example, Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ 
(n 13) (United Nations); Trachtman, ‘Constitutional Economics’ (n 13) (WTO).  
29 Teubner notes that international institutions literature tends to focus on formal international 
organizations. See, Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and 
Globalization (OUP 2012) 57. 
30 Such institutions and groupings are discussed in the principled wave. For example, Neil Walker, 
‘Beyond boundary disputes and basic grids: Mapping the global disorder of normative orders’ 
(2008) 6(3&4) I·CON 373, 381-382 (Basel Committee); Petra Dobner, ‘On the Constitutionability 
of Global Public Policy Networks’ (2009) 16(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 605. 
31 Jan Klabbers, ‘The Paradox of International Institutional Law’ (2008) 5 International 
Organizations Law Review 1, 4. 
32 Teubner, Constitutional Fragments (n 29) 54-55. 
33 ibid 55-56. 
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means that there is little understanding of the actors for the purposes of 
democracy.34 
 
Secondly, the relationship between states and international organisations, as 
understood in international organisational law, has the potential to influence 
democracy. The creation of an international organisation is predicated on state 
consent.35 Member States consent to the creation of an organisation and, as 
acknowledged by the ICJ, the powers of an organisation are tied to state 
consent.36 Within international organisational law there is a debate on the divide 
between the Member State and the organisation and the extent to which 
international organisations are autonomous. The extent to which the Member 
State and international organisation are separate has an impact on potential 
accountability mechanisms. In an accountability relationship, there is an 
‘accountor’ and an ‘accountee’,37 but within international organisational law the 
identity of these elements of the accountability chain are contested.38 This has 
ramifications as who is being held to account by whom can change.  
 
If international organisations are autonomous then they can be held directly 
accountable. Whether they are accountable to Member States or natural persons 
                                                          
34 For a discussion on the need for clarity see, Besson, ‘Ubi Ius, Ibi Civitas’ (n 20) 208 
35 Charnovitz acknowledges that the state-centricity of international institutional law ‘must be 
respected in finding solutions to the democratic deficit internationally’. See Steve Charnovitz, ‘The 
Emergence of Democratic Participation in Global Governance (Paris, 1919)’ (2003) 10(1) Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 45, 58. 
36 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, (Advisory opinion) [1949] 
ICJ Rep 174. 
37 Julia Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric 
Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2(2) Regulation and Governance 137, 150.  
38 For discussions on the complexity, see Joost Pauwelyn ‘Informal International Lawmaking: 
Framing the Concept and Research Question’ in Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A Wessel and Jan 
Wouters (eds), Informal International Lawmaking (OUP 2012); Catherine Brölmann, The 
Institutional Veil in Public International Law: International Organisations & the Law of Treaties 
(Hart 2007) 271. 
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is an open question. Alternatively, if international organisations are not 
autonomous, and their powers are derived from the states, then arguably it is the 
states that are held directly held accountable. Some argue that ‘since states 
retain sufficient direct or indirect control’ there is not a democratic deficit.39 The 
role of Member States here is problematic in a discussion on democracy. Member 
States are often used as conduits between international organisations and 
citizens,40 which means Member States act as intermediaries between 
international organisations and natural persons. As will discussed in more detail, 
this constructed chain between citizens, Member States, and international 
organisations is weak.41 The natural persons have little power within these chains 
of accountability. Furthermore, in this chain the ‘accountees’ are citizens within a 
state, thus excluding persons from other states that are potentially affected by a 
decision. To enhance such an accountability chain, would necessitate further 
accountability mechanisms within the state to ensure that the people can hold the 
state accountable and mechanisms that facilitate direct accountability links 
between persons and the international organisation.42 Where international 
organisations are held accountable by these conduit Member States, the role of 
natural persons to hold decision-makers accountable is lost.  
 
That said, there is a shift to prioritise natural persons within accountability. As 
discussed below, global constitutionalists seek to place individuals at the core of 
international law, which would make natural persons the appropriate 
                                                          
39 See Gráinne de Búrca, ‘Developing Democracy Beyond the State’ (2008) 46(2) Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 101,110. 
40 For a discussion on the shift from state consent to conduit, see Besson who presents it as a 
shift from state consent to ‘democratic state consent’. Besson, ‘Ubi Ius, Ibi Civitas’ (n 20) 214; 
Besson, ‘Institutionalising global demoi-cracy’ (n 16) 61-64. 
41 Peters, ‘Membership’ (n 13) 212. 
42 ibid 210. 
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‘accountee’.43 These natural persons could be citizens of a state. Alternatively, 
Peters argues that global citizens could be the accountee, though she dismisses 
a global citizenry in favour of nation or local-based demoi.44 Focus on individuals 
or citizens, rather than polities or demoi, fails to appreciate the tension between 
the individual and collective, and this will be explored further below.  
 
Thirdly, there is a focus on accountability in international organisational law. Since 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the study of international organisations is 
increasingly concerned with the question of accountability,45 and such a focus 
shapes the discussion on democracy. Accountability can be ex post facto or ex 
ante, so it can refer to taking into account people’s interests or giving an account, 
and it can it be legal or political.46 If accountability is the framework within which 
democracy is being discussed, elements of democracy can be side-lined 
because accountability can encompass the act of holding decision-makers to 
account and taking into account the preferences and interests of individuals.47 To 
focus on one and not the other risks the construct of only a partial idea of 
democracy. Whilst the relationship between democracy and accountability is 
complex, with accountability mechanisms forming part of democracy,48 the 
concern is that accountability becomes a compensatory approach.49 
 
                                                          
43 Jan Wouters, Nicolas Hachez and Pierre Schmitt, ‘Managerial accountability: What impact on 
international organizations’ autonomy?’ in Richard Collins and Nigel D White (eds), International 
Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy: institutional independence in the international legal 
order (Routledge 2011) 236. 
44 Peters, ‘Membership’ (n 13) 211; Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 298-300. 
45 See Klabbers, ‘The Paradox of International Institutional Law’ (n 31) 1-23; Peters, ‘International 
Organizations: Effectiveness and Accountability’ (n 21). de Búrca argues that reforms had been 
targeted at efficiency, effectiveness and output. de Búrca, ‘Developing Democracy’ (n 39) 103. 
46 For a discussion see Chapter 2, section 2.4.1.  
47 Wouters et al., (n 43) 236. 
48 Terry Macdonald and Kate Macdonald, ‘Non-Electoral Accountability in Global Politics: 
Strengthening Democratic Control within the Global Garment Industry’ (2006) 17(1) EJIL 89, 90. 
49 de Búrca, ‘Developing Democracy’ (n 39) 158. 
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Within the organisational wave of global constitutionalist scholarship, the 
meaning of accountability is not always clear. Dunoff and Trachtman refer to 
accountability mechanisms without further explanation.50 Yet, there appears to 
be a shift away from responsibility towards control.51 Peters makes accountability 
synonymous with elections52 and there is a tendency to equate accountability with 
the removal of decision-makers.53 Klabbers argues that if there is a lack of ex 
ante accountability, this can be rectified with ex post facto accountability 
mechanisms,54 But, Peters contests this as she correctly argues that complaints 
procedures cannot fill the place of people participating in decision-making and 
judicial accountability mechanisms are not substitutes for political mechanisms.55 
The ambiguity around what accountability means can risk it being associated with 
democracy when it does not sufficiently contribute to a debate on the What of 
democracy because it does not lead to the people having power in decision-
making. 
 
On the whole, scholars are not arguing that encouraging accountability amounts 
to democracy,56 rather that this concept can fill ‘the normative gap left by the 
deficiency of democracy’.57 Klabbers, for example, draws a distinction between 
                                                          
50 Dunoff and Trachtman, ‘A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization’ (n 14) 21.  
51 See the discussions on accountability in Christine E J Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in 
International Legal Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 34 and 58. 
52 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 340; Trachtman, ‘Constitutional Economics’ (n 13) 221.  
53 See Petersmann, ‘State Sovereignty, Popular Sovereignty and Individual Sovereignty’ (n 14) 
17. See also, Macdonald and Macdonald discuss control mechanisms and the giving of an 
account. Macdonald and Macdonald (n 48). 
54 Klabbers, ‘Institutional Ambivalence by Design (n 21) 420. 
55 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 339-340. 
56 Cf Dobner, who argues that accountability is part of a democratisation of global politics. Dobner, 
‘On the Constitutionability of Global Public Policy Networks’ (n 30) 607. 
57 See, de Búrca, ‘Developing Democracy’ (n 39) 126. This is a similar conversation to the Global 
Administrative Law project. See, Sabino Cassese, ‘Administrative Law without the State? The 
Challenge of Global Regulation’ (2005) 33 International Law and Politics 663, 688; Daniel Etsy, 
‘Good governance at the Supranational Scale: Global Administrative Law’ (2005-2006) Yale 
Journal of International Law 1490, 1520. 
 
167 
Franck’s ‘emerging right to democratic governance’ and accountability.58 He 
argues that the ‘right to democratic governance’, whilst plausible within states, is 
not evident at the international organisational level and instead, accountability is 
sufficient.59 Nevertheless, the closeness with which democracy and ex post facto 
accountability are discussed,60 without consideration as to how they sit in tension 
with one another, risks accountability being treated as democracy. 
 
Accountability as a dominant theme within international organisational law 
shapes the discussion on democracy through its emphasis on particular 
mechanisms, and the role of the state within the international organisations 
influences the Who of such an accountability process. Constructing an idea of 
democracy around accountability alone generates a shallow debate, as the 
extent of the power of the people within democracy is disregarded.  
 
International Law and Global Constitutionalism  
 
Scholars in the organisational wave of global constitutionalist scholarship place 
reliance on the international law discussion on the ‘norm of democratic 
governance’, which was discussed in Chapter 3.61 Peters, for example, points to 
Franck as evidence that states should be democratic.62 As will be unpacked in 
                                                          
58 Klabbers, ‘The Paradox of International Institutions Law’ (n 31) 16-17. 
59 ibid 16-17. 
60 Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective (n 51) 22; Petersmann, 
‘State Sovereignty, Popular Sovereignty and Individual Sovereignty’ (n 14) 24. 
61 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 264. See also, Hauke Brunkhorst, ‘Constitutionalism and 
Democracy in the World Society’ in Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism? (OUP 2010) 191; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘European and International 
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Norms’ (n 3) 80. 
62 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 273. 
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more detail below, this assimilation of the international legal discourse on 
democracy is problematic. That scholarship was shown to be constructed on a 
narrow, state-centric idea of the demos and tied to procedural ideas of democracy 
that were predicated on elections.63  
 
Within this wave of global constitutionalist scholarship, popular sovereignty sits 
in tension with state sovereignty.64 In her discussion on the global community, 
Peters does not go as far as to endorse popular sovereignty,65 but in her 
discussion on ‘Dual Democracy’, she argues that state sovereignty is 
reconceptualised as being built on popular sovereignty.66 When discussing the 
state as a member of an international or global community, the state is sovereign, 
but when discussing the state as a container of democracy, the people are 
sovereign. This inconsistent use of popular sovereignty raises questions about 
the relationship between state and popular sovereignty.  
 
Global constitutionalists sit in a trajectory of international law scholarship that 
calls for and documents the shift from state to popular sovereignty.67 Whilst, the 
starting point is that states are sovereign and equal, scholars including global 
constitutionalists, attempt to revise this notion of state sovereignty by using 
international human rights law to show that states have ‘responsibility’ for their 
citizens.68 Reisman goes further, and he argues that human rights, self-
                                                          
63 See Chapter 3. 
64 Examples include: Petersmann, ‘State Sovereignty, Popular Sovereignty and Individual 
Sovereignty’ (n 14); Besson, ‘Ubi Ius, Ibi Civitas’ (n 20) 232.  
65 Peters, ‘Membership’ (n 13). 
66 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 272. 
67 For discussions on the changing role of sovereignty, see W Michael Reisman, ‘Sovereignty and 
Human Rights in Contemporary International Law’ (1990) 84(4) AJIL 866; Jean L Cohen, 
‘Sovereignty in the Context of Globalization: A Constitutional Pluralist Perspective’ in Samantha 
Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (OUP 2010) 269-270. 
68 See, Peters, ‘Membership’ (n 13) 185; See also Cohen, ‘Sovereignty in the Context of 
Globalization’ (n 67) 261 and 269-270.  
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determination and the emerging right to democratic governance, are evidence 
that international law is no longer concerned with the sovereign state but with 
popular sovereignty.69  
 
However, responsibility is not akin to representation or popular sovereignty. 
Global constitutionalists, such as Peters and Tomuschat have equated 
sovereignty as responsibility with the idea that states are representative of their 
citizens.70 Building on human rights provisions and the norm of democratic 
governance, these scholars argue, as Tomuschat states, that it is the function of 
states ‘to serve the interests of their citizens’.71 But the responsibility idea and the 
norm of democratic governance is internal to the state, with little investigation by 
the global constitutionalists on mechanisms within the state to ensure states 
‘serve’ its citizens in foreign affairs. Moreover, reliance on the ‘emerging norm of 
democratic governance’ thesis leads to an approach to popular sovereignty that 
is contained within specific, state-based democratic processes.72 The people 
have limited powers within this conceptualisation of democracy, which is 
restricted to electing and rejecting governments.73 This limited idea of popular 
sovereignty, does little to challenge the integrity of the state and leaves intact 
state sovereignty and the idea that the states are the leading subjects of 
international law.74 
                                                          
69 Reisman (n 67) 869. 
70 Peters, ‘Membership’ (n 13) 185; Christian Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the 
Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century’, General Course on Public International Law 
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73 ibid 9. 
74 See Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal from 
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170 
 
The tension between state and popular sovereignty arises from a dual-agenda 
within global constitutionalist scholarship, which can be either descriptive or 
normative. A descriptive approach in global constitutionalist literature is situated 
within the current international legal frameworks, where there is arguably a shift 
towards state responsibility, but international law is still constructed on the 
centrality of states. In contrast, a normative approach in global constitutionalist 
literature, building on constitutionalist theory, advocates popular sovereignty. 
Peters begins her discussion on democracy in a normative approach, which 
would mean that democracy is popular sovereignty,75 but as such a discussion is 
restricted by the current international legal framework, she adopts a descriptive 
method that incorporates state sovereignty. Under the normative approach, if 
individuals are at the core, if they have the potential to hold constituent power, 
and they made a collective decision to create a Parliamentary Assembly or to 
change the membership criteria at international organisations, the states would 
have to comply. However, adopting a descriptive approach, Peters argues that 
certain organisational reforms, such as the creation of an assembly or the change 
to membership criteria, cannot take place because international law is predicated 
on state sovereignty and state consent.76 As states will not consent to an 
assembly, for Peters, it is not possible.77 This sits at odds with the idea that states 
act on behalf or in the best interests of their citizens.  
 
                                                          
phenomena as the ‘centrality of the state’. See, Karen Knop, ‘Re/Statements: Feminism and State 
Sovereignty in International Law’ (1993) 3 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 292, 
308. 
75 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 267. 
76 ibid 293 (membership criteria) and 320 (Parliamentary Assembly). 
77 ibid 325. 
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Within Peters’ global constitutionalist model, popular and state sovereignty 
coexist because she attempts to balance a normative and descriptive approach. 
Whilst in theory there is nothing wrong with advancing a normative claim and then 
explaining how in the current climate it would not work, such a shift is not made 
explicitly. Furthermore, using a descriptive or empirical argument to undermine a 
normative problem, suggests that the commitment to democracy within her 
account of global constitutionalism is not that strong. If state consent can trump 
democracy, this strips democracy of weight. The debate over popular and state 
sovereignty is unresolved, and the dual normative and descriptive agenda makes 
it difficult to locate sovereignty.  
 
As will be explored in more detail below, the organisational wave of global 
constitutionalist scholarship attempts to weaken the state-centricity of 
international law. It seeks to place the individual at the core of international law, 
for example. However, as this sub-section highlighted, the wave does little to 
challenge state sovereignty. Building on the international legal discourse on 
democracy, which keeps intact the integrity of the state, this wave allows state 
sovereignty to frustrate democratic processes. The Circumstances facilitates a 
discussion on the What of democracy, which exposes that when state sovereignty 
and the centrality of the state trumps the will of the people, the people do not 
have much power. 
 
Constitutionalism and Global Constitutionalist Scholarship  
 
The meaning of constitutionalism changes across the history of international and 
global constitutionalist literature. Kumm sums up this shift by distinguishing 
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between ‘small c’ constitutionalism, which focuses on questions of hierarchy, and 
‘big c’ constitutionalism, which is open to public law discussions.78 Such a neat 
divide overlooks the different approaches to constitutionalism, and other scholars 
have sought to establish the type of constitutionalism used within global 
constitutionalist scholarship.79 This sub-section argues that alongside an 
awareness of the type of constitutionalism, there is also need for a discussion on 
the relationship between democracy and the approach taken to constitutionalism.  
 
In this wave of global constitutionalist scholarship, democracy has an 
instrumental role.80 Democracy is tied up with questions of accountability and 
placing limits on the powers of international organisations.81 Focusing on 
restricting power can give rise to a limited understanding of the What of 
democracy. Within this wave the restrictions are derived from the idea of ex post 
facto accountability mechanisms. Moreover, the use of democracy in the 
limitation of power, but not the allocation of power – or in other words, the use of 
democracy in everyday decision-making, but not in constitutional moments – 
demonstrates a narrow approach to the When of democracy.  
 
Within this organisational wave, discussing democracy as a norm or principle of 
constitutionalism is a common trope.82 Fassbender engages in a comparative 
                                                          
78 Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism’ (n 11) 260. 
79 Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective (n 51); von Bogdandy, 
‘Constitutionalism in International Law’ (n 74). 
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81 See above, section on International Organisational Law. See also, Louis J Kotzé, ‘Arguing 
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exercise in which he argues that democracy is a ‘common constitutional value’,83 
and reaches the conclusion that democracy is a norm of constitutionalism. 
Assuming that democracy is a norm of constitutionalism, risks conceptualising 
them as compatible and potentially conflating the two ideas, thus side-lining the 
important tensions. 
 
There is some acknowledgement that constitutionalism and democracy are not 
synonymous. Petersmann, for example, identifies that approaches to 
constitutionalism will discuss democracy differently. Yet, Petersmann’s use of 
constitutional democracy is an example of how the tension between the two ideas 
can get lost. He argues that there are three functions of democracy in 
constitutional democracy: ‘to legitimise “government of the people”’, ‘to constitute 
and limit “government by the people” through democratic institutions’, and ‘to 
promote participatory deliberative democracy’.84 In this approach, democracy is 
said to ‘limit “government by the people”’, but the traditional view is that 
democracy is limited through a tension with the principles of constitutionalism 
(such as the rule of law, human rights and the separation of powers).85 Walker 
would argue that democratic institutions, such as political parties and 
representative parliaments are aspects of constitutionalism, which act to realise 
democracy.86 Werner would prefer to conceptualise them as constructed through 
the constitution.87 How democracy and constitutionalism interact is lost in 
Petersmann’s approach; democracy is said to limit itself, rather than appreciating 
                                                          
83 Bardo Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter As Constitution of The International 
Community’ (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529, 554. 
84 Petersmann, ‘European and International Constitutional Law’ (n 61) 95. 
85 ibid 95. 
86 Neil Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: An Iterative 
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87 Wouter G Werner, ‘Democracy, Constitutionalism and the Question of Authority’ (2010) 39(3) 
Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie 267, 268. 
 
174 
that it is the tension with constitutionalism that shapes democracy. To have a 
discussion on democracy, it first needs to be understood without being ‘defined 
up’.88 What is needed is a reflection on the relationship between constitutionalism 
and democracy. 
 
One of the differences between the waves of global constitutionalist thought is 
the sources used. The organisational wave prioritises international and 
international organisational law. These choices with respect to method shape the 
discourse on democracy. Building on international and international organisations 
law constructs a dialogue that is restrained by the accountability debate and the 
need to protect state sovereignty, which leaves a bereft discourse lacking in the 
rich debates on people’s power found in constitutional and democratic theory.  
 
4.2.2 The Legitimacy Deficit 
 
International organisations are increasingly exercising administrative functions 
that previously belonged to the state.89 There is an anxiety that decisions made 
at international organisations override democratic decisions made at the state-
level, eroding national sovereignty and democracy within the state.90 Global 
constitutionalists have sought to tackle how to legitimise international 
organisations and protect democracy.91 Whilst legitimacy is a social construct, 
                                                          
88 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.1. Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ 
(n 86) 211. 
89 Weiler, ‘The Geology of International Law’ (n 10) 561; Errol P Mendes, Global Governance, 
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and there are different factors that can be used to construct it, democracy is 
increasingly important.92 
 
At the global level, there is no consensus on how to respond to the legitimacy 
deficit of international organisations. Global constitutionalists can respond by 
discussing the legitimacy of the international organisation, and suggesting 
democracy as the panacea, or they focus on the protection of domestic 
democracy.93 This gives rise to an inconsistent discussion on democracy 
because there is no agreed understanding of Where, with some scholars arguing 
that it is to remain within states and protected by the constitutionalisation of 
international organisations, others arguing for a complementary democratic 
constitutionalisation at the international level.  
 
Legitimacy can be understood as either input or output, and global 
constitutionalist scholarship responds by discussing democracy as enhancing 
either. In relation to ‘input’, there are discussions about transparency, 
representation and participation.94 In respect to ‘output’, most discussions focus 
on the effectiveness of decision-making,95 but there are discussions about 
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decisions being for the benefit of the people,96 which is arguably an aspect of 
democracy.97 In legitimacy scholarship, there are debates on the relationship 
between input and output legitimacy,98 but within the global constitutionalist 
scholarship either input or output is prioritised.99 Klabbers suggests that output 
legitimacy can compensate for the lack of input legitimacy.100 Peters critiques this 
arguing that decisions cannot be made on behalf of the citizens, rather processes 
have to take into account citizens’ interests.101 This disconnect between, and 
potential conflation of, input and output legitimacy has implications for the role of 
the people. Whilst the people have a role in input legitimacy, output legitimacy 
operates to instigate decisions on their behalf. 
 
Legitimising international organisations constructs a particular role for 
democracy. Democracy, it is argued, can have instrumental and/or foundational 
value.102 For example, Franck uses the discussion on democracy and 
international parliaments to incorporate ‘fairness into international law and 
institutions’.103 Democracy for Franck is tied to the idea of fairness, and as such 
he asks questions about the inclusion of certain groups, or in other words, he 
                                                          
96 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 340. 
97 Richard Bellamy, ‘Democracy without democracy? Can the EU’s democratic “outputs” be 
separated from the democratic “inputs” provided by competitive parties and majority rule?’ (2010) 
17(1) Journal of European Public Policy 2, 3. Cf Ferejohn who outlines the difference between 
government for and government by the people. John Ferejohn, ‘Accountability in a Global Context’ 
(2007) Institute for International Law and Justice Working Paper 2007/5 
<http://www.iilj.org/publications/accountability-in-a-global-context/ > accessed 9 September 2017  
98 Vivien A Schmidt, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output 
and “Throughput”’ (2013) 61 Political Studies 2; Harlow, ‘The Limping Legitimacy of EU 
Lawmaking’ (n 95) 47. 
99 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Multilevel Trade Governance in the WTO Regimes: Multilevel 
Constitutionalism’ in Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, 
Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation (Bloomsbury Publishing 2006) 20-21. 
100 See Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’ (n 94) 40-41. Cf Weiler, ‘The Geology of international law’ 
(n 10) 562. 
101 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 340. Dobner also criticises such substitutions, see Dobner, 
‘On the Constitutionability of Global Public Policy Networks’ (n 30) 607. 
102 T D Christiano, ‘Democracy: Normative Theory’ in James D Wright (eds), International 
Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Elsevier Science & Technology 2015) 3414-
3415. 
103 Trimble (n 90) 1948. 
 
177 
asks about the Who of democracy in his discussion on international forums.104 In 
contrast, within the organisational wave, democracy’s commitment to 
participation or accountability is often offered as a panacea. Where the focus is 
on participation and accountability, questions shift to the How, as will be 
discussed in detail below. This instrumental role of democracy sidesteps 
foundational questions, such as the What of democracy.  
 
Global constitutionalist scholarship is cross-disciplinary in nature, influenced by 
international law, constitutionalism and international organisational law. These 
sub-disciplines prioritise particular research questions, which have the impact of 
focusing on certain Circumstances. This organisational wave exhibits an overlap 
with international organisational law, making it unclear what is ‘constitutionalist’ 
about this wave. The organisational wave adopts international and international 
organisational law perspectives with little engagement with constitutional 
discourse, allowing international structures, such as sovereignty, to frustrate 
democracy.  
 
4.3 The Circumstances of Democracy 
 
4.3.1 Who 
 
The plausibility of a demos beyond the state preoccupies global constitutionalist 
scholars.105 From the discussions on democracy in the previous chapter, it is 
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derived that the demos is a group of individuals that may be constructed through 
territory, nationality, or some looser sense of commonality.106 Who falls within the 
demos is unclear in the organisational wave of global constitutionalist literature. 
This section considers the actors that are discussed with reference to democracy 
and the role of the international community in demarcating a demos.  
 
The role of individuals within the demos is contested. Whilst a classical and 
republican model would prioritise the group over the ‘active’ individual, a liberal 
model focuses on the rights of individuals.107 When democracy is discussed 
beyond the state, the fixation on the lack of demos means that these nuances are 
sometimes lost. This section will discuss the role of states and individuals within 
the construction of democracy. This section first considers the role of the 
international community in the discourse. It will then use Peters’ distinction 
between an individual and a statist-track of democracy to explore the role of 
states. Finally, it explores the role of individuals and their relationship with the 
community, within this wave of global constitutionalist scholarship.  
 
The International Community 
 
The international community plays a central role within international and global 
constitutionalist discourse.108 But, who falls within the community is contested. 
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Whether it includes just states or also international organisations and non-state 
actors is debated. A pertinent question to this inquiry is whether the international 
community is an appropriate starting point for the Who of democracy.109  
 
There is ambiguity around the meaning of the international community; whilst it 
can mean states,110 it can also mean individuals of the world,111 or it can also 
mean a collection of normative values.112 Fassbender draws a distinction 
between the international society and community to show that community goes 
beyond actors, and suggests a commonality.113 He argues that the international 
community can be said to be constituted of states, international organisations, 
peoples and minorities, belligerent parties, individuals, and special entities, which 
he states includes the Holy See.114 Peters discusses the ‘global’ community as 
including states, organisations, individuals, transnational corporations, public-
private partnerships, and NGOs.115 The lack of clarity on the members of the 
international community makes it difficult to identify the Who of democracy.  
 
Arguably, both the international community and the participants referred to in 
debates on global democracy are constructed from the same actors: namely a 
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mix of individuals, states, NGOs. However, for Peters the roles of these actors 
are different. In relation to the international community, the relationship between 
individuals and states is conceptualised as follows: individuals are ‘the ultimate 
normative source of international law’ and the state acts for the benefit of its 
people.116 In contrast, when democracy is the topic, it is citizens (and not 
individuals) that are conceived as the ‘ultimate source of political authority’.117 
This change between individuals and citizens needs to be unpacked. It constructs 
a disconnect as ‘citizens’, rather than individuals, implies some form of 
membership (however loosely enforced) and this raises questions about how 
people are excluded.  
 
Moreover, democracy is built from the demos – which means a group of people 
and not just individuals – and this can sit at odds with the protection of the 
individual.118 The use of human rights provisions to revise sovereignty in light of 
the rights of the individual has the potential to shift the discussion away from 
groups of people (i.e. demos) towards individuals. However, as shown, 
democracy and constitutionalism work together to protect individual rights and 
collective decision-making.119 Conflating democracy and constitutionalism, to 
prioritise the protection of the rights of individuals, undermines the idea of 
collective self-government.120  
 
                                                          
116 Peters, ‘Membership’ (n 13) 155. 
117 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 264 (emphasis added). 
118 Besson, ‘Sovereignty, International Law and Democracy’ (n 61) 383; Cf Petersmann, 
‘European and International Constitutional Law’ (n 61) 86. 
119 Chapter 2, section 2.2.1. Jürgen Habermas, ‘Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union 
of Contradictory Principles?’ (2001) 29(6) Political Theory 766, 767. 
120 Volk argues that global constitutionalism places undue weight on individuals, and he criticises 
this individualism as it is evocative of a liberal approach. See Christian Volk, ‘Why Global 
Constitutionalism Does not Live up to its Promises’ (2012) 4(2) Goettingen Journal of International 
Law 551, 560. For a discussion on the tension between individuals and community, see Besson, 
‘Sovereignty, International Law and Democracy’ (n 61) 383. 
 
181 
Furthermore, Peters talks of state responsibility in relation to the international 
community, but popular sovereignty when discussing democracy.121 This 
suggests that citizens as actors within global democracy are considered 
sovereign, but sovereignty within the international community is contested, and 
is more likely to lie with the state. The relationship between democracy and 
popular sovereignty is contested,122 but if the people are not sovereign they lack 
power over governments.  
 
If the international community prioritises citizens rather than demoi and negates 
the sovereignty of the people, it is not an appropriate foundation for a discussion 
on democracy. To the extent that the international community refers to 
individuals, there is a concern about how the organisational wave seeks to 
balance the individual’s interests with the collective decision-making of 
democracy. Furthermore, where the people are included, they are not considered 
to be sovereign. Constructing the international community in this way and using 
it as a unit of democracy within global constitutionalist scholarship, raises 
problems if democracy is a form of collective governance. 
 
State and Individual  
 
Peters argues that there are two tracks that can explain the approach to demos 
in global constitutionalism; the statist and the individualistic track.123 Within the 
broad church of global constitutionalist scholarship, some favour a statist-track 
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and others favour a hybrid of the two tracks.124 This sub-section outlines the two 
tracks and considers the relationship between the state and individual within 
global constitutional thought.  
 
The ‘statist-track’ starts from the position that states are ‘the ultimate reference 
point’ in international law125 and it prioritises the sovereign equality between 
states.126 In other words, this track is developed from positivist international law, 
where the state is considered the dominant actor in global governance.127 Whilst 
Peters challenges this position, and argues that within global constitutional law, 
there are differing obligations across the different actors and states are not ‘the 
“primary” subjects of international law’,128 state-centricity underpins the 
approaches in this organisational wave.  
 
The first way to discuss democracy in the statist-track is through the idea of the 
equality between sovereign states.129 Franck, when initiating a discussion on 
democratic governance in international law, equated states with people, saying 
that states were ‘free, equal, and autonomous beings’.130 States could then be 
the unit of inter-state democracy.131 The argument then runs that the 
representation of different states at international organisations is sufficient for 
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international democracy.132 However, within this approach, there is little 
connection to the people.133 It is becoming apparent that states cannot be 
assumed to represent their citizens,134 and in this model such representation is 
not even required. Whilst the modalities, such as participation and deliberation of 
actors are part of the discussion, the people are obscured.  
 
A second way to approach democracy within the statist-track is to conceptualise 
the state as a conduit between international organisations and citizens of a 
state.135 In this approach, states act on behalf of their citizens, with their 
legitimacy being derived from ‘how they serve individuals as members of 
humanity’.136 For this to amount to democratisation, the argument goes that 
states need to be democratic.137 Tomuschat argues that any democratic 
legitimacy of international law is derived from the democratic nature of states.138 
The international organisations are ‘democratised’ to the extent that the Member 
States are democratic. Whether a state is democratic could be assessed using 
the range of democracy indices, but in the literature, reference is made to the 
literature on the ‘norm of democratic governance’, discussed in Chapter 3.139 
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Peters, for example, looks at the potential requirements for democracy in 
statehood and the recognition of governments.140  
 
This approach was critiqued previously and it assumes that individuals are 
represented by the states and that states are appropriate sites for decision-
making.141 There is an assumption within the statist-track that individuals are 
‘entirely and properly “mediated” by their states in international organizations’.142 
However, as the previous chapter demonstrated, the human rights framework 
restricts the right to vote to citizens,143 thus potentially ostracizing other persons 
in the population. Moreover, within international law the executives, rather than 
parliaments act as state representatives and as is discussed in more detail below, 
parliaments’ role can be fairly limited.144 This means that the link between 
populations and international organisations is stretched. Furthermore, even if 
states are democratic, Dahl argues, domestic democratic procedures are not 
concerned with foreign relations, and he argues that populations can be poorly 
informed about inter-state decisions.145 Thus, states are not appropriate conduits. 
 
The state-based framework also excludes those persons that fall outside states 
(e.g. diaspora, stateless persons) or are not represented by states as in some 
cases the rights of minority groups are not protected. Moreover, the 
interconnectedness of globalisation means that decisions in one country can 
impact on another and yet, a state’s domestic democracy does not represent or 
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necessarily consider another state’s population.146 As noted by Paulus, 
transnational decision-making cannot be fixed by democracy within the states.147 
The states are no longer sufficient containers of decision-making. Transnational 
concerns, such as terrorism, global poverty and climate change, mean that 
domestic states are unable to provide ‘the collective answer’ necessary to 
address these problems.148 So the statist-track is not conducive to the type of 
global democracy that is proffered in this organisational wave. 
 
One of the implications of the statist-track and the idea that states act as conduits 
is that democracy becomes bounded by the state. For Petersmann, initially, 
democracy takes place within the state and the role of the international 
organisation (in this case the WTO) is to promote democracy within the state.149 
It is not sufficient for global constitutionalists to end their inquiry at state-level 
democracy because the state is not the sole locus of decision-making, and to limit 
the inquiry to states excludes persons within states who are not citizens and 
persons outside of the state framework that might be affected by decisions.  
 
The individualist-track places individuals at the core of international law.150 
Traditionally, in international law, individuals are objects of international law.151 
This individualist-track builds on a trend within international legal scholarship both 
to revise this conceptualisation of individuals and the importance of state 
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sovereignty.152 On this track, international organisations should be accountable 
to the individuals and individuals should participate or be represented at the 
international level.  
 
There is an ambiguity around the meaning of individual and how these individuals 
are grouped, if at all.153 On the one hand, they are conceptualised as 
individuals.154 Individuals (or natural persons) as a collective constitute 
humanity.155 On the other hand, they are conceptualised as citizens.156 The 
discussion in the previous chapter on citizens, demonstrated that there is a 
disconnect in human rights law between the population as a whole and 
citizens.157 Llanque critiques the distinction between individuals and citizens; he 
exposes that the citizenry is a section of the population, whereas individuals can 
be said to constitute the people or the population.158 Focusing on citizens has the 
potential to exclude persons. The organisational wave of global constitutionalist 
literature suggests its notion of democracy encompasses humanity, and yet 
building this idea of democracy on citizenship limits the franchise. 
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Within global constitutionalist thought there are several approaches to 
citizenship. Firstly, there is domestic citizenship and as such, the individuals are 
still conceptualised as being within a state.159 Secondly, there is discussion on a 
global citizenry.160 Cosmopolitanism is built on an ‘all-inclusive citizenship’, 161 in 
which all of humanity is a member. Building on the cosmopolitan approach, 
Peters discusses a global citizenry, and although she claims that the global 
citizen should sit alongside state citizenry, she then dismisses the global idea as 
too abstract.162 Thirdly, there is an acknowledgement of multiple demoi.163 For 
example, the EU is described as constituted of multiple demoi rather that a single 
demos. Within this approach, the global citizenry sits alongside other allegiances, 
including state citizenship and local or regional identities.164 The fluidity of demoi 
offers an attempt to move away from the state-contained demos. Peters’ 
discussion revolves around rights and duties of citizens,165 so it is imperative to 
reflect on how ideas of citizenship can limit the franchise, especially as scholars 
rarely indicate what is meant by ‘citizen’ and the term ‘citizen’ is used 
interchangeably with individuals.  
 
In addition to individuals and citizens, other non-state groups are raised as the 
relevant unit of democracy. One such group is the idea of relevant 
stakeholders.166 Macdonald and Macdonald use the term ‘stakeholder’ to refer to 
‘individuals affected (in ways that implicate democratic values of autonomy and 
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equality)’.167 The use of stakeholder as a unit will require a method of determining 
those that are ‘affected’, and political scientists have proposed a number of 
different methods.168 This is another mechanism to demarcate the demos without 
relying on the state boundaries. However, it is not always clear what is meant by 
a stakeholder, they are not necessarily individuals as companies and private 
actors can have a stake in a decision. Though stakeholder is predominantly 
invoked to refer to relevant individuals, it can also be used to refer to private 
actors and thus exclude persons.169 This complexity around the use of 
stakeholder is illustrative of the problem of ascertaining the Who in global 
constitutionalist literature. The lack of clarity around Who risks talking about 
different actors without linking them back to the people.  
 
Take, for example, the WTO. The WTO is criticised for its democratic deficit.170 
To rectify this, Shaffer proposes a consultative inter-parliamentary body, where 
national politicians (most likely members of ‘trade committees of national 
parliamentary bodies’) attend.171 He argues that a WTO parliamentary body 
would facilitate the participation of stakeholders.172 Yet, as discussed above, the 
meaning of stakeholder is contested within this wave and Shaffer refers to 
countries, persons, and businesses as potential stakeholders.173 He proposes to 
                                                          
167 Macdonald and Macdonald (n 48) 94. 
168 Robert E Goodin, ‘Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives’ (2007) 35(1) 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 40, 48; Nancy Fraser, Scales of Justice: Reimaging Political Space 
in a Globalizing World (Columbia University Press 2010) 95-96; Laura Valentini, ‘No global 
demos, no global democracy? A systematization and critique’ (2014) 12(4) Perspectives on 
Politics 789; Thomas Christiano, ‘Is Democratic Legitimacy possible for International Institutions?’ 
in Daniele Archibugi, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi and Raffaele Marchetti (eds), Global Democracy: 
Normative and Empirical Perspectives (CUP 2011) 7. 
169 James Tully, Jeffrey L Dunoff, Anthony F Lang JR, Mattias Kumm and Antje Wiener, ‘Editorial: 
Introducing global integral constitutionalism’ (2016) 5(1) Global Constitutionalism 1, 8. 
170 Mendes (n 89) 152. 
171 Gregory Shaffer, ‘Parliamentary Oversight of WTO Rule-Making: The political, normative, and 
practical contexts’ (2004) 7(3) Journal of International Economic Law 629, 651-652. 
172 ibid 629. 
173 ibid 649. 
 
189 
assess the democratic nature of this assembly by the extent to which ‘less 
powerful stakeholders’ participate, but given that this could be countries or 
businesses, it does not ensure a genuine link to the people.174  
 
Moreover, this proposal is predicated on a state-based idea of democracy. The 
representatives are elected for their role as national politicians and not 
international politicians. Although the Where shifts beyond the state, the Who is 
girded by the state, thus potentially excluding relevant members of the demos. If 
the Circumstances of Democracy are to align, the Who must move beyond the 
state as well. How this is achieved is subject to much controversy, with debates 
ranging from all-affected and all-subjected principles to new ideas of 
constituency.175 This thesis does not offer the answer, but rather initiates a 
discussion on the types of questions that should be asked to avoid the sorts of 
pitfalls made in the current literature.  
 
Moreover, this discussion on stakeholders raises a question about the role of the 
individuals. As noted previously, classical and republican democratic theory 
subsumes the individual within the community.176 Whilst the liberal approach 
focuses on rights, the republican approach constructs an active concept of 
citizenship.177 Llanque outlines that within a constitution, citizens are given 
various roles and attributes: rational thought, dedication to the common good, 
and indifference to their own personal benefit.178 In republican thought, where the 
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citizen is virtuous, the individual has to go through a process to transform into a 
citizen.179 Liberalism rejects this for it potentially limits who is a citizen and taken 
to the extreme could become an ‘educational dictatorship’, where individuals are 
taught how to behave as citizens.180 This demonstrates tensions around how to 
reconcile the individual and the collective. Even within the cosmopolitan ideal of 
an all-inclusive citizenry, there is a standard of rationality and responsibility 
required.181 Focusing on individuals, as the organisational wave does, overlooks 
this problem. 
 
The global constitutionalist scholars in this organisational wave do not explicitly 
engage with how the relationship between the individual and the collective 
impacts on democracy. Rather a liberal model is adopted, where the individual is 
prioritised.182 The idea of individuals having particular roles or character traits 
within the community is also not challenged by the global constitutionalists. It is 
not sufficient, as von Bogdandy suggests, to say that the international community 
merely amounts to a ‘self-aware and organized group of human beings’.183 For 
the individuals and the citizens within such a community have particular roles and 
competencies attached to them.184 Global constitutionalist scholarship should 
engage with the relationship between the individual and the collective, which is 
part of the broader tension between constitutionalism and democracy.  
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There is no one approach to the Who within global constitutionalist literature. A 
range of actors, from states, individuals, relevant stakeholders, and non-state 
actors are discussed. A problem with this is that these actors do not ensure 
people have power in decision-making. The link to the demos as the unit of 
democracy, so that it is people who have the power over decision-making, is often 
stretched to accommodate the role of states and NGOs in current global decision-
making.  
 
4.3.2 What 
 
When it comes to the question of the extent of the power of the people, there is 
no one answer in the organisational wave. Building on the assumption that 
democracy within the state cannot be directly transferred to the global level, 
global constitutionalists in this wave seek to revise democracy, and as such 
different definitions of democracy are proffered, from the idea that people should 
influence political decisions, to the notion that people should decide the rules that 
‘govern their collective life’.185 Whilst some scholars argue that democracy 
requires popular sovereignty, others are more concerned with the influence of 
people within decision-making. This section considers the difference between 
voice and vote to explore how the organisational wave approaches the What of 
democracy.  
 
Popular Sovereignty 
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The meaning of popular sovereignty in this wave of global constitutionalist 
scholarship is unclear as invocations of popular sovereignty are infrequent and 
lack detail. Whilst Dobner argues that democracy is concerned with popular 
sovereignty within states,186 it is not discussed by Trachtman and Dunoff, nor 
Fassbender, and mentioned only in passing by Cottier.187 In this wave, popular 
sovereignty can be the source of governmental legitimacy,188 and it can invoke 
the idea of an absolute and indivisible idea of sovereignty located in the people.189 
Petersmann, however, draws distinctions between political sovereignty, 
constitutional sovereignty, democratic sovereignty and individual sovereignty.190 
Though he does not define popular sovereignty, he argues that ‘human rights and 
popular sovereignty include citizens’ rights to participate in the election of 
governments and in the exercise of government power which must be based on 
“the will of the people”’.191 Whilst the idea of participating in elections invokes a 
liberal idea of popular sovereignty, the suggestion that the will of the people 
underpins the exercise of government is suggestive of a republican ideal.192 
Conflating the liberal and republican approaches to popular sovereignty, gives 
rise to an ambiguity of the scope of power held by the people. This lack of clarity 
means that it is difficult to ascertain the What of democracy.  
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Voice or Vote 
 
As a political process of decision-making, democracy is traditionally defined as 
‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’.193 Yet, there are 
repeated attempts to weaken the role of people within democracy in this wave of 
global constitutionalist literature. Peters, for example, cites this quote by Lincoln, 
and then states that this means; ‘democratic government requires that the 
citizens can give their input to decisions of law and policy, and that political 
processes produce outputs in the interests of the citizens’.194 ‘Input’ is weaker 
than ‘by the people’ or self-government and it facilitates a discussion on 
deliberation or participation without the need for the assurance that the individuals 
have power in the decision-making process or over their representatives.  
 
This weaker approach to democracy is manifested in the tension between voice 
and vote.195 The idea of giving persons ‘voice’ reoccurs throughout the global 
constitutionalism debates.196 Cottier argues that ‘[a]ll polities have a voice and 
modes of such voice can vary, ranging from direct democracy to representation 
by elected government’.197 Peters argues that individuals should have a right to 
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be heard and NGOs should be given a voice because they operate as an 
opposition.198 But, this focus on ‘voice’ raises questions about how the What of 
democracy is conceptualised in this wave of global constitutionalist scholarship.  
 
Peters sets up a distinction between voice and vote. In her emphasis on voting, 
she suggests that the vote is the core of democracy and voice is a weaker 
alternative. Deliberative and participatory models of democracy, for Peters, are 
not sufficient because they do not end in a vote and democracy requires both 
deliberation and voting.199 One of the problems with this approach is that placing 
a liberal democratic model, which focuses on elections, on a pedestal has the 
disadvantage of mythologizing voting. In fact, decisions can be made without 
voting; deliberative democracy proposes that decisions are made through 
consensus or negotiation.200 The tension between voice and vote exposes a 
conflation of the Circumstances. Focusing on voting is an example of prioritising 
the How over the What. The What asks about the scope of the power of the 
people; for democracy people should have the power to make decisions. For 
Peters, voting as a How is offered instead of a reflection on the scope of power. 
 
Voice is used as a weaker alternative to voting, but how voice is allocated 
exposes a lack of reflection on the What of democracy. The participation of NGOs 
in international law and governance is a trope of global constitutionalist 
scholarship.201 Peters argues that NGOs are not accountable to the people, so 
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they cannot vote.202 For Peters, giving NGOs a voice strikes an appropriate 
balance and she acknowledges that the participation of NGOs is not democracy 
per se. 203 NGOs are not necessarily accountable to the people, they therefore 
break the link to the people. Their voice does not amount to people having the 
power to make collective decisions because the link between the people and the 
NGO is weak and NGOs are not involved in decision-making if they only have a 
voice. In this wave, NGO participation is used as a How, without reflecting on the 
Who and What of democracy.  
 
The What of democracy is not consistent across global constitutionalist 
scholarship. Choices are made by scholars on the types of decisions that the 
people can make. There is a suggestion that the people are involved in the 
creation of constitutional norms (which would make them constituent power 
holders). Armingeon et al., argue that the people are involved in the creation and 
development of ‘global constitutional norms’.204 They go on to argue that people 
should also be part of the development and implementation of ‘global norms’,205 
which may not be constitutional. This raises questions about whether people are 
involved in constitutional or ordinary law-making or governance more broadly. 
Though positivist international lawyers argue that states, as legal persons, are 
the definitive actors within law-making, global constitutionalist scholars challenge 
this to make individuals ‘co-law makers’.206 What sorts of decisions the people 
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can make is left open. Moreover, the people’s ability to exercise this role is 
frustrated given the weak links to them. 
 
The What is under-theorised in the organisational wave. There are different 
perspectives on what decisions people have power over, and a lack of agreement 
on the size of people’s power. The role of popular sovereignty in democracy is 
not sufficiently engaged with, and the impact of shifting between voting and voice 
is not debated in relation to the changing scope of the power of the people. This 
means that whilst the discourse prioritises processes, there is a deficit of debate 
on why these procedures are ‘democratic’; global constitutionalist scholarship 
must reflect on all of the Circumstances. 
 
4.3.3 When  
 
Considering When democracy takes place requires a reflection on both everyday 
decision-making and constitutional moments. Within the organisational wave of 
global constitutionalist scholarship, the emphasis on reform procedures (such as, 
parliamentary assemblies and changes to voting structures) are geared towards 
everyday decision-making. Where there are reflections on the constitutional 
moment, and questions of constituent power, they are ex post facto 
considerations of already established international organisations. The everyday 
decision-making dominates discussions on democracy.207 This section first 
considers the discourse on parliamentary assemblies, as it reoccurs through the 
wave, and then it will explore how the wave discusses constituent power. 
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The organisational wave is preoccupied with parliamentary-esque bodies.208 
Scholars discuss the potential for a Parliamentary Assembly at the UN and 
parliamentary bodies at the WTO. Scholars debate what actors would participate 
in the assembly, the types of processes, and the powers of the assembly. This 
focus on parliamentary bodies is criticised and Brunkhorst argues that 
parliaments are no longer ‘the one and only true representative of the general will 
of the people’.209  
 
At the UN, there are two prominent proposals; the UN Parliamentary Assembly 
(UNPA), championed by Bummel and supported by Peters,210 and a second 
chamber of the UN General Assembly. The UNPA would be a subsidiary organ 
of the UN General Assembly, created by a decision of the UN General Assembly 
under Article 22. For Bummel, and the UNPA campaign, representatives will 
eventually be directly elected and grouped according to political disposition 
(something akin to but falling short of formal political parties).211 The UNPA would 
initially be a consultative body, and it is envisioned that it would operate as a 
watchdog for the UN.212  
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The alternative is to create an additional chamber at the UN General Assembly. 
Franck proposes that the UN General Assembly becomes a two-chamber 
parliament, and the new chamber would be directly elected on the basis of 
universal suffrage.213 He suggests that decisions might be adopted on a simple 
majority of both chambers, rather than the two-thirds majority set out in the UN 
Charter.214 Franck does not grant this chamber law-making powers, rather the 
assembly can make recommendations.215 He acknowledges that the powers 
granted to this second chamber are limited, and that state consent would still be 
required to pass resolutions.216 For Franck, representation by governments is 
insufficient, as it excludes the voices of indigenous communities.217 He argues 
that elected representatives would have to be responsive to the interests of these 
communities.218 Peters also proposes to introduce a second chamber of the UN 
General Assembly that is constituted of representatives of peoples or citizens.219  
 
These reforms can be critiqued using the Circumstances of Democracy. The 
Who, for both Franck and Peters, attempts to move away from the inter-state 
conceptualisation of democracy as there is a focus on citizens electing 
representatives. However, as is noted above the use of citizens here is 
ambiguous and might refer to states’ citizens or a global citizenry.220 If it refers to 
states’ citizens, the demos is still state-based. As noted above, state-based 
demoi are insufficient for transnational democracy, because they exclude 
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persons.221 Furthermore, Franck argues that elected representatives will be 
responsive to minorities, but the discussion on the relationship between the 
majority and minority in a demos is more complicated, with the minority potentially 
being subsumed within a majoritarian model. To avoid this, more than elections 
is needed to ensure that the views and interests of disadvantaged minorities are 
protected. The What of democracy is not adequately considered as these are 
consultative bodies with limited power and there is little detail to explain why there 
is a shift from super to simple majority, which influences the scope of the people’s 
power. The focus on the construction of an institutional model, is a focus on How 
and this institutional focus is at the expense of reflecting on the What questions. 
 
Reforms to the UN General Assembly include changes to voting. Peters proposes 
to introduce a voting system within the UN General Assembly that is based on 
population size, but also potentially Gross Domestic Product (GDP).222 Using the 
Circumstances, these reforms can be critiqued. This would still be a state-bound 
conceptualisation of the Who, and thus persons excluded or marginalised by that 
state-based system would remain on the peripheries and unrepresented. With 
respect to What, it is still not the people who have power in decision-making, but 
governments. As Simma argues, government representatives ‘have their own 
logic’,223 they operate to defend the national interest and the interest of the 
organisation,224 which could undermine the will of the people. Furthermore, her 
suggestion to introduce voting according to GDP is not further elaborated on. 
Voting based on GDP sits uneasily with the Circumstances, because the Who is 
states and not people, and the What is restricted according to finances. Whilst it 
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is arguable that the GDP of a state could make it more or less affected by a 
decision, it requires further analysis to equate this voting structure with ideas of 
people having power. It would need to be argued that an all-affected principle 
was being used to demarcate the demos and that GDP was a criterion. This 
highlights the lack of reflection on the Who and What, and the need to ask about 
these Circumstances.  
 
The controversy surrounding the creation of a parliamentary body highlights how 
the scholarship in this wave rejects a role for democracy in constitutional 
decision-making. Reform to an organisation so as to introduce a parliamentary 
assembly, for the most part, would require treaty amendment.225 International 
treaties are adopted and amended by states and not individuals. If global 
constitutionalist scholarship was concerned with the role of democracy in the 
creation of foundational law, there would be a discussion on whether individuals 
can hold the power to create international organisations. Peters briefly explores 
whether civil society could construct a Parliamentary Assembly.226 She argues 
that civil society, at present, is not strong enough to construct such a body.227 
She then goes on to question whether this Parliamentary Assembly, constructed 
by civil society, would have a foundation in law. This implies that for a body to 
have a foundation in law it must be constituted by states. In international law, 
states are the only subjects and only states can make law. Nevertheless, a global 
constitutionalist discourse that advocates democracy, would surely reflect on the 
problem of placing states as constituent power, and the need for constituent 
power to shift to the people.  
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Moreover, there are a number of instances in Peters’ discussion on the 
construction of a Parliamentary Assembly where the state interests are allowed 
to trump the hypothetical will of the people. She argues that civil society would 
not be able to construct a Parliamentary Assembly because ‘numerous 
governments would not allow elections in their countries’,228 that even if such a 
body was created, its powers of law-making would be limited because, she 
argues, texts of treaties would ‘still be subject to ratification by states’.229 Peters 
tries to construct a model where people and states are ‘co-lawmakers’.230 The 
problem is that states are still given priority. Her normative position, to introduce 
democracy, is then restricted by her assessment of the reality of international law. 
The reliance on state consent and state sovereignty undermines a role for 
democracy in constituent power.  
 
The question of constituent power is most prominent in Fassbender’s discussion 
on the foundation of the UN Charter as the international constitution. For 
Fassbender, there is a dialectal relationship between the international community 
and the international constitution;231 as such he does not need to ‘presuppose 
the existence of the community’ as all that is required is that the states agree to 
establish a constitution.232 Peters adopts a similar approach.233 Peters argues 
that the global community and the global constitution are in a dialectical 
relationship and that the demoi of global democracy are not pre-established, but 
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constructed. This dialectic approach between community and constitution 
helpfully contests the argument that democracy is not possible at the global level 
because it lacks a global demos. In this dialectical approach, the global demos 
does not have to be pre-established, but can be constructed via 
constitutionalisation.  
 
However, Besson argues, that there are two parts to the creation of a constitution; 
the creation of the community and the creation of the constitution.234 How the 
community is demarcated, whether through nationality, ethnicity, other forms of 
commonality, is not necessarily democratic.235 For Besson, the process of 
creating and adopting a constitution, from the democratic perspective, needs to 
be democratic.236 For democratic constitutionalists, the constitution is written ‘by 
the people’, there is a constituent power expressed at a particular moment and 
this process has to be democratic.237 Besson argues that there needs to be a 
process of democratic decision-making, both in the design and adoption of the 
constitutional system.238 Armingeon et al., for example, argue that ‘a global 
constitutional order needs a democratic decision-making system for producing 
and developing global constitutional norms’;239 or in other words, a democratic 
foundation to a global constitutional system.  
 
Adopting the dialectic approach conflates these two stages. Arguing that the 
people are constructed through a process of constitutionalisation, conflates the 
                                                          
234 Besson, ‘Whose Constitution(s)?’ (n 112) 397. 
235 ibid 397. 
236 ibid 397. 
237 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.2.  
238 See for example, Besson, ‘Whose Constitution(s)?’ (n 112) 389. 
239 Armingeon et al., (n 204) 78. See also Dunoff and Trachtman, ‘A Functional Approach to 
International Constitutionalization’ (n 14) 25. 
 
203 
two issues of community and constitution, and allows global constitutionalists to 
sidestep questions about whether the people construct the constitution and 
whether it was adopted democratically.240  
 
For Fassbender, what is required is that the states agree to establish a 
constitution.241 There are two implications of this for democracy. The international 
community for Fassbender is more than just the states (and for other scholars it 
includes a plethora of actors).242 Focusing on the consent of states, excludes the 
other actors within the international community, so, for Fassbender, whilst such 
actors are considered to form part of the international community, they do not 
have to consent to the constitution. Fassbender’s argument presupposes that 
states act as conduits for their citizens. Indeed, he argues that the states acted 
as representatives of the nations at the San Francisco Conference in 1945.243 
The Charter states ‘We, the Peoples of the United Nations’ and Fassbender 
argues that this refers to the ‘nations’ or the peoples, rather than just the states. 
Constituent power, he argues lies with the people and he endorses the idea that 
this reflects a ‘democratic basis’ of the UN Charter.244 Yet, he argues that it would 
be impractical and unnecessary to require direct action or direct representation 
of the people of the world because the states are sufficient representatives.245 
However, this is not self-evident as the Coordination Committee of the UN 
                                                          
240 For example, Peters argues that there is a global constituent power, but not does outline who 
this refers to. Peters, ‘Membership’ (n 13) 154. 
241 Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter As Constitution of The International Community’ (n 
83) 561. 
242 ibid 532, 563-564. See above, section 4.3.1, text of fn 113-117. 
243 Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community 
(n 132) 91-92. 
244 Bardo Fassbender, ‘“We the Peoples of the United Nations”: Constituent Power and 
Constitutional Form in International Law’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds), The Paradox 
of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (OUP 2012) 286-288. 
245 Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community 
(n 132) 93. 
 
204 
Charter stated that it was the governments that were represented and not the 
people.246 Furthermore, and as noted above, states and governments cannot be 
assumed to be representative of affected persons. Thus, the link to the people 
and to democratic decisions is weak. 
 
Continuing his discussion on constituent power, Fassbender argues it is sufficient 
for democracy that there is a process of ratification that is ‘in accordance with 
respective constitutional processes’.247 Yet, the ratification process Fassbender 
speaks of does not necessarily have to link to the people or parliaments,248 thus 
potentially denying a link to people. Within this wave of global constitutionalist 
scholarship, emphasis is often placed on the ratification of the treaty establishing 
the international organisation.249 In particular, there is an argument that the role 
of parliament in the ratification of a treaty is democratising.250 Merkel argues that 
democratic legitimacy can be derived from ‘the process of approval by 
parliaments and citizens of Member States through referenda on acceptance of 
the organisation’s founding treaty’.251 If this were accurate, it would provide an 
example where democracy takes place with respect of fundamental law. 
However, this role of parliaments within the ratification process needs to be 
unpacked. There are varying practices with respect to the parliament in the 
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ratification process.252 Whilst there is a shift to increase the role for 
parliaments,253 this is often limited to specific occasions.254 Moreover, in dualist 
systems, parliaments are often only brought into the negotiations at the end and 
cannot amend or debate the content of the treaty.255 
 
If the national parliament does play a role in the ratification of the treaty, there is 
arguably a ‘“transmission belt”’ from the citizens to the international 
organisations, which implies that the citizens pass on their consent for the 
treaty.256 This could be said to be a weak, ‘transitive’ democracy257 as this is a 
one-way process. Peters argues that the ‘transmission belt’ is one of 
accountability,258 but the ratification process is a one-off, after which, national 
parliaments give way to the executive. Thus, the international organisations are 
not made accountable to a states’ citizens on an ongoing basis through this 
ratification process. 
 
The lack of a genuinely democratic constituent power in this wave arises, in part, 
because of the approach to constitutionalism. Within the Kelsian German 
constitutionalism tradition, the constituent power is not discussed as a democratic 
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form.259 In contrast, the French tradition draws on an exercise of constituent 
power by the people.260 Building on the German tradition,261 this wave of global 
constitutionalist thought de-prioritises the democratic constituent power. 
 
Where there is focus on the question of constitutional moments, space for 
discussion on democracy is obscured. Either the global constituent power is 
unidentified,262 or emphasis is placed on states as representatives of the 
constituent power in the creation of international organisations.263 The failure to 
engage sufficiently with the constitutional moment weakens the approach to 
democracy. Without a discussion on the democratic constituent power, 
arguments that build democracy from a constituent act are weak and there is little 
space to reform international organisations.  
 
The extent of the discussion on voting procedures,264 the participation of 
NGOs,265 and parliamentary assemblies demonstrates that global 
constitutionalist scholarship when discussing international organisations is 
concerned more with everyday decision-making. The debate on the creation of a 
                                                          
259 Christoph Möllers, ‘“We are (afraid of) the people”: Constituent Power in German 
Constitutionalism’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: 
Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (OUP 2012) 87, 94, 97-98. 
260 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.2. For a discussion on how the American tradition of 
constitutionalism engaged with constituent power, see Michael W Dowdle and Michael A 
Wilkinson, ‘On the Limits of Constitutional Liberalism: In Search of Constitutional Reflexivity’ in 
Michael W Dowdle and Michael A Wilkinson (eds), Constitutionalism Beyond Liberalism (CUP 
2017) 18 
261 von Bogdandy, ‘Constitutionalism in International Law’ (n 74) 223; Andrea Bianchi, 
International Law Theories: An Inquiry into Different Ways of Thinking (OUP 2016) 44-46. 
262 Peters, ‘Membership’ (n 13) 154. 
263 Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community 
(n 132) 93. 
264 Trachtman, The Future of International Law (n 9) 282; Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 287-
288 (on weighted voting); Trachtman, ‘Constitutional Economics’ (n 13) 221 (majority voting at 
the WTO). 
265 Simma, ‘From bilateralism to community interest in international law’ (n 108) 262; Peters, ‘Dual 
Democracy’ (n 13) 315. Klabbers, ‘Autonomy, constitutionalism and virtue in international 
institutional law’ (n 201) 130. 
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parliamentary assembly is a good example that demonstrates how the focus is 
skewed in favour of everyday decision-making. Much more emphasis is given to 
the question of everyday decision-making in this wave of global constitutionalist 
literature. 
  
4.3.5 How 
 
The preceding sections show that within the organisational wave there is a 
commitment to institutional reform. This gives rise to a tendency to prioritise 
discussion on processes and institutions. Peters argues that focus on themes, 
such as representativeness, inclusion, and participation ‘reflect democratic 
concern’.266 But, approaching these processes through the Circumstances of 
Democracy exposes questions and debates that do not form part of their 
discussions on democracy. These next sub-sections consider participation and 
representation to explore the gaps within the Circumstances of Democracy. 
 
Participation 
 
Participation in decision-making is a common trope in the organisational wave. 
Invoked as a mechanism of democratisation, there are proposals for participation 
at international organisations, often through parliamentary-style bodies.267 
Scholars advocate the participation of NGOs.268 Yet, participation is not 
synonymous with democracy and using the Circumstances of Democracy can 
                                                          
266 Anne Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 287. 
267 Shaffer, ‘Parliamentary Oversight of WTO Rule-Making’ (n 171) 629; Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ 
(n 13) 322-326. See also Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (n 7) 477-484. 
268 Simma, ‘From bilateralism to community interest in international law’ (n 108) 262; Peters, ‘Dual 
Democracy’ (n 13) 316. 
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expose this disconnect. The inconsistency comes in relation to what is meant by 
participation, who is to participate and how.  
 
There is a lack of clarity around what is meant by participation. Participation can 
be direct or indirect, where direct is usually used to invoke the participation of 
natural persons and indirect indicates the involvement of representatives. Such 
a divide is not as clear within this wave of global constitutionalist literature. For 
Petersmann, participation or ‘democratic’ participation as he refers to it, is how 
democracy should be understood within the international organisation.269 
Discussions on the role of particular actors, raises questions about the scope of 
power. He discusses the ‘participation of private citizens in international 
organizations’, as well as the representation of employers, workers and 
governments within the tripartite structure of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO).270 Petersmann puts forward two conceptualisations of 
participation (direct and indirect) without considering whether one form is more 
democratic than the other.  
 
For Petersmann direct participation refers to natural persons. Others, such as 
Peters and Simma encourage the participation of NGOs,271 but there is ambiguity 
around whether they are conceptualised as direct or indirect participants. Simma 
suggests that NGOs are agents of the community interests, and they have a role 
in participation without being representative of persons.272 Peters conceives of 
NGOs as representative, to an extent, but she argues that their function as a 
                                                          
269 Petersmann, ‘Constitutionalism and International Organizations’ (n 149) 433. 
270 ibid 433. 
271 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 316; Simma, ‘From bilateralism to community interest in 
international law’ (n 108) 262. 
272 Simma, ‘From bilateralism to community interest in international law’ (n 108) 262. 
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watchdog or opposition outweighs their lack of representative credentials.273 The 
disconnect between non-state actors, such as NGOs, and the people is also well 
documented in the literature.274 In essence, NGOs become direct participants, 
rather than the natural persons. It would be beneficial to reflect on the difference 
between direct and indirect participation as it is a question that goes to the scope 
of power. 
 
There is also no agreement on the processes of participation. Much of the 
discussion is on participating within decision-making, which could be law-making 
or policy-making.275 Petersmann, however, also discusses access to international 
courts and tribunals.276 The participation of individuals within judicial procedures 
is a crucial aspect of constitutionalism; it is a form of legal accountability that 
enhances the rule of law, and public access to such processes can enhance the 
transparency of legal decision-making. However, participating in a judicial 
process is not a form of collective decision-making done by the people.277 
Similarly, other methods of participation can aid democracy but are not sufficient; 
consultation procedures, which are advocated for by Peters,278 are part of 
accumulating a common position (or general will), but as the people are then not 
involved in the decision-making itself, an element of democracy is missing. 
Asking the What Circumstance exposes the indiscreet use of participation. Not 
                                                          
273 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 315- 316. Volk argues that this means the participation of civil 
society groups, for Peters, forms part of ‘the formal accountability mechanisms’. See, Volk (n 120) 
564. 
274 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 316. See also, Jan Aart Scholte, ‘Civil society and 
democratically accountable global governance’ (2004) 39(2) Government and Opposition 211, 
231; Magdalena Bexell, Jonas Tallberg and Anders Uhlin, ‘Democracy in Global Governance: 
The promises and pitfalls of transnational actors’ (2010) 16 Global Governance 81, 87. 
275 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 265. 
276 Petersmann, ‘Constitutionalism and International Organizations’ (n 149) 433. 
277 For a discussion on judicial review and democracy, see Jeremy Waldron ‘The Core of the 
Case against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115(6) The Yale Law Journal 1346. 
278 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 300. 
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only can participation refer to very different processes, as in the case of 
participation in judicial processes, it can also fail to link back to the people or 
facilitate the people having power in decision-making.279  
 
Representation 
 
There is an overlap between participation and representation and the discussion 
on the complexity of direct and indirect participation exposes some of the issues 
with representation. This sub-section views global constitutionalist discussions 
on representation through the Circumstances of Democracy to expose how 
representation is used in discussions on democracy. This sub-section will discuss 
the choice of the representative and what is being represented.  
 
Who acts as the representative is contested within this wave. As discussed 
above, there is a plethora of actors discussed in global constitutionalist literature, 
and their status is not always clear.280 Within global constitutionalist scholarship, 
states and NGOs are common choices for representatives.281 How the state acts 
as a representative has been unpacked previously.282 As discussed, states are 
not strong representatives of their citizens. Within democratic states, citizens do 
not necessarily participate in elections on the basis of international affairs.283 
Moreover, the states are not representative of all people; where there is a 
                                                          
279 For a critique of participation see Petra Dobner, ‘On the Constitutionability of Global Public 
Policy Networks’ (n 30) 609. She argues that participation does not necessarily amount to ‘the 
equal representation of all stakeholders’. 
280 See above, section 4.3.1. 
281 For example, Simma, ‘From bilateralism to community interest in international law’ (n 108) 262; 
Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 316; Paulus, ‘The International Legal System’ (n 1) 95. Cf 
Petersmann referred to the tripartite representation at the ILO as democratic, meaning that 
employers and workers representatives are also possible representatives. Petersmann, 
‘Constitutionalism and International Organizations’ (n 149) 433. 
282 See above, section 4.2.1 and 4.3.1. 
283 Robert A Dahl, On Democracy (Yale University Press 1998) 115-116. 
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weakness in the human rights protection of minority groups, stateless persons, 
diaspora, and other groups not within a state, fall outside the representation of a 
state. The executive act as representatives, and this is criticised for being 
undemocratic.284 Non-democratic states cannot be said to represent the 
collective interests of the citizens.285 Furthermore, as noted above, this idea of 
representation is built on a revision to state sovereignty that uses the international 
legal scholarship to assume states are representative.286 Debates need to be had 
on how ideas of representation feed into democracy. 
 
A discussion on NGOs as representatives exposes the way that elements of the 
Circumstances of Democracy are conflated. Within global constitutionalist 
scholarship, NGOs have been given a number of functions; NGOs have been 
labelled the global civil society, a form of opposition, and a watchdog.287 However, 
NGOs are not necessarily democratic. Peters argues that NGOs are accountable 
to their donors and their members; she argues that ‘[d]onor’s “vote” with their 
cheque book’ and members can leave.288 This accountability is said to be 
‘democratic’, yet the accountability chain has to be between the governed and 
governor or the representative and represented.289 Within the UN, NGOs have to 
have accreditation to participate.290 The lack of assessment of democratic 
structures of NGOs within the UN system of consultative status is discussed 
                                                          
284 Chapter 3; Nigel D White, The Law of International Organisations (3rd edn, OUP 2016) 201. 
285 Christiano, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’ (n 22) 125. 
286 See above, section 4.2.1. 
287 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 315. 
288 ibid 317. 
289 Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century’ 
(n 70), 155. 
290 UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1996/31 ‘Consultation relationship between the 
United Nations and non-governmental organizations’ (25 July 1996) UN Doc Res 1996/31. 
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elsewhere,291 but suffice to say NGOs are not always accountable to the people 
they claim to represent. Scholars have argued that the participation of NGOs is 
not legitimate because the majority of organisations are located and funded by 
the Global North292 and it is these Global North elites, these funders and 
stakeholders, which get to dictate what interests the NGO supports.293 There is 
little connection to the people, so it is not the people who have power in decision-
making. In the discussion on NGOs, the How of democracy is prioritised over the 
Who and the What. 
 
This section on How has shown that democracy at the international organisational 
level is often equated with participation, representation, and as the previous 
discussion demonstrated the relationship between democracy and 
accountability.294 On the one hand, this can be evidence of a thicker 
conceptualisation of democratic governance. Peters argues that transparency, 
participation, and access to justice form the basis of ‘a tryptichon of international 
procedure’.295 However, concepts such as transparency, accountability and 
participation can also be considered ‘surrogate’ for democracy.296 This can be 
problematic because they are not synonymous with democracy.297 
Accountability, participation and representation are types of processes, which 
                                                          
291 See for example. Peter Willets, ‘The Cardoso Report on the UN and Civil Society: 
Functionalism, Global Corporatism, or Global Democracy?’ (2006) 12(3) Global Governance: A 
Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 305. 
292 See Bexell et al., ‘Democracy in Global Governance’ (n 274) 87-93. 
293 For a discussion on the elite nature of NGOs and civil society see, Dobner, ‘On the 
Constitutionability of Global Public Policy Networks’ (n 30) 609-610. 
294 See above section 4.2.1. 
295 Peters, ‘International Organizations: Effectiveness and Accountability’ (n 21). 
296 See Thomas Risse, ‘Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics’ (2000) 54 
International Organization 1, 15; Delbrück, ‘Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State’ (n 210) 
1040; Peters, ‘International Organizations: Effectiveness and Accountability’ (n 21); de Búrca, 
‘Developing Democracy’ (n 39) 124.  
297 Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance’ (n 92). Cartledge argues that there is 
a distinction between the ancient Greek idea of democracy that referred to power and the modern 
ideas that rely on public argument, deliberation and participation. See Paul Cartledge, 
Democracy. A Life (OUP 2016) 3; de Búrca, ‘Developing Democracy’ (n 39) 124. 
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should work to ensure the other Who and What of democracy are connected. 
Whilst accountability can be understood to establish a relationship between an 
‘accountee’ and ‘accountor’, these processes say little about who should 
participate, how they should participate, and their respective roles in decision-
making. Moreover, the processes say little about what decisions are being made 
and when. Such an indiscriminate use of these processes risks excluding 
members of a demos, as well as shutting down discussions on questions of 
power. The organisational wave of global constitutionalist scholarship would 
benefit from reflecting on how the Circumstances of Democracy should align.  
 
4.4 Chapter Conclusion  
 
This chapter asked how one wave of global constitutionalist scholarship 
discusses democracy. The organisational wave, which focuses on the reform of 
international organisations, is closely associated with the international 
organisational literature on legitimacy, which leads to an overemphasis on formal 
international organisations and accountability as a proxy for democracy. Within 
this wave, the What of democracy is under-theorised and replaced with 
mechanisms that are analogous to democracy at the domestic level, such as 
voting and parliaments and modalities such as, accountability and participation. 
This chapter identified that this wave of global constitutionalist literature lacks 
convincing engagement with the Circumstances of Democracy. 
 
With the reform of international organisations as the focal point of this wave of 
global constitutionalist literature, institutions and mechanisms of democratisation 
are prioritised. Discussions on the reform of international organisations, such as 
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the constitutionalisation of the WTO, means that this wave tends to prioritise the 
How of democracy. Scholars propose a number of different reforms, which can 
include new institutional arrangements to increase the direct participation, but 
also the representation or indirect representation of people. How, in this thesis, 
is not just about mechanisms, it should ensure that the Circumstances of 
Democracy are amalgamated. 
 
The Who of democracy within the organisational wave is complex. There are a 
number of actors related to the discussion on democracy, and it is unclear 
whether they are considered part of the demos or as the governing power and 
whether they have constituent power or are constituted power. The lack of clarity 
is suggestive of a failure to link the demos and constituent power to the people. 
The relationship between individuals and the state, which is a crux within global 
constitutionalist scholarship, is problematic for a discussion on democracy. Whilst 
at times, individuals are the core unit, at others, states can trump their collective 
will, which again suggests a denial of the people as the Who in democracy.  
 
Moreover, focusing on individuals, at the expense of the collective, highlights the 
need to reflect on the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy. 
Constitutionalism (in particular, fundamental human rights) can protect the 
interests of the individual. In so doing, it can place limits on democracy. The 
justification for the individualisation is based on the idea that collective rights are 
derivative of individual rights,298 but the tension between the individual and the 
collective is well-documented in democratic theory.299 Discussions on democracy 
                                                          
298 Peters writes that her approach is based on methodological individualism and normative 
pluralism. Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 307. 
299 Chapter 2, section 2.2.1 and 2.3.2. 
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within the constitutionalist lens would benefit from a reflection on the relationship 
between constitutionalism and democracy.  
 
Within this wave, there is little reflection on the What of democracy. Ideas about 
the people having power to make decisions are largely absent. The 
impracticalities of decision-making on a global scale are offered as defences 
against stronger powers of the people. But, the relocation of the Where of 
democracy, from the state to the global level, should not automatically change 
the meaning of What.  
 
The When of democracy becomes limited to everyday decision-making in this 
wave of global constitutionalist literature. Concerns with the reform of current 
practices at international organisations situate democracy within the sphere of 
everyday politics. There is limited engagement with the democratic constituent 
moment. Peters’ argument that a Parliamentary Assembly constructed by civil 
society actors alone would not have a legal basis is suggestive of a normativist 
approach to constituent power in this wave,300 which means that the people, and 
democracy, are not considered as part of a constituent moment. Focusing on one 
element of When gives a partial account of democracy. Chapter 5 explores the 
approach taken by the principled wave, and the shift in favour of the constituent 
moment, generates a disconnect between the two waves.  
 
The organisational wave focuses on quasi-parliamentary bodies as the location 
for democracy at international organisations. Parliamentary bodies are used as 
indicators of democracy, even where the power of the people is severely limited 
                                                          
300 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 13) 321. 
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– as in the case of purely consultative bodies – and where the link to the people 
is minimal.  
 
The organisational wave started a constitutionalist discussion on democracy, but 
this chapter has shown that the way democracy is conceptualised is restrictive. 
Whilst attention is paid to the plausibility of a Who of democracy beyond the state, 
the people are not constructed as the core of democratic mechanisms, rather 
states and non-state actors are proffered as substitutes. Using the 
Circumstances of Democracy avoids narrowly focusing on the How and facilitates 
a debate on the people’s power in decision-making.
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Chapter 5: Global Constitutionalism and Democracy: A Principled 
Approach 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Contemporary scholarship witnesses commitments to a more principled 
approach to global constitutionalism. For example, O’Donoghue calls on global 
constitutionalist scholars to give meaning to constitutionalism.1 A principled 
approach engages with the norms of modern constitutionalism, so there are 
discussions on the rule of law, the separation of powers, and constituent and 
constituted power. Scholars have engaged with traditional aspects of 
constitutionalism and discussed what constitutionalism means at the global level, 
and critical legal scholars within this wave have convened a debate on the relation 
between law and politics.2 There is a shift towards a ‘bottom-up’ approach to 
constitutionalism that centres on a debate about constituent power.3 This shift 
towards a discussion on constitutionalism creates a new environment for a 
discussion on democracy. This chapter identifies the progress that has been 
made, but also demonstrates the limitations of current approaches.  
                                                          
1 Aoife O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (CUP 2014) ch 6. See also 
Kumm’s discussion on ‘Big C’ constitutionalism. Mattias Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in 
Constitutionalism: On the relationship between constitutionalism in and beyond the state’ in 
Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International 
Law, and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 260.  
2 See Emilios Christodoulidis, ‘On the Politics of Societal Constitutionalism’ (2013) 20(2) Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 629; Gavin W Anderson, ‘Societal Constitutionalism, Social 
Movements, and Constitutionalism from Below’ (2013) 20(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies 881. 
3 Antje Wiener and Stefan Oeter, ‘Introduction: Who recognizes the emperor’s clothes anymore?’ 
(2016) 14(3) I·CON 608, 609; Geneviève Nootens, ‘Constituent power and the people-as-the-
governed: About the “invisible” people of political and legal theory’ (2015) 4(2) Global 
Constitutionalism 137; Neil Walker, ‘The return of constituent power: A reply to Mattias Kumm’ 
(2016) 14(4) I·CON 906. 
 
218 
 
This shift towards a broader set of constitutionalism questions, is not indicative of 
a unified response. Rather, the category of principled constitutionalism is an 
attempt to demarcate the scholarship according to research question and not by 
ideological position. This also means that the principled wave is not necessarily 
committed to the idea of democracy beyond the state, rather there are 
disagreements: whilst Habermas critiques the trend to deny democracy beyond 
the state,4 Kumm situates democracy within the state and is hesitant to use the 
language of democracy to analyse international processes.5 The principled 
approach spans different discussions and it includes the principled approach 
taken by O’Donoghue,6 Walker’s constitutional pluralism,7 de Búrca’s 
‘democratic-striving approach’ to global governance,8 and Teubner’s approach to 
societal constitutionalism.9 This chapter uses all the Circumstances of 
Democracy to analyse this principled wave.  
 
The principled approach to global constitutionalism engages in a number of 
discussions about the viability and shape of global constitutionalism. Two 
competing approaches are singled out within this chapter to explore how the 
competing conceptualisations of constitutionalism can influence the discussions 
on the Who and Where democracy. The two strands of global constitutionalist 
                                                          
4 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems 
of a Constitution for World Society’ (2008) 15(4) Constellations 444, 445. 
5 Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism’ (n 1) 260. 
6 O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 1) ch 6. 
7 Neil Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: An Iterative Relationship’ 
(2010) 39(3) Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie 206, 230; Neil Walker, ‘Beyond the Holistic 
Constitution?’ In Petra Dobson and Martin Loughlin (eds) The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP 
2010) 298. 
8 Gráinne de Búrca, ‘Developing Democracy Beyond the State’ (2008) Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 101. 
9 Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization (OUP 
2014). 
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literature considered in depth in this chapter are constitutional pluralism and 
societal constitutionalism.  
 
The constitutional pluralist debate is situated within a reconstruction of the 
relationship between constitutionalism and the state. It abstracts the meaning and 
elements of constitutionalism and proposes that the unified constitution of the 
state is not necessarily replicable or desirable at other constitutional sites. These 
debates at times cross into the literature on global legal pluralism, which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. The constitutional pluralist literature enhances a 
discussion on principled global constitutionalism because of its commitment to 
thinking about the meaning and institutionalisation of constitutionalism. The 
constitutional pluralist debates facilitate a discussion on the Where of democracy 
and constitutionalism.  
 
Societal constitutionalism rejects the narrow-mindedness of liberal, political or 
republican constitutionalism; it challenges the focus on forms of government and 
on ‘the division of powers’,10 the divide between state and civil society, as well as 
questioning the principal focus on individuals and the state.11 For Teubner, 
societal constitutionalism is the ‘legally institutionalized guarantees of a self-
restraint of politics’.12 In essence, importance is placed on legal rules to restrain 
politics. Societal constitutionalism has two phases.13 The first phase proposes a 
                                                          
10 David Sciulli, Theory of Societal Constitutionalism: Foundations of a non-Marxist critical theory 
(CUP 1991) 7. 
11 Anderson, ‘Societal Constitutionalism, Social Movements, and Constitutionalism from Below’ 
(n 2) 884-885 
12 Gunther Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional 
Theory?’ in Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand and Gunther Teubner (eds) Transnational 
Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart 2004) 3, 12. 
13 See Gunther Teubner, ‘Societal constitutionalism: nine variations on a Theme by David Sciulli’ 
in Paul Blokker and Chris Thornhill (eds), Sociological Constitutionalism (CUP 2016). 
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shift away from formal political institutions towards the societal sphere.14 The 
second phase, led by Teubner, builds on Luhmann’s ‘autopoietic systems theory’. 
Societal constitutionalism offers a radical alternative to ideas of democracy, as it 
challenges the Who, What, and Where of constitutionalism and democracy. In 
this chapter, societal constitutionalism is used to explore potential alternatives of 
discussing democracy within global constitutionalist literature.  
 
This chapter uses the Circumstances of Democracy as a matrix to analyse how 
the principled wave approaches democracy. A comparison between the 
organisational and principled waves exposes which Circumstances are 
prioritised, exposing gaps in the literature, and highlighting limitations. The first 
part of the chapter will focus on two aspects of the current literature to consider 
how the disciplinary frames of constitutionalism and international law influence 
the discourse. It will reflect on the relationship between constitutionalism and 
democracy as conceptualised within this wave of scholarship and the role of 
international law. It will then initiate a comparison between the organisational and 
principled wave. In the second part of the chapter, the Circumstances are used 
to explore the approach of the principled wave to fundamental questions of 
democracy.  
 
5.2 Aspects of the Current Discourse in the Principled Wave 
 
The principled wave of global constitutionalist scholarship uses constitutionalism 
as its starting point. Previously, it was shown how the organisational wave is 
                                                          
14 Dieter Grimm, ‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism and its Prospects in a Changed World’ In 
Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds) The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP 2010) 19. 
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influenced by its connections with international and international organisational 
law.15 This section will investigate how the approach to democracy adopted by 
the principled wave is informed by the cross-disciplinary nature of global 
constitutionalist scholarship. To investigate how the disciplinary biases structure 
democracy, this section will discuss two aspects of the current discourse. Firstly, 
it will discuss the concerns around the relationship between constitutionalism and 
democracy. Secondly, it will explore the relationship between global 
constitutionalist literature and the other sub-disciplines.  
 
5.2.1 Constitutionalism and Democracy 
 
In adopting a starting position that engages with the meaning of constitutionalism, 
the principled wave offers a new environment for discussions on democracy. 
Within the principled approach there is an acknowledgement of a relationship 
between constitutionalism and democracy, but a lack of agreement as to the 
nature of that relationship. Whilst Walker diagnoses a tension between 
constitutionalism and democracy,16 Habermas, O’Donoghue and de Búrca 
conceive of a complementary relationship.17 This section considers how the focus 
on constitutionalism can influence the shape of democracy.  
 
One approach to democracy within the principled wave, is to consider it in 
functional terms. Functions include the demarcation of a polity and the 
legitimisation of governance. One of the problems with the functional approach is 
                                                          
15 See Chapter 4, section 4.2.1. 
16 Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 7). 
17 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory 
Principles?’ (2001) 29(6) Political Theory 766, 767; Aoife O’Donoghue, ‘International 
constitutionalism and the state’ (2013) 11(4) I·CON 1021, 1040; de Búrca, ‘Developing 
Democracy’ (n 8) 129. 
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that there is little agreement on the functions. For Walker, constitutionalism (and 
the idea of constituent power) rather than democracy defines the Who.18 In 
contrast, O’Donoghue argues that democratic legitimacy is part of 
constitutionalism and thus alongside the rule of law and the separation of powers, 
democratic legitimacy plays a role in determining the constituents.19  
 
An additional problem with a functional approach to constitutionalism and 
democracy, is that the functions can change when moved across governance 
systems and as such distort the meaning of democracy. For Thornhill, a 
constitution is ‘the legally articulated form of a society’s inclusionary structure’.20 
The priority then becomes inclusion. He argues that global constitutionalism (or 
as he refers to it ‘transnational judicial constitutionalism’) is more inclusive than 
national ‘pure’ democracies because international human rights law is 
universal.21 Democracy located within the state, for Thornhill, does not 
emphasise inclusion to the same extent. This shows how the values and 
characteristics of democracy can change. It also demonstrates a need to reflect 
on the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy: the contentious 
relationship between human rights and democracy was noted above.22 
Constructing a functional relationship between constitutionalism and democracy 
is problematic as there are conflicting functions that shape the approach to 
democracy, and it side-lines the tension between constitutionalism and 
democracy.  
 
                                                          
18 Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 7) 215. 
19 O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 1) 110. 
20 Chris Thornhill, A Sociology of Transnational Constitutions: Social Foundations of the Post-
National Legal Structure (CUP 2016) 7. 
21 ibid 422. 
22 Chapter 2, section 2.2.1. 
 
223 
Rather than a functional approach, O’Donoghue demonstrates how the 
separation of powers, the rule of law, and democratic legitimacy have to work 
together; the relationship between constituent and constituted power is to be 
constructed with the norms of constitutionalism working together.23 Democracy is 
considered to be in a dialectic and iterative relationship with constitutionalism. 
Walker, as explored above, argues that democracy and constitutionalism are in 
tension.24 What Walker attempts to show is that constitutionalism and democracy 
are in an ‘iterative and indeed irresoluble’ relationship.25 He argues that 
democracy is incomplete and as such constitutionalism both realises and 
qualifies democracy.  
 
One of the advantages of acknowledging the tension between constitutionalism 
and democracy is that it generates a discussion on the appropriate work of 
democracy. Within global constitutionalist literature, there is a tendency to use 
democracy to provide a multitude of outcomes; the legitimacy of governance, 
development,26 individualisation of international law and individual human rights 
protection.27 Peters, for example, places the individual at the core of international 
law28 and yet, the literature on democracy demonstrates that the role of the 
individual is subsumed within the collective.29 Rather than making democracy do 
all the work and then being disappointed when it cannot deliver everything, 
Walker demonstrates the role of constitutionalism to balance individual liberties 
                                                          
23 O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 1) 110. 
24 Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 7) 213. 
25 ibid 213. 
26 Deborah Z Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization: Legitimacy, 
Democracy, and Community in the International Trading System (OUP 2005) ch 8. 
27 Anne Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 2009) 278-279. 
28 Anne Peters, ‘Membership in the Global Constitutional Community’ in Jan Klabbers, Anne 
Peters, and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 2009) 157. 
29 Chapter 2, section 2.3.2, text at fn 208-217. 
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and collective decision-making. Democracy and constitutionalism have to work 
together to ensure the individual is protected and the collective have power to 
make decisions. But in so doing, constitutionalism can limit democracy. 
Constitutionalism can infuse democracy with human rights, it can mitigate the 
power of the people using norms such as the rule of law and the separation of 
powers, and the constitutional frame can impose restrictions on When and Where 
people can exercise their power. 
 
The principled approach to global constitutionalism proffers rich, conceptual 
discussions on the meaning of democracy beyond the state. Moreover, there is 
an engagement with the tension between constitutionalism and democracy. 
However, going forward there needs to be a more explicit acknowledgement of 
the impact of constitutionalism on the meaning of democracy.  
 
5.2.2 Disciplinary Boundaries 
 
In addition to the role of constitutionalism, this thesis shows that global 
constitutionalist scholarship is in parts informed by international law. The previous 
chapter demonstrated the extent to which the organisational wave builds on 
assumptions in international law with respect to the state and democracy.30 This 
section considers the differences between the organisational and principled wave 
of global constitutionalist literature, and the extent to which the principled wave 
continues to accommodate the undemocratic features of international law.  
 
                                                          
30 Chapter 4, section 4.2.1. 
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Organisational Wave and Principled Wave 
 
The organisational and the principled wave have different disciplinary focuses. 
The organisational wave is committed to reforming or constructing 
representational bodies (such as quasi-parliamentary structures). In contrast, the 
principled approach to constitutionalism and democracy is not as concerned with 
the institutionalisation, but with conceptual debates. These different disciplinary 
focuses influence the Circumstances of Democracy. The organisational wave is 
focused on the How of constitutionalism and democracy. Moreover, the emphasis 
on How gives rise to a focus on the institutional dimension of the Where question. 
The principled wave is concerned with constitutionalism, and there is a 
commitment to constituent power and constitutional moments, which places 
emphasis on Who. The emphasis placed on different Circumstances means that 
there is a disconnect between the organisational and principled waves.  
 
The siloed nature of the two waves of global constitutionalist scholarship gives 
rise to gaps. This is most obvious with respect to the shift to discuss constituent 
power. The organisational wave either side-lines the question of constituent 
power or places it in the hands of states.31 Scholars within the principled wave 
challenge this and advocate non-state actors and individuals as constituent 
power holders.32 The focus on constituent power shifts the When from everyday 
decision-making to constituent moment. As will be explored, the shifting 
emphasis gives rise to incomplete discussions on democracy.  
                                                          
31 Chapter 4, section 4.3.3. 
32 Nele Noesselt, ‘Contested global order(s): Rising powers and the re-legitimation of global 
constitutionalization’ (2016) 14(3) I·CON 639, 640; Saki Bailey & Ugo Mattei, ‘Social movements 
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Principled Wave of Global Constitutionalist Scholarship and International 
Law 
 
The principled approach to global constitutionalism, adopting constitutionalism 
and constitutional theory as the starting point, circumvents the international law 
discussion of the organisational wave. This is laudable because it moves away 
from state-defined demos and from the assumptions that underpinned the 
international legal debate on democracy, such as the territorial integrity of the 
state and the reification of elections. However, if questions are not asked about 
domestic democracy, the limitations of the democracy discussion in international 
law and in the organisational wave are not addressed. This means that potentially 
the assumptions of international law with respect to the state and democracy go 
unchallenged.  
 
One of the examples of the troublesome relationship between international law 
and global constitutionalist literature is the approach to self-determination. The 
meaning of self-determination is not the same in international law and global 
constitutionalist scholarship.33 As noted, within international law self-
determination is considered a starting point for a discussion on democracy.34 But, 
the complex relationship between sovereignty and territory means that territorial 
integrity trumps the will of the people.35 Within the principled wave, self-
determination is used by Habermas to denote self-government.36 Furthermore, 
                                                          
33 For Brunkhorst, for example, self-determination is used as an adjective to show that the polity 
demarcated itself. Hauke Brunkhorst, ‘Constitutionalism and Democracy in the World Society’ in 
Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP 2010) 198. 
34 Chapter 3, section 3.3.1. 
35 Chapter 3, section 3.3.1. 
36 Jürgen Habermas, The Divided West (ed. Ciaran Cronin, Polity Press 2006) 157. 
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where in international law, the people are defined using territory,37 in certain 
strands of constitutionalism, especially where a relationalist approach to 
constituent power is adopted, the people is not defined by territory.  
 
Without reflecting on the relationship between constitutionalism and international 
law, the global constitutionalist approach cannot challenge the state-centric 
conceptualisation of the people within international law. Habermas argues that 
states ensure ‘the political self-determination of their citizens’.38 This potentially 
improves upon the trend in global constitutionalist literature to revise sovereignty 
as a form of responsibility; it creates a space to investigate the 
representativeness of states. But, he relies on President Wilson’s approach to 
self-determination as self-government,39 rather than explore the implications of 
self-determination in international law, which leaves the liberal approach to 
democracy, which was discussed previously,40 without critique. The principled 
wave of global constitutionalist scholarship does not engage with the way that 
international law predetermines the demos and limits the people’s power using 
self-determination. Using the Circumstances of Democracy, a discussion across 
disciplinary boundaries is facilitated, ensuring the limitations are raised. 
 
This fragmentary nature of global constitutionalist scholarship is one of the key 
limitations of the debates on democracy. The organisational and principled waves 
place varying emphasis on international law and constitutionalism and these 
waves stress different aspects of the Circumstances of Democracy. This section 
showed that whilst the international law literature on democracy does not have a 
                                                          
37 Frontier Dispute case (Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali) [1986] ICJ Reports 554. 
38 Habermas, ‘The Constitutionalization of International Law’ (n 4) 449. 
39 Habermas, The Divided West (n 36) 157. 
40 Chapter 3, sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. 
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prominent role in the principled wave, there is a failure to challenge the state-
centricity of the international legal scholarship. Although democracy within the 
state is important within this wave,41 scholars do not question the approach within 
international legal scholarship, which leaves this global constitutionalist wave 
vulnerable to the impacts of state sovereignty.  
 
5.3 The Circumstances of Democracy 
 
5.3.1 Who 
 
Within the principled wave of global constitutionalist literature, there are attempts 
to move away from conceptualisations of the polity that rely too heavily on 
commonality, ethnos and nationality. There is a shift towards constituency and 
constituent power as appropriate tools to demarcate the polity for 
constitutionalism.42 This move disconnects the state and constitutionalism and it 
facilitates a discussion of democracy and constitutionalism beyond the state. 
However, focusing on constituent power has the potential for conflation of 
constituent power and demos.43 If constituent power relates to constitution-
making, then it is a greater power than that afforded to a demos, which is usually 
conceptualised as situated in everyday governance and relates to the creation of 
ordinary law.44 The powers of constituent power holders are more radical than 
those of the demos, which are usually prescribed under the constitution.45 To 
                                                          
41 O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 1) 254; Habermas, ‘The 
Constitutionalization of International Law’ (n 4) 449; Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the 
Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 7) 219. 
42 O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 1) ch 3. 
43 Chapter 2, section 2.2.2. 
44 Chapter 2, section 2.2.2. 
45 For a discussion on the role of the constitution in this relationship between constituent power 
and democracy, see Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 7) 215-
216 and 221-222. 
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avoid the potential for conflation, the Who needs to be considered alongside the 
What; the people and their respective powers and roles need to be explored.  
 
As the principled wave shifts the Who question from demos to constituent power, 
this section discusses the relationship between constituent power and 
democracy. In particular, this section investigates the distinct roles of constituent 
power and the respective power of people within democracy in the principled 
wave. To evaluate the utility of shifting the discussion towards constituent power, 
this section will discuss: the different types of actors that are said to have 
constituent power; the demarcation of the constituent power; the extent of the 
power; and, the relationship between constituent power and democracy in this 
principled wave of global constitutionalist scholarship.  
 
Identity of Constituent Power Holders 
 
One issue to consider is the identity of constituent power holders within the 
principled wave. There is a trend to include people as constituent power 
holders.46 This trend responds to the unsatisfactory discussion on constituent 
power within the organisational wave; rather than adopting a normativist position, 
or assuming constituent power sits with states, the principled wave places 
individuals at the core of the discussion.47 Collectives of individuals, as well as 
non-state actors (such as networks of states,48 and NGOs49) are also considered 
                                                          
46 Wiener and Oeter, ‘Introduction’ (n 3) 609; Noesselt argues that it is humanity, see Noesselt (n 
32) 640. 
47 See Chapter 4, section 4.3.3. 
48 Noesselt (n 32) 640-642. 
49 Bailey & Mattei (n 32) 965. 
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as potential constituent power holders within this wave.50 However, Kumm argues 
that constituent power has to be revised to include citizens and the international 
community.51 As noted previously, who constitutes a member of the international 
community is not clear; if it is just states, these are not responsive to citizens, and 
citizen-based approaches to demos are restrictive,52 but the international 
community could also include other unaccountable non-state actors. Using 
Kumm’s approach, there is both a lack of clarity around the identity of constituent 
power holders and the potential for unaccountable, unrepresentative actors to 
hold constituent power. Moreover, NGOs, for example, can be unrepresentative 
and unaccountable, so the role of individuals as the ideal constituent power 
holders within these collectives is not clear. Krisch warns that the link to the 
people is weak,53 and scholars do not demonstrate genuine links to the people.54  
 
Although the conceptualisation of states as constituent power holders is critiqued, 
states are still given a constituting role within this principled wave.55 The 
relationship between states and citizens for the purposes of constituent power in 
this wave is not clear. Whilst on the one hand, states are included because they 
ensure the ‘political self-determination of their citizens’.56 On the other hand, it is 
just assumed that states as prominent actors have constituent power.57 
                                                          
50 See Nico Krisch, ‘Pouvoir constituant and pouvoir irritant in the postnational order’ (2012) 14(3) 
I·CON 657, 674. 
51 Mattias Kumm, ‘Constituent power, cosmopolitan constitutionalism, and post-positivist law’ 
(2016) 14(3) I·CON 697, 698. 
52 See Chapter 3, section 3.3.1. 
53 Kumm, ‘Constituent power, cosmopolitan constitutionalism, and post-positivist law’ (n 51) 677. 
54 Noesselt refers to BRICS countries to argue that the Westphalian model has ignored these 
regional groups but such groups are resisting. Moreover, it is government ministers acting. This 
is still a state-based constituent power that does not move the discussion on from Fassbender’s 
use of constituent power. Noesselt (n 32) 643. 
55 See, Habermas, ‘The Constitutionalization of International Law’ (n 4) 449 (states ‘qualify as 
founding members already in virtue of their current role in guaranteeing the political self-
determination of their citizens’); Krisch, ‘Pouvoir constituant and pouvoir irritant in the postnational 
order’ (n 50) 674. 
56 See, Habermas, ‘The Constitutionalization of International Law’ (n 4) 449. 
57 For example, Noesselt is about different state interests. Noesselt (n 32). 
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Habermas argues that states and citizens can hold constituent power, but he is 
clear that this is because states ensure the self-determination of citizens.58 This 
is suggestive of a move way from sovereignty as responsibility, where states act 
on behalf of their citizens.59 This then facilitates a move away from state-centric 
approaches to constituent power.  
 
Societal constitutionalism offers an alternative method of distancing constituent 
power from the state. For societal constitutionalism, the constituent power is ‘a 
communicative potential’.60 Systems theory, which underpins societal 
constitutionalism, does not associate constituent power with individuals or the 
population.61 This communicative power acts as a ‘permanent irritant to the 
constituted power’.62 The idea of ‘irritant’ that characterises this rewriting of 
constituent power alters the scope of the power, which will be discussed below.63 
With respect to the identity of constituent power holders, it is clear that within 
societal constitutionalism, constituent power is not located within collectives of 
people per se, but who can harness this ‘communicative potential’ is not made 
clear. The risk is that constituent power is moved away from the people.  
 
Within this principled wave there is a conscious effort to discuss the role of 
constituent power and to place people at the core. However, there is a plethora 
of non-state and state actors that are still holders of constituent power within this 
                                                          
58 Habermas, ‘The Constitutionalization of International Law’ (n 4) 449. 
59 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Plea for a constitutionalization of international law’ (2014) 40(1) Philosophy 
and Social Criticism 5, 9. 
60 Teubner, Constitutional Fragments (n 9) 62. 
61 ibid 62. 
62 ibid 62. 
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wave. The inconsistency with which constituent power links back to the people 
highlights the need to reflect on the Who.  
 
Demarcation of Constituent Power 
 
With respect to the demarcation of Who, the principled wave seeks to challenge 
the role of state-boundaries. Habermas, in particular, seeks to disconnect the 
state, national identity, and the demos.64 This concern to move away from state-
centric conceptualisations of constituent power,65 leads to revising constituent 
power. This sub-section will outline two approaches: O’Donoghue’s discussion 
on the role of process and Walker’s ‘Beyond the Holistic Constitution’. 
 
The relational approach to constituent power argues that the interrelation 
between constituent power and constituted power means that the identity of 
constituent power holders is determined through a process. O’Donoghue argues 
that understanding constituent power as demarcated by a process means that it 
can change over time, it can be re-evaluated and new demarcations can be 
made.66 The relational idea is useful because it can be used at different sites of 
governance, and at more flexible sites where processes are taking place but 
perhaps lack the organisation of a state-like system. The relational idea builds on 
the myth of constituent power, so that constituent power holders can be 
constructed in the moment (or through the process) rather than relying on a pre-
legal society to coalesce and claim constituent power. In this respect, it is useful 
                                                          
64 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Toward a Cosmopolitan Europe’ (2003) 14(4) Journal of Democracy 86, 
88-89; Ulrich K Preuss, ‘Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some deliberations on 
the relations between constituent power and the constitution’ (1992-1993) 14 Cardozo Law 
Review 639. 
65 Krisch, ‘Pouvoir constituant and pouvoir irritant in the postnational order’ (n 50) 657. 
66 O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 1) 110. 
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for discussing constituent power beyond the state, where it is not practical to 
speak of such a community.67 One of the questions is what type of process is 
necessary. For O’Donoghue law determines the process, and that process 
determines the relationship between constituent and constituted power. This will 
be further discussed in the section on When, but there are two broad categories 
of process: constitutional (both creation and reform) and everyday decision-
making processes. Yet, constituent power is traditionally conceptualised as being 
before the law and tied to constitutional processes,68 which means that 
O’Donoghue’s process is an example of constituted power. This use of process 
suggests that constituent power can be limited. It raises questions about the 
scope of constituent power and demonstrates the importance of asking the What 
question.  
 
Walker discusses constituent power and democracy in a series of publications 
and there are differences in his approach.69 This chapter explores these. Though 
responding to whether constitutionalism is a useful moniker for governance 
beyond the state, and thus addressing a different question, Walker’s ‘Beyond the 
Holistic Constitution?’ is useful for a discussion on the Who of democracy. Walker 
outlines four frames of constitutionalism: juridical, politico-institutional, popular 
and societal.70 Though all four-layers are needed for the integrity of the whole,71 
how these layers are arranged is not dictated. State-constitutionalism has a 
particular ‘formulation’ of the layers, post-state constitutionalism might have a 
                                                          
67 The difference between this and the approach adopted by Fassbender and Peters is that this 
approach links to the people, it is an ongoing formation of the polity and constituted power holders, 
rather than the constitution demarcating the people. 
68 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.1. 
69 Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 7); Walker, ‘Beyond the 
Holistic Constitution?’ (n 7). 
70 Walker, ‘Beyond the Holistic Constitution?’ (n 7) 298. 
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different model.72 Walker makes use of the framework to analyse whether 
governance systems are constitutional; for example, he argues that the EU has 
a ‘thin’ constitutionalism as elements of the juridical and politico-institutional 
layers are present, but as it lacks the popular and societal layer there is not ‘thick’ 
constitutionalism and other ‘transnational societal actors’ do not exhibit any 
elements of the four-layers.73 This framework can be repurposed to explore how 
democracy is conceptualised within the principled wave.  
 
Walker constructs a divide between a popular and societal frame.74 The societal 
frame contains questions about the demarcation of the requisite polity, which 
could include the ideas of commonality that have been used to construct demoi.75 
The popular frame concerns the ‘democratic self-constitution and self-authorship’ 
of a public.76 In disconnecting the authority of the public from ideas of 
commonality, Walker offers a way of demarcating a demos without relying on 
territory and nationality. In disconnecting the two frames, Walker, like Besson, 
asks two questions: the formation of constituent power holders, and the formation 
of the constitution.77  
 
Previously it has been shown that for Walker, when a society comes together this 
does not have to be democratic,78 but the expression of constituent power in this 
model does involve democracy. What is meant by ‘democratic’ needs unpacking. 
In his article on the ‘Incompleteness of Democracy’, Walker argues that the 
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77 Samantha Besson, ‘Whose Constitution(s)? International Law, Constitutionalism, and 
Democracy’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, 
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creation of the polity and the adoption of the constitution is not informed by 
democracy,79 and yet here he seems to be suggesting constituent power is 
‘democratic’. If he seeks to argue that constituent power is not expressed 
democratically, nor destined to construct a democratic outcome, as he suggests 
in the ‘Incompleteness’ article, then the meaning of ‘democratic’ here is unclear. 
It would seem that Walker is referring to the idea that the people have some role 
in constitution-making. 
 
Separating the frames can also risk obscuring the Who. Across global 
constitutionalist scholarship, the people are not always at the core of decision-
making. Whilst a polity does not necessarily need to be demarcated using 
national identity, ethnos, or territorial boundaries, there does need to be a polity. 
A process that facilitates popular participation raises questions about democracy 
if those processes do not link to the individuals within the societal frame. What 
Walker proffers is an attempt to problematise the relationships between the 
frames, but it also demonstrates how it is possible to treat the frames in the 
abstract without acknowledging the need to connect to the people. 
 
Scope of power 
 
Another issue is the extent of constituent power. This can be determined both in 
terms of the powers and roles, but also temporally. Previously, it was noted that 
constituent power can manifest itself at the foundational moment alone or it can 
lie dormant as a threat to government that could reappear.80 Within the principled 
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wave of global constitutionalist scholarship, the scope of constituent power is 
unclear. Nootens’ discussion on constituent power highlights the ambiguity. She 
argues that the concept of constituent power embodies the idea that persons 
within a polity ‘are to be the source of the [regime’s] arrangements (constitutional 
and institutional)’.81 Whilst it is generally agreed that constituent power is the 
power to make and change constitutional arrangements, the meaning of 
‘institutional’, as used by Nootens, is less clear. What is meant by institutional will 
determine the scope of constituent power; if it means constitutional institutions 
then constituent power still has scope for foundational changes, if on the other 
hand it is evocative of everyday processes, then constituent power extends 
beyond constitutional moments.  
 
Patberg argues that ‘[c]onstituent power then describes the citizens’ ongoing 
entitlement to shape the constitutional order through democratic procedures’.82 If 
‘democratic procedures’ refers to institutionalised processes under the 
constitution, then there is a misunderstanding of constituent power. In other 
words, ‘democratic procedures’ could refer to voting, elections, or other 
participatory procedures that are outlined in the constitution to legitimatise 
governmental decision-making. As noted above, Sieyès vehemently rejected the 
conflation of constituent power and legislative processes; the constituent power 
predates those processes, it creates the constitution that provides for those 
processes.83 Constitutional amendments blur the lines between constituent 
power and everyday governance, because scholars have referred to amendment 
                                                          
81 Nootens (n 3) 137-138. 
82 Markus Patberg, ‘Against democratic intergovernmentalism: The case for a theory of 
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powers as constituent power.84 Yet, constituent power is not expressed through 
processes within the constitution; constituent power sits outside the constitution, 
and so if amendment procedures are provided for within the constitution, 
implementing them is not an expression of constituent power.85 Alternatively, 
Patberg’s use of ‘democratic procedures’ could refer to the idea that constituent 
power has to be expressed democratically. This ambiguity around the meaning 
of ‘democratic procedures’ highlights that constituent power is not just a Who 
question, but also a When question. 
 
The open nature of constituent power, or the idea that it continues to resist 
constituted power is mooted within global constitutionalist discourse. Krisch 
argues that social movements and NGOs have a function as a pouvoir irritant.86 
What it means to be an ‘irritant’ needs to be unpacked. ‘Irritant’ is evocative of 
the threat of the return of constituent power, this refers to a power that still exists 
outside of the constitution. Care needs to be taken here to stress that even the 
irritant function is a radical power. It is not mere resistance, opposition, or 
objection, but a threat or attempt to rewrite the constitutional system. However, 
for Krisch this irritant function is akin to resistance; he argues that when states 
refer to their domestic situation to threaten to renegotiate their international 
obligations, this is potentially an example of constituent power.87 The constituent 
power is held by the state, and invoked at the international level; despite Krisch 
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calling for a popular process for constituent power,88 a specific role for the people 
is not made out in this state-based example. Moreover, renegotiating 
international obligations is not necessarily constitutional for the global level of 
governance. It would only fall within the ambit of constituent power if the 
international obligations were ‘constitutional’, and there was not a pre-ordained 
amendment procedure that the state was following.89 Using irritant in this manner 
means that the lines between political and constituent power are blurred. 
 
This shift to conceive of constituent power as an irritant, highlights that the 
constituent power raises questions of What. The scope of the power depends on 
how constituent power is conceptualised; the shift to view constituent power as a 
form of irritation weakens the scope of the power. Whilst the principled wave 
draws attention to constituent power as a means of constructing a Who for global 
constitutionalism, the question of constituent power should also be seen as 
offering an alternative approach to What and When.  
 
Relationship between Constituent Power and Democracy  
 
Within the relational and decisionist approaches to constituent power, there is an 
assumption that constituent power is a ‘democratic entitlement’.90 Yet, as noted, 
there is a more complex relationship between constituent power and 
democracy.91 There are multiple sites at which democracy and constituent power 
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can potentially intersect: the demarcation of the polity, the manifestation of 
constituent power, and everyday governance. As will be explored in more detail 
below, scholars disagree about the role of democracy at these moments. This 
sub-section uses Walker’s approach to constituent power to highlight the 
potential disconnects between democracy and constituent power, raising 
questions about whether constituent power is an appropriate basis for a global 
constitutionalist discussion on democracy.  
 
In his discussion on the tension between constitutionalism and democracy, 
Walker adopts a distinction between constitutionalisation and everyday 
governance. For Walker, the question of authority, is answered by constituent 
power and constituent power is tied to the formation of the polity, the writing and 
the acceptance of the constitution.92 This act of constituent power determines the 
constitution and the shape of the polity. The second question, for Walker, is about 
representation and it concerns Who counts within the demos.93 Walker notes that 
it is the constitutional framework that determines the identity of those eligible to 
participate in democratic process.94 In other words, the constitution provides the 
rules on the eligibility of the electorate. He argues that this is not ‘derived from 
democratic principles’.95 Walker argues that processes of constitutionalism 
operate to create a system in which democracy can then flourish. For Walker, the 
constitutionalisation process is not informed by democracy, democracy is an 
everyday governance concern.96  
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Constructing a divide between authority and representation raises questions 
about the utility of using constituent power in the Who of a democracy discussion. 
Walker creates a distinction between the constituent power holders and the 
people participating in the democratic process; they are not necessarily the same 
actors as the constitutional order could limit the number of people who participate. 
In excluding democratic principles in determining the Who of the demos, Walker 
suggests that democracy is merely a process, where the question of political 
equality arises only after the people are demarcated by constitutionalism. The 
divide between constitutionalisation (constituent power) and democracy, where 
democracy does not have a role in the constitutionalisation process, undermines 
the utility of constituent power as a basis for democracy in global 
constitutionalism.  
 
The process of constitutionalisation can be broken down into a series of phases: 
formation of the polity, writing the constitution, accepting the constitution, and 
amending the constitution. The role for constituent power and democracy at these 
phases is contested within global constitutionalist literature. Adopting the position 
he takes in the ‘Incompleteness of Democracy’, Walker would argue that 
democracy is not necessary at the formation of the polity, nor the writing and 
acceptance of the constitution.97 But, he acknowledges that democracy plays a 
role in changing the constitutional arrangement.98 In contrast, Besson requires 
democratic processes at each stage and O’Donoghue argues that democracy 
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informs constituent power.99 There is a real complexity to the relationship 
between constituent power and democracy, and this needs to be appreciated 
before constituent power is used as a basis for democracy. 
 
Within the principled wave of global constitutionalist literature, scholars have 
latched onto constituent power as a method of expanding the Who beyond the 
state-centricity of international law; non-state actors such as collectives of 
individuals, social movements, and NGOs are discussed as potential constituent 
power holders to bring them into the relevant actors of international law. This 
section has considered the utility of such a move and raised the limitations of 
focusing on constituent power. Within this wave, constituent power is treated as 
a Who question, as a lens to expose potential actors currently disadvantaged or 
ignored by the international legal system. But, as this section has demonstrated, 
constituent power must also be addressed as a What and When question as 
doing so highlights the differences between constituent power and democracy.  
  
5.3.2 What 
 
The broad umbrella nature of the principled approach to global constitutionalism 
means that there is no consensus on the What of democracy; in other words, the 
scope of the power of the people within democracy is not agreed. Whilst the shift 
to constituent power, and to investigating the allocation of power within 
constitutionalism, means that there are fruitful discussions on popular sovereignty 
and democracy, there are limitations to this discussion. In particular, the moniker 
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of democratic legitimacy used in the scholarship further complicates matters. To 
explore how this wave conceptualises the What of democracy, and to investigate 
where limitations arise, this section will explore the extent to which democracy is 
considered foundational, then it will discuss the limitation of the democratic 
legitimacy moniker. 
 
Popular Sovereignty; the scope of the power? 
 
This sub-section explores how this wave of global constitutionalist scholarship 
approaches the What of democracy. Within the principled approach, there is an 
acknowledgement that democracy is about popular sovereignty. But, there are 
certain discussions that question the relationship between population sovereignty 
and democracy; namely, the fact that state sovereignty still has prominence in 
global constitutionalist discourse. In addition, within this principled wave there is 
disagreement as to the types of decisions people are given control over.  
 
What popular sovereignty and democracy means for the principled wave is 
unclear. For Walker, questions of popular sovereignty are located within the 
constituent power, which he argues is disassociated and in a contested 
relationship with democracy.100 Furthermore, he distances democracy from 
popular sovereignty as he ties democratic politics to voting and standing for 
election.101 Walker’s approach fits with the tradition that ties popular sovereignty 
to the constitutional moment.102 In contrast, for Habermas, democracy and 
                                                          
100 Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 7) 229. 
101 ibid 216. 
102 See Chapter 1, section 1.5.1 and Chapter 2, section 2.3.3. 
 
243 
popular sovereignty are equated.103 He argues that popular sovereignty is 
proceduralised, which means it ‘retreats into democratic procedures’.104 But, in 
proceduralising popular sovereignty, Habermas makes it into a communicative 
power; a power that falls short of republican notions of popular sovereignty.105 
The wave encompasses different positions on popular sovereignty, leading to an 
incoherent discourse on democracy.  
 
Popular sovereignty, even within the principled approach to global 
constitutionalism, can get overlooked as there is an unclear relationship between 
popular and state sovereignty.106 In international law, whilst there is an attempt 
to incorporate ideas of popular sovereignty, the territorial integrity of the state 
trumps the will of the people,107 and there is still a commitment within the 
organisational wave to state sovereignty.108 The principled wave fails to explicitly 
challenge this tension between popular and state sovereignty. Discussions on the 
state highlight this. Habermas argues that there are two subjects within global 
constitutionalism, states and individuals. O’Donoghue, building on Habermas, 
argues that it is practical to acknowledge the role of states: ‘[a]cknowledging 
states and individuals as subjects in combination with international organisations 
and structures for the maintenance of the legal order is perhaps a more realistic 
proposition than what is first apparent.’109 This realistic position is evocative of 
Peters’ approach in the organisational wave. Despite normative approaches to 
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democracy requiring a challenge to state sovereignty, Peters protects state 
sovereignty because it is a foundation of international law.110 O’Donoghue does, 
however, note that classical approaches to the state are no longer sufficient,111 
which leaves space to discuss how states are representative of their populations, 
rather than merely assume, which is the position adopted within the 
organisational wave.112  
 
Preuss, who argues that constitutionalism is about popular sovereignty, does not 
challenge state sovereignty. Preuss uses jus cogens, erga omnes norms, ‘world-
order treaties’ and an independent international judiciary as evidence of 
international constitutionalisation.113 Whilst jus cogens norms, erga omnes 
norms, and an independent judiciary witness a move away from state consent, 
they are not generated by the people, and furthermore treaties are predicated on 
state consent. Incorporating the idea of ‘word-order treaties’, which locates the 
discussion in state sovereignty, Preuss does not engage with how state 
sovereignty can quell popular sovereignty. In balancing the interests of 
individuals and the role of the state in international law, this wave of global 
constitutionalist literature can fail to negate the impact of state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity on democracy.  
 
What decisions will be subject to democratic processes are inconsistent in this 
wave. Whilst Føllesdal argues that the constitution as a whole should be subject 
to democratic scrutiny, he allows for select agencies and organisations to act 
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independently provided they maintain public trust.114 Walker similarly argues that 
democracy cannot extend to the ‘very nook and cranny of decision-making’, and 
that other non-democratic mechanisms such as expertise should determine some 
decisions.115 The idea that some discreet exercises of power can be measured 
against non-democratic mechanisms, raises questions about the What of 
democracy. Both Føllesdal and Walker introduce non-democratic mechanisms 
because legitimacy is socially constructed and thus not necessarily tied to 
democracy.116 Legitimacy can be derived from trust and expertise as they 
suggest. Other norms and processes within constitutionalism can generate 
legitimacy, such as the rule of law. Where democracy is facilitated and where 
non-democratic mechanisms are used can be explained by the tension between 
constitutionalism and democracy; constitutionalism can place limits on 
democracy. But, what is missing from the principled wave is an acknowledgement 
of the disagreements on the scope of democracy, and the role of constitutionalism 
in demarcating this scope.  
 
In principle, the competing approaches to popular sovereignty or political equality 
are not problematic. Terms, such as popular sovereignty and democracy, are 
nebulous and can therefore be used as part of different constitutional projects. 
The problems arise where there is no explicit acknowledgement of the changes 
to the scope of people’s power. Using the Circumstances exposes the shifts to 
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the scope of power and how subtle modifications to the When and Where can 
influence the What of democracy.  
 
Democratic Legitimacy 
 
A common moniker within the principled wave of global constitutionalist literature 
is ‘democratic legitimacy’, but there is a lack of clarity around what democratic 
legitimacy means and what roles and powers it gives to the people. Democratic 
legitimacy might indicate the When of democracy, to the extent that it can indicate 
that decision-making has to be rooted in a democratically legitimate authority. In 
this sense, democratic legitimacy is tied to popular sovereignty as a constituent 
moment, where representatives can operate provided they link back to some 
mythical idea of the people as sovereign.117 O’Donoghue seems to incorporate 
an idea of democratic legitimacy as a foundational question as she draws a 
distinction between democracy and democratic legitimacy, and democratic 
legitimacy is concerned with the recognition of constituent power holders and 
linking them to constituted power holders.118 Potentially then, democratic 
legitimacy is tied to the question of When and in particular, to foundational 
moments.  
 
Using democratic legitimacy as a foundational question, ignores the everyday 
decision-making. That said, the distinction in the principled wave is not so clear 
cut. O’Donoghue blurs the lines between constituent and everyday moments as 
the relationship between constituent and constituted power is iterative. 
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Furthermore, Habermas refers to democratic legitimacy with respect to both 
everyday governance and constituent moments.119 He argues that international 
organisations have to construct processes that secure ‘democratic legitimation’, 
by which he means that they link back to the legitimacy of the state.120 He seems 
to be suggesting that democratic legitimacy within the state refers to the 
foundation, but at the international level it refers to processes that build on this 
state-based legitimacy.121 This risks returning to the approach within the 
organisational wave, which is to assume state-based processes are 
democratically legitimate.122 If the meaning of democratic legitimacy is not clear, 
and if it can be used interchangeably without explanation as to its meaning, then 
the scope of the power of the people within democracy is not clear.  
 
Linking democracy and legitimacy impacts on the scope of democracy as it can 
give democracy a very particular function.123 Democracy can be considered 
‘indispensable normative component [sic] for the legitimacy of a legal order’.124 
As legitimacy can be disaggregated into a cluster of input, output, and process 
values, scholars can focus on one or other to generate legitimacy.125 The problem 
with democratic legitimacy is the use of democracy descriptively; democratic can 
be disaggregated from the general concept of democracy, such that certain 
values and/or processes of democracy can be selected without referring to ‘the 
full range of democratic values and institutions’.126 For example, O’Donoghue, 
when discussing democratic legitimacy, conceptualises democracy as ‘linking 
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constituent and constituted power holders together’.127 According to 
O’Donoghue, this ‘ensures that power is exercised in a transparent and justifiable 
basis’.128 Here, arguably, elements of democracy are focused on, rather than 
democracy as a concept. This means that the moniker of democratic legitimacy 
can be used, but it can be referring to selected aspects of democracy.  
 
The scope of democracy is contested so at present scholars can exchange 
different definitions of democracy, with particular elements emphasised over 
others, or aspects of governance included at the expense of others. There is 
nothing wrong with choosing to shape democracy into democratic legitimacy to 
form a norm within constitutionalism, but going forward global constitutionalist 
scholarship should be explicit about where it seeks to limit, shape, and constrain 
democracy.129  
 
5.3.3 When 
 
As the discussion on constituent power above demonstrates, this principled 
approach shifts focus towards the constituent moment.130 This is in contrast with 
the organisational wave of global constitutionalist scholarship that sidestepped 
the issue of the foundational moment. As the discussion on constituent power 
demonstrated, When the constituent power is manifested is unclear; whilst some 
scholars restrict it to foundational moments, others have an evolutionary 
understanding, and others equate it with the processes of everyday 
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governance.131 As such, the question of When democracy takes place is unclear. 
This section will first explore the impact of the shift to constituent power on the 
When of democracy and then it will consider Walker’s model of constitutionalism, 
which seeks to divide constitutionalism into four-layers. Splitting 
constitutionalism, as Walker does, raises questions about the When of 
democracy.  
 
Shift to constituent power 
 
The focus on constituent power shifts democracy away from everyday 
governance and towards constituent moments. Patberg criticises the debate on 
democracy at the global level because it is ‘dominated by proposals’, with 
‘blueprints for legitimate institutions and procedures’.132 As the exploration of the 
organisational wave demonstrated, aspects of the global constitutionalist 
literature advocate the reform of existing international organisations. Patberg 
argues that the issue of institutional change is ignored.133 He argues that for 
‘normal politics’ to be democratic, the institutions need to be ‘set up legitimately’ 
and constituent power helps to address who has the right to found or reform 
institutions.134 As this broadens the application of democracy, it is a welcome 
shift. 
 
Unlike Sieyès, who drew a distinction between constituent and constituted power, 
the principled wave adopts a more complex relationship between constituent 
                                                          
131 Chapter 2, section 2.2.2. 
132 Markus Patberg, ‘Constituent Power beyond the state: an emerging debate in international 
political theory’ (2013) Millennium 224-238, 230. 
133 ibid 230. 
134 ibid 230. 
 
250 
power and democracy. Walker argues that democracy does not inform the 
creation of the polity nor the creation of the constitutional arrangement, but he 
does argue that democracy is a reflexive process that can act to question the 
constitutional order; it facilitates the ‘continuously self-amending relationship of a 
collective self to itself’.135 For O’Donoghue, the role of constituent power is to 
‘choose the form and substantive character of the governance system’ and 
changes to it.136 She argues that democracy is part of the constituent moment 
and changes to the subsequent expressions of constituent power. O’Donoghue 
argues that change of the constitutional order is an expression of constituent 
power and democracy plays a role in this process. She argues that 
‘constitutionalism is reliant on democracy to legitimately change the content of its 
own order’.137 The differing roles Walker and O’Donoghue give democracy and 
constituent power in constitutional change could be evocative of Tully’s 
‘democratic constitutionalism’ or Krisch’s weaker pouvoir irritant.138 On a stricter 
approach to constituent power, these discussions are at odds with the idea that 
amendment procedures are not an expression of constituent power.139 The 
complexity demonstrates the magnitude of the challenge in discussing 
democracy in global constitutionalism.  
 
The problem is that it is not clear when constituent power manifests itself. Though 
not explicitly, O’Donoghue discusses democratic legitimacy at both the 
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foundational moments and everyday governance.140 With respect to everyday 
governance, she discusses the operation of a legitimate governance order and 
the distribution of the benefits of the constitutional order.141 On the one hand, the 
idea that benefits are distributed gives democracy a distributive role, on the other 
hand, she writes that the benefits have to be ‘functional’142 or, in essence, that 
people are able to exercise their power. Whilst predominantly she discusses 
constituent power and democracy as manifested in constitutional moments and 
changes, there is a suggestion here that both can have a role in everyday 
governance.  
 
Conflating the constitutional moment and the everyday can cause problems. As 
noted, Sieyès warned against such a conflation because if every act of decision-
making is an act of constituent power, all law or policy becomes constitutional 
law.143 On the one hand, constitutional laws are typically above the contestation 
of the people and difficult to amend. On the other hand, if every act is an act of 
constituent power, this grants the people a radical power to reconstitute the 
constitutional order on a frequent basis. It is this shift in the scope of the power 
that the principled wave needs to be explicit about. 
 
In contrast, de Búrca explicitly discusses the everyday governance. In her 
democratic striving approach, she applies aspects of democracy to everyday 
governance. When she discusses the construction or reform of international 
organisations, she argues that democracy requires the reform of international 
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organisations and their processes.144 It is not clear what types of reforms are 
required, but her discussion on the proposals for reforming the institution focuses 
on states.145 de Búrca’s reliance on states echoes the approach adopted by 
Fassbender and Peters in the organisational wave.146 She outlines the proposal 
to ensure the increased participation of governments from developing countries, 
but does not critique that states are a weak form of representative for people. The 
presence of intergovernmental democracy at the foundational moment, and the 
disconnect between state and people, weakens democracy’s role at the 
foundational moment.  
 
As the work of O’Donoghue, Walker and de Búrca demonstrate, there is little 
clarity over When democracy should take place in this principled wave. Albeit 
there is a shift towards taking seriously the foundational moment, the role of 
democracy at those moments is still contested. As discussed above, there are 
three questions to consider when investigating When: the role of democracy in 
the demarcation of the polity; the role of democracy in the expression of 
constituent power; and the role of democracy in everyday governance. At each 
instance, there is a lack of agreement. For Walker, the demarcation of a polity is 
not necessarily democratic,147 but de Búrca and O’Donoghue argue democracy 
should be taken into account on an ongoing basis to determine the 
demos/constituency.148 Whilst O’Donoghue would ensure that democracy played 
a role in the expression of constituent power,149 Walker has shifted democracy to 
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a phase after the constituent moment.150 With respect to the everyday 
governance, all three place democracy within this phase, but not necessarily as 
part of a constituent power; whilst O’Donoghue interrelates democracy and 
constituent power, Walker distinguishes them so that constituent power still 
denotes the radical power to constitute, and de Búrca does not reflect on 
constituent power in everyday governance. Within the principled wave there are 
different approaches to the When of democracy, but the scholars do not respond 
to one another. Rather, these approaches to When are co-existent and there is 
little reflection on how this shift in When shapes the approach to democracy.  
 
The shift to constituent power creates gaps with respect to everyday governance. 
Patberg uses constituent power to challenge and reform ‘intergovernmental 
democracy’.151 Rather than relying on states as constituent power holders, 
Patberg calls for a shift to citizens.152 But, constituent power (traditionally 
understood) speaks to the constituent moment and not everyday governance. 
Patberg does not discuss who would represent citizens in everyday decision-
making. In other words, he critiques how the parliamentary body is established 
but then leaves the state-based representatives intact, thus not moving beyond 
the statist-track outlined in the organisational wave.153 Separating constituent 
power from democracy exposes the limitation of Patberg’s argument, and 
highlights the need to conceptualise constituent power as a When and What 
question, rather than just a Who question.  
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In his discussion on whether there is a Pouvoir Constituant Mixte at the EU, 
Habermas demonstrates the complex relationship between constituent power 
and democracy.154 For Habermas, the constituent power of the EU is divided as 
individuals are both citizens within Member States and part of the European 
people, it is in both of these roles that they have constituent power.155 He draws 
a distinction between constituting power, which is concerned with creation and 
change to constitutions, and the legitimacy of political processes within a 
constitutional system.156 In the European Parliament, the voting practices are at 
odds with political equality; the degressive proportional allocation of seats means 
that votes are not counted equally. Habermas uses the idea of the divided 
constituent power to justify this rejection of political equality in the European 
Parliament; state equality is protected as a part of the act of constituent power, 
when the people chose to project their status as citizens in Member States. A 
former act of constituent power justifies the undemocratic decision-making 
processes.  
 
The problem with Habermas’ discussion on constituent power is that it prioritises 
only one aspect of the When of democracy. Limiting the discussion to the 
constituent power negates the power of the demos. If, as Tully argues, 
democracy requires an iterative challenge to constitutionalism, Habermas’ 
argument ignores this reflexive role for democracy.157 This approach to 
constituent power focuses on the constituent moment at the expense of the 
everyday decision-making. This thesis argues that the role for democracy should 
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be considered in relation to both the constituting power and the political 
process.158  
 
Layers of constitutionalism 
 
Walker’s four layers (the juridical, the societal, the popular, and the politico-
institutional)159 do not have a fixed formation, but rather iteratively interact 
according to the context.160 When this is paired with Walker’s idea of the 
constitutional constellation, which is the idea that within global constitutionalism 
different sites can interact to form constitutionalisation,161 it raises questions 
about When democracy is located within constitutionalism. 
 
The juridical layer is concerned with a self-contained legal order.162 The politico-
institutional layer concerns the ‘differentiation of the sphere of the public and the 
political’.163 As noted above, the popular layer ‘refers to the dimension of “we the 
people”’ and the societal layer ‘refers to the idea that the constitution pertains to 
a particular “society” self-understood and self-identified as such’.164 It is within the 
‘popular’ layer that Walker explicitly engages with questions of democracy: the 
constitutional order is underpinned by ‘its democratic self-constitution and self-
authorship’.165  
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The way in which the four layers are constructed raises questions about When 
democracy is conceptualised. Walker places democracy in the ‘popular’ frame, 
but he argues that there is interaction between the four frames as they are 
‘dependent on the integrity of the whole’.166 What is not explicitly addressed in his 
chapter is how issues, such as democracy, move across the four layers. For 
example, if there is a disconnect between the ‘popular’ and ‘societal’ layer this 
suggests, as argued above, that Walker does not envisage a role for democracy 
in the construction of the polity.167 He addresses the ways in which the juridical 
and the politico-institutional might relate to each other, raising issues such as 
decision-making,168 but, not how these layers interact with the popular frame. In 
suggesting that the constitution is underpinned by democracy it is possible that 
the governance must link back to the people, but this is not explicit. This is 
symptomatic of shifting the discussion to constituent power, without addressing 
everyday governance.  
 
In global constitutionalist scholarship, there is a shift from the organisational wave 
dealing with everyday governance in international organisations, to the principled 
wave, which focuses on constitutional moments. Whilst the focus on constituent 
power adds the additional element of the foundational moment, it necessitates a 
reflection on the other Circumstances of Democracy as constituent power is a 
question of Who, What and When.  
 
A shift in the When can influence the Who and the What of democracy. Not 
appreciating the impact of shifting the When, has the potential to conflate the 
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demos and constituent power. The demos and constituent power have different 
roles and powers; whilst the powers of the demos are prescribed by the 
constitution, the constituent power is a radical power to rewrite the constitutional 
frame. Global constitutionalist scholarship needs a reflection on the different roles 
and powers of the constituent power holders and the demos. If democracy is to 
be conflated with constituent power, then this more radical notion of democracy 
should be explicitly acknowledged.  
 
5.3.4 Where 
 
Walker approaches the Where of global constitutionalism from four angles: unity, 
sectoral, societal and then constitutional pluralism. Walker, who advocates a 
constitutional pluralism, places the other approaches on a continuum, with unity 
at one end and societal constitutionalism at the other.169 The unity approach 
argues that there is a single constitutional system, such as the UN Charter as the 
constitution of the international community. The sectoral angle acknowledges the 
fragmentation of international law and discusses constitutionalisation within 
different sectors of international law. The principled approach includes a shift in 
favour of a pluralist or sociological approach, and this section considers the 
influence of this shift on discussions of democracy.  
 
Constitutional Pluralism  
 
                                                          
169 Neil Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan 
Komárek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart 2012) 27. 
 
258 
Constitutional pluralism originated in debates on membership to the EU,170 and 
though it is criticised for misconceptions of sovereignty or constructing a new form 
of anarchy,171 it is used as a framing device in aspects of global constitutionalist 
literature. What constitutional pluralism means is debated. Whilst some argue 
that it amounts to interactions between autonomous legal orders,172 others have 
constructed a constellation from elements of legal orders.173 Maduro 
demonstrates that there are empirical and normative claims of constitutional 
pluralism. The empirical claim is that there are a ‘plurality of constitutional sources 
and claims of final authority’.174 The normative claim is that final authority should 
be left open.175 In other words, neither system could claim superiority over the 
other.176 This sub-section uses Walker’s constitutional pluralism.  
 
For Walker, constitutionalism and democracy can take place across levels. He 
uses constitutional pluralism to argue that constitutional ‘points’ can interact with 
‘strongly democratic settings’, forming a constellation where one point will 
democratise the other.177 As an example, he suggests that the democratic 
Member States of the Council of Europe can act to democratise the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).178 Walker acknowledges that this model 
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can be criticised for constructing an ‘attenuated’ link between the international 
organisation and the demos.179 But, he responds by arguing that 
constitutionalism and democracy are in tension. The argument is that the 
constitutionalism offered by a body such as the Council of Europe through the 
ECHR realises democracy within a state.180 But, as Tully in his use of ‘democratic 
constitutionalism’ argues, constitutionalism should be infused with democracy.181 
This means that the Council of Europe would need democratisation. To argue 
that constitutionalism can work to limit democracy without demonstrating how 
democracy works on constitutionalism, effectively shuts down claims for 
democratising international and supranational organisations. Within this model, 
the role of democracy is diminished.  
 
Walker attempts to address the weak link between the people and the 
constitutional point. Walker argues that Member States provide democratic 
legitimacy by adopting the norms of the ECHR.182 Firstly, this lacks a discussion 
on the What, as the people have limited decision-making capacity in relation to 
the adoption of such norms, especially as the ratification process does not have 
to involve Parliament.183 Secondly, the adoption of norms is ambiguous with 
respect to When; adoption could mean the ratification of the ECHR, or the 
continuous engagement with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights. If the argument is that Member States ratified the ECHR this echoes with 
the reliance on ‘intergovernmental democracy’ in the organisational wave, where 
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states are key actors and there is limited engagement with the people.184 In 
contrast to the organisational wave, which merely assumed the state was 
representative, Walker outlines that to be democratic a state must meet ‘minimal 
conditions of political and personal freedom on the part of its stakeholders and 
office-holders’.185 This is an improvement on the approach in the organisational 
wave, which reconceptualised the sovereign state as responsible to its citizens, 
as it is suggestive of a need to investigate the state’s political methods. Whilst 
this is a move in the right direction, there is a need to reflect on the Who, What, 
and When. In principle, the constitutional constellation could work, provided that 
there was genuine input of the people.  
 
The flexibility of Walker’s constitutional pluralism moves the discussion on 
democracy forward. It moves beyond state-contained ideas of constitutionalism 
and looks for genuine responsiveness of states to people, rather than relying on 
international legal debates on the revision of sovereignty as responsibility. The 
problem with Walker’s constellation lies in the lack of procedural details; more 
needs to be done to ensure genuine links to the people and a more nuanced 
relationship between constitutionalism and democracy.  
 
Societal Constitutionalism  
 
Societal constitutionalism argues that the state is not the only location for 
constitutionalisation, rather autonomous systems can develop as constitutional 
orders. Societal constitutionalism examines constitutionalism in non-state 
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examples,186 such as civil society, business corporations and private 
organizations.187 Teubner argues that sectors of society (economy, science, arts 
etc.) have their own autonomous identity.188 Societal constitutionalism challenges 
the public private divide and argues for the constitutionalisation of private sectors. 
The commitment to autonomous constitutions within different sectors of society, 
means that in principle constitutionalism can take place across the levels of 
governance and within them. It opens spaces for constitutionalism and 
discussions on democracy.  
 
Within Walker’s four layers of constitutionalism that were outlined in the previous 
section, one of the layers was the politico-institutional layer.189 This layer is 
predicated on a public/private divide, as it locates the political within a public 
sphere.190 The very premise of Walker’s politico-institutional layer places the 
Where of democracy in the public sphere, thus limiting the types of international 
institutions people have power over. de Búrca limits her enquiry to ‘public 
governing institution[s]’.191 She argues that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
should be subject to democratic legitimacy because it has public goals and is an 
authoritative public policy-maker.192 For de Búrca, authoritative decision-making 
should be subject to democratic legitimacy.193 This is broad criteria, which 
facilitates discussions on bodies other than formal international organisations, 
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and thus moves beyond the organisational wave. However, it is still situated 
within the public sphere, leaving the private sphere unaccountable. Using 
functions of a body to demarcate the location of democracy can exclude those 
bodies that wield power over persons but do not exhibit such functions.194 An 
alternative argument is that state authority is subjected to democracy because of 
its coercive force and another approach is that all exercises of power should be 
subject to democratic control.195 The public/private divide exhibited by Walker 
and de Búrca is criticised by scholars such as, Teubner and Thornhill in societal 
constitutionalism,196 as it overly restricts the application of constitutionalism and 
democracy.  
 
Societal constitutionalism questions the primacy of the state constitution and 
examines constitutionalism in non-state examples.197 This includes civil society 
as well as business corporations and private organisations.198 For Teubner this 
is about developing a theory of constitutionalism without the state.199 This means 
that in theory democratic decision-making is located across society and other 
organisations.200 However, as Teubner argues, these sectors of society 
(economy, science, arts etc.) have their own autonomous identity; in other words, 
the state constitution should not be a blueprint, rather each sector has a process 
of constitutionalisation.201 How each system self-constitutionalises is specific to 
that system, which could potentially exclude democracy.  
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In societal constitutionalism, the focus on constitutionalisation as a process gives 
a different approach to the question of Where. Societal constitutionalism is 
concerned with the constitutionalisation of self-limiting autonomous spheres, 
which is an ongoing process. Teubner distinguishes between ‘La politique’ and 
‘le politique’.202 La politique refers to ‘institutionalized politics’ and le politique 
refers to ‘politics in society’ or other potential autonomous spheres.203 The 
relationship between La politique and le politique is defined in the negative; 
Teubner argues that La politique cannot represent the whole of le politique.204 
The role for le politique within La politique is unclear.205 With respect to the Where 
of constitutionalism, he argues that both La politique and le politique experience 
the paradox of constituent power and constituted power as both self-constitute.206 
But, Teubner does not explicitly introduce democracy to this question of 
constituent power.207 For Teubner, constituent power is a process that is not tied 
to democracy and whilst he introduces ideas of participation in le politique, it is 
not clear that participation is equivalent to democracy.208 Societal 
constitutionalism offers a different Where for constitutionalism and democracy; 
the constitutionalisation of le politique. But, as it falls outside of Teubner’s project, 
there is no exploration of the ramifications for the When of democracy.  
 
Together Teubner and Walker offer a more integrated model of global 
governance, which has the potential to expand into the private sphere. However, 
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the discussions on Where demonstrate a failure to connect the Circumstances of 
Democracy. There is scope for a disconnect between Where and the requisite 
Who. Teubner is ambiguous about the place of people in his conceptualisation of 
constituent power and democracy. Whilst Walker offers a non-holistic concept of 
the constitution as a way of disassociating from the state but still ensuring that 
the different elements of constitutionalism are present, the idea of the people 
making collective decisions can still get lost. There needs to be explicit debates 
on the links between the people and their genuine power in decision-making for 
democracy.  
 
5.3.5 How 
 
The commitment to both an integrated concept of global governance and the 
need to incorporate the private sphere within the principled wave, has 
implications on the How of democracy. This wave acknowledges that 
international organisations are not the only sites in need of reform, parliamentary 
style bodies are not sufficient, and the focus on Member States is not plausible. 
Alongside models that are predicated on elections,209 there are innovative 
approaches, such as de Búrca’s ‘democratic-striving’ approach. Nevertheless, 
the institutionalisation of democracy within global constitutionalist literature is not 
as prominent within the principled approach.210  
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This section will explore how representation and participation are used within the 
principled wave. It focuses on the contrasting models proffered by de Búrca, 
Teubner, and Brunkhorst. These different approaches to representation and 
participation expose how scholars can offer alternative debates on 
democratisation, without debating democracy and how the questions of Who and 
What are side-lined.  
 
‘Democratic-Striving’ Approach 
 
One of the clearest examples of a discussion on How in the principled wave 
appears in de Búrca’s ‘democratic-striving’ approach, but even she states that 
her aim was not to offer detailed proposals.211 Her discussion is on decision-
making processes at the IMF and World Bank, with respect to development 
projects. The democratic-striving approach encompasses the idea of democracy 
as iterative.212 She argues for the ‘fullest-possible participation in effective 
processes of decision-making by those concerned’.213 For de Búrca, Who is 
purposefully left open.214 The Who should be iteratively established and 
challenged to ensure the greatest participation of affected actors. de Búrca 
innovates around the Who,215 but the processes can still be subjected to the 
critiques of the organisational wave.  
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de Búrca’s discussion on democracy within the IMF and World Bank is illustrative 
of the importance of asking the Circumstances. She argues that the ‘participatory-
representative dimension of democracy’ is needed to promote a ‘public-oriented 
character’ of governance.216 If the What Circumstance is reflected on here, there 
is a concern with the meaning of ‘oriented’. As noted above, defining a body by 
its aims and functions restricts the types of decisions the people have power over 
and the types of bodies that the people can hold accountable.217 By participation, 
she includes the participation of civil society actors.218 Yet, she does not reflect 
on whether these actors are accountable to the people. The Circumstances would 
require an investigation on how NGOs link back to the people. Furthermore, the 
participatory-deliberative model is compared to elections as de Búrca argues that 
such a model is crucial in the absence of elections at the transnational level.219 
In doing so, she suggests that the participatory-representative element of 
democracy is second to elections, which work to ‘throw the rascals out’.220 This 
comparison of processes is not as useful as asking the foundational questions 
and in particular, exploring the scope of the people’s power. 
 
Through her model, de Búrca illustrates the importance of reflecting on 
constitutionalism and democracy. She acknowledges that participation and 
representation are just one element of democracy.221 The other elements she 
argues are: ‘protection for human rights and minority rights, equality, pluralism 
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and due process guarantees’. This could be labelled a thick conceptualisation of 
democracy, as it considers human rights.222 She conceptualises it as discussing 
constitutional democracy, where constitutionalism and democracy are seen to 
work in harmony. Yet, this thesis has demonstrated that the relationship between 
constitutionalism and democracy is more complex.223 Human rights and norms of 
constitutionalism interact.224 Whilst democracy and constitutionalism can be 
considered together, to understand democracy, it needs to be treated separately 
first. de Búrca, in adopting constitutional democracy as her model, does not 
elaborate on how the norms of constitutionalism shape democracy.  
 
de Búrca’s discussion on participation and representation is more nuanced than 
the organisational wave. She highlights that such processes are not definitive of 
democracy and her iterative conceptualisation of Who moves the conversation 
forward, away from state-centric notions of demos. Yet, this discussion still falls 
into the same problems as the organisational wave with respect to NGOs, as the 
role of these non-state actors is not fully explored. Participatory practices are 
advocated within the principled wave, but, as argued previously, participation is 
not necessarily akin to democracy.225 As de Búrca’s model of participation 
demonstrates, further questions need to be asked about the scope of the power 
of people in these processes. 
 
Societal Constitutionalism  
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The societal constitutionalism perspectives are illustrative of the potential 
conflation between the Circumstances. Societal constitutionalism mandates a 
reflection on the Who and the Where; it provides a ‘communication’ approach to 
constituent power and priorities society, rather than state-based institutions. 
However, the societal constitutionalism lacks a convincing theorisation of the 
What. This is demonstrated mostly clear in Teubner’s discussion on ‘reflection 
centres’. This sub-section considers how Teubner’s discussions conflate the 
Circumstances.  
 
The ‘reflection centres’ are an alternative to political institutions in the state.226 
These centres operate to self-limit an autonomous system; the centre ‘allows 
systems to channel their societal responses to their expansion in the direction of 
their own self-limitation’.227 Where in liberal constitutionalism, checks on 
expansion might be done through the people or the courts, and in republican 
constitutionalism by the people, societal constitutionalism discusses auto-
limitation. This means that the decision is made by the system itself (for example, 
the corporate structure) or in other words, by an elite.228 Critics of societal 
constitutionalism note that without a central figurehead, ‘self-limitation [will be] 
guided by the actor’s interest, not the common interest’.229 Through these 
reflection centres, the role of the people in placing limits on power is side-lined. 
Teubner associates these reflection centres with democracy, as they are a 
‘criterion of a democratic society’.230 But, this is to ignore the What of democracy. 
In this model, democracy loses its link to the idea of the sovereignty of the people, 
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or of self-government, and potentially becomes a series of participatory 
processes, in which it is not necessarily people participating but an elite. 
 
What Teubner means by democracy is not explicitly outlined, rather it has to be 
derived from the different iterations of democracy through his scholarship. On the 
one hand, democracy is ‘realized through procedures which are oriented toward 
the social responsibility of decentralized collective actors’, which is both 
advocating a plurality of actors/voices as well as increased participation.231 There 
is an argument within societal constitutionalism that conceptualises democracy 
as overlapping networks.232 Citizens participate in different networks and have 
different roles within these networks,233 but it is not clear what these roles are. 
The lack of clarity around the role of the people shows a need to reflect more on 
the scope of the power of the people within democracy. 
 
On the other hand, Teubner constructs a divide between the ‘organized-
professional sphere’ and the ‘spontaneous sphere’234 and democracy can be 
achieved through the interaction between these spheres.235 For Teubner, 
democracy is about the spontaneous sphere placing controls on the organised 
sphere. He writes: 
 
if one wants to enhance the democratic potential beyond the classical 
constitutional institutions (participation, deliberation, electoral 
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mechanisms in politics, and decentralized market mechanisms in the 
economy) then one would need to extent the means by which the 
spontaneous sphere can control the organized sphere.236 
 
In politics, the organised sphere refers to political parties and state institutions, 
and the spontaneous sphere refers to the electorate and public opinion.237 
Though Teubner refers to the spontaneous sphere ‘controlling’ the organised 
sphere, he then limits the role of the spontaneous sphere to one of iteration and 
challenge; the organised sphere makes the decisions, and the spontaneous 
sphere can challenge these.238 He states that the organised sphere does not 
receive ‘clear signals’ from the spontaneous sphere.239 This seems to suggest 
that the scope of the people’s power here is limited to resistance.  
 
Democracy, for Teubner, has three main ideals: irritation of the organised sphere 
by the spontaneous sphere;240 plurality of opinion; and some form of participation 
(though not of people per se, but of autonomous systems).241 Given that the 
constituent power is communicative, rather than necessarily located in a people, 
and that participation is disconnected from the people, Teubner disconnects the 
people from the Who of democracy. Furthermore, the What of democracy is 
limited to irritation and participation. These are processes that are notionally 
‘democratic’, to the extent that participation is commonly associated with 
democracy. The problem is that it does not link to the people, as it is participation 
of systems, and for Teubner, participation is the end-goal rather than a process 
of democratisation. For Teubner, mere participation is sufficient without the 
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additional aspect of power in decision-making. Christodoulidis argues that 
Teubner’s approach is ‘functionally equivalent’ to democracy.242 But this is 
troubling, as without the link to the people and the reflection on the power they 
might have in decision-making, Teubner is not discussing democracy per se, but 
mere participation. 
 
The societal constitutionalism debate on participation highlights the importance 
of asking the Circumstances, rather than relying on proxies and well-known 
modalities of democracy. Teubner’s discussions on participation fail to 
adequately address the What and he disassociates the people from his 
conceptualisation of the Who. Asking the Circumstances highlights that 
participation, rather than democracy, is the end-goal in societal constitutionalism.  
 
Brunkhorst’s Weak and Strong Publics 
 
Brunkhorst critiques the approach to democracy in global constitutional 
scholarship by distinguishing between a weak and strong public.243 A weak public 
has only moral influence through ‘communicative power’.244 This means that 
whilst they can have a political impact,245 they do not make political decisions. A 
strong public has both moral and political influence; discursive practices are 
linked to decisions through legal procedures.246 Such a distinction helpfully starts 
to unpack the extent of the people’s power within democracy and global 
constitutionalism. Brunkhorst argues that at the global level, there is only a weak 
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public.247 The focus placed on deliberation and participation, without emphasising 
the decision-making element of democracy renders the approach within global 
constitutionalist scholarship weak.  
 
However, a critique of Brunkhorst’s discussion on the potential for a strong public 
demonstrates the conflation of What and Who, and the need for a Circumstances 
approach to global constitutional democracy. The weak public on the global level, 
for Brunkhorst, is a select group of social movements and networks of 
associations.248 He then argues that if this weak public were accompanied by 
NGOs, ‘a global professional class and an emerging human rights culture’, a 
strong global public could emerge.249 Rather than addressing the question of 
power, Brunkhorst introduces a new Who. The question of What is replaced by 
an extension of the Who.  
 
Moreover, in Brunkhorst’s publics, the people of both the weak and strong public 
can be represented by non-state, non-representative and non-accountable 
actors. He does, however, suggest that the stronger public would not be 
democracy because it lacks representative processes and discussions are not 
related to decisions.250 Arguing that discussions should link to decisions 
demonstrates a commitment to reflecting on the What of democracy. But, 
Brunkhorst does not engage explicitly in a discussion as to whether these NGOs, 
social movements and networks are representative of or accountable to either 
type of public. This highlights the need for more reflection on the Who and What 
                                                          
247 ibid 680. 
248 ibid 683. 
249 ibid 690. 
250 Brunkhorst, ‘Globalising Democracy Without a State’ (n 243) 690. 
 
273 
of democracy and for a discussion on the people having power in decision-
making.  
 
Within the principled wave closer attention is paid to questions of democracy. 
Walker and O’Donoghue and Habermas open up space to ask about the state’s 
processes for representation,251 and there is an acknowledgement that 
democracy is an ongoing process that needs to continually address the 
demarcation of the Who.252 But this section demonstrated that work still needs to 
be done to ensure that democracy is at the fore of the debates. Across the 
principled wave, there are instances of inadequate attention to the Circumstances 
and in places the Circumstances are conflated. Whilst the organisational wave 
replaces What with How, in the principled wave questions of What are replaced 
with debates on Who.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
The shift towards a principled approach to constitutionalism enhances the 
discussion on democracy. The principled wave initiates a debate on the 
relationship between democracy and constitutionalism and there is now a 
genuine engagement with the question of constituent power within global 
constitutionalism. Within this wave, democracy is not expressed in terms of 
processes and institutions (i.e. voting and elections), rather there is an attempt to 
extract the values and principles of democracy. However, there is still room for 
improvement.  
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The discussion on How demonstrates that there is still a need to ask the 
Circumstances in turn. Within the principled wave, non-state actors are still 
presented as appropriate representatives despite the lack of investigation into 
their democratic credentials. The power of the people is obscured in this wave, 
as Teubner fails to link processes to the people or to decision-making and the 
conflation of Who and What is suggestive of a lack of concern for ensuring people 
have power. To address this, the Circumstances should be taken in turn to ensure 
that each element of democracy is addressed.  
 
This chapter used the Circumstances of Democracy to investigate how the 
principled wave of global constitutionalist literature approaches democracy. The 
principled wave is concerned with constituent power. Whilst the actors within the 
wave are similar to those in the organisational wave, their roles and powers are 
different. Constituent power is not just a question of Who, but also of What. In 
this wave, questions of popular sovereignty exist alongside discussions on 
democratic legitimacy so the What of democracy is difficult to ascertain. There is 
uncertainty around the When of democracy when constituent power is used as a 
frame for the Who. There is a disconnect between constituent power and 
everyday governance, and there is an indiscriminate use of constituent power 
where it is not identified as a radical power to (re)write a constitutional system. 
With respect to the Where, Teubner’s attempt to relocate constitutionalism in 
autonomous spheres, results in an ambiguous Who and a weak understanding 
of What, and whilst Walker’s constellation idea is useful for thinking through the 
Where of constitutionalism, the link to the people is weak.  
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The deeper engagement with the relationship between constitutionalism and 
democracy is laudable. But, one of the persistent limitations is the speed with 
which global constitutionalist scholarship assumes democracy means 
constitutional democracy.253 Whilst it is an important and relevant manifestation 
of democracy, presenting it as uncontested overlooks the tensions between 
constitutionalism and democracy, and the way in which democracy is modified to 
be accommodated by constitutionalism. Furthermore, constituent power is 
addressed as a Who question within the scholarship, but it raises questions about 
When and What. Failure to engage with the changing When and What of 
constituent power risks the conflation of constituent power and democracy. 
 
Analysing both the organisational and the principled wave of global 
constitutionalist literature shows the variation in approaches. Both waves 
prioritise certain Circumstances and ask different questions. In particular, the 
principled wave focuses on the question of constituent power, focusing on a new 
Who and When. The principled wave in moving the debate to constituent power 
does not address the limitations of the organisational wave with respect to 
everyday governance. The principled approach to global constitutionalism is less 
situated in concerns about the practicalities. Where Peters proposes detailed 
models of assemblies, O’Donoghue and Walker focus on the theoretical 
questions, which means the institutionalisation of democracy within global 
constitutionalist thought is not at the forefront of this principled debate. The 
difference in approach between the organisational and the principled waves leads 
to gaps, as the shift in focus means that the waves do not necessarily address 
                                                          
253 For example: de Búrca, ‘Developing Democracy’ (n 8); Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the 
Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 7). 
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one another, but rather offer alternative discussions on democracy. By asking the 
foundational questions, rather than participating in siloed discourses, the 
Circumstances of Democracy can overcome these gaps.
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Chapter 6: Global Constitutionalist Scholarship and Democracy: Using the 
Circumstances of Democracy 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Global constitutionalist scholarship has made great strides in discussing 
democracy beyond the state. Where previously, democracy was not considered 
part of a discussion on international constitutional law, it is now frequently 
debated. Democratic legitimacy is an important point of reference, not just for this 
discourse, but for international law as well. Detailed models on how to do 
democracy beyond the state are proffered. Hard questions are being brought to 
the fore, and the principled wave of global constitutionalism has begun to unpack 
the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy. 
 
Democratic legitimacy is now a frame of reference in international law and 
international organisations literature. In international law, democratic legitimacy 
is discussed in relation to government recognition, state recognition, and the 
processes of international organisations.1 The International Public Authority 
school considers ways of constructing democratic legitimacy within international 
law and international decision-making,2 and within EU constitutional law 
democratic legitimacy has become a common standard. The legitimacy of 
                                                          
1 Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy’ (2006) 28 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 878; James Crawford, The Creation of States 
in International Law (OUP 2006); Alison Duxbury, The Participation of States in International 
Organisations: The Role of Human Rights and Democracy (CUP 2011). 
2 See Armin von Bogdandy, Matthias Goldmann, Ingo Venzke, ‘From Public International to 
International Public Law: Translating World Public Opinion into International Public Authority’ 
(2016) Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law Research Paper No. 
2016-2 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2770639> accessed 19 
September 2017.  
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international and supranational institutions is informed by democracy to the 
extent that democratic legitimacy is the desired benchmark, from which other 
forms of legitimacy must be measured.3  
 
Ways of doing democracy beyond the state are now debated in both the 
organisational and principled waves of global constitutionalist scholarship. There 
are detailed models on parliamentary bodies and voting mechanisms in the 
organisational wave.4 Attempts to institutionalise deliberative and participatory 
democracy offer sophisticated reflections on what democracy could mean 
beyond the state.5 Debates on the global demos across both waves, and the 
recent trend to debate constituent power, are evidence of the scholarship 
grappling with the hard questions.  
 
There is partial acknowledgement, in the principled wave, of the complex 
relationship between constitutionalism and democracy. Walker, in his discussion 
on the iterative relationship between democracy and constitutionalism, brings to 
the fore relevant questions,6 and Tully reflects on the relationship in light of 
globalisation.7 These scholars offer useful starting points, but there is still more 
that needs to be done to expose the role of this complex relationship in a 
discussion on global constitutionalism and democracy.  
 
                                                          
3 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for 
International Environmental Law?’ (1999) 93 AJIL 596, 599 (democracy is the ‘touchstone of 
legitimacy’). 
4 Anne Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 2009). 
5 For example, Steven Wheatley, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law (Hart 2010); 
Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 4). 
6 Neil Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: An Iterative Relationship’ 
(2010) 39(3) R&R 206, 213. 
7 James Tully, ‘The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional 
Democracy’ (2002) MLR 204. 
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Current discussions on democracy have begun to break down the divide between 
disciplines as constitutional language is utilised in international legal scholarship. 
Although global constitutionalist literature is criticised for using international law 
as its starting point, and for failing to engage genuinely with constitutional 
literature,8 there is a change in the research agenda towards questions about 
legitimacy and accountability as well as the rule of law and democratic 
legitimacy.9 These sorts of questions are evidence of a cross-fertilisation between 
international legal scholarship and constitutional discourse.  
 
Global constitutionalist scholarship now takes the issue of democracy seriously. 
As debates spark about the need for a global demos, or the inappropriateness of 
elections and the substitution of deliberative processes, the debate needs to be 
reframed to ensure that democracy is at the core. This chapter provides a guide 
for how a discussion on democracy in global constitutionalism ought to be 
constructed if democracy is to be prioritised. The two waves of the global 
constitutionalist literature prioritise different research questions, focusing on 
some Circumstances and not others. They utilise different source materials, with 
the organisational wave taking international law as its starting point and the 
principled wave engaging with constitutional literature. The diverse approaches 
cause a polarisation of the debate on democracy. It is proposed that these gaps 
in the literature can be overcome through the Circumstances of Democracy, and 
this chapter demonstrates how.  
                                                          
8 Aoife O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (CUP 2014) ch 6. 
9 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the relationship between 
constitutionalism in and beyond the state’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling 
the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 260; 
Christine E J Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) 110; See O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation 
(n 8) 24. 
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The current discourse lacks a reflection on the concept of democracy and its 
foundational component parts. This thesis used the matrix of the Circumstances 
of Democracy to demonstrate that at present, within global constitutional 
scholarship, the concept of democracy is not the benchmark. The thesis 
highlighted a lack of attention to the fundamental elements of democracy, as well 
as a need to reflect on how the methodological choices shaped the approach to 
democracy. The next section draws together the limits of the global 
constitutionalist scholarship. It first reflects on the unconvincing discussions on 
the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy and then it 
demonstrates how the cross-disciplinary nature of global constitutionalist 
scholarship shapes the discussion on democracy.  
 
6.2 Are we there yet? 
 
6.2.1 Constitutionalism and Democracy 
 
Global constitutionalist literature oscillates between a position that assumes 
democracy is a norm of constitutionalism,10 to an approach that attempts to 
remove democracy.11 Both the approach to constitutionalism, and the perceived 
relationship between constitutionalism and democracy, influences how 
democracy is constructed. This section will compare the approaches to 
                                                          
10 For example: Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 4) 263; Antje Wiener, ‘Contested Meanings of 
Norms: A Research Framework’ (2007) 5 Comparative European Politics 1, 3; Andreas Føllesdal, 
‘When Common Interests Are Not Common: Why the Global Basic Structure Should be 
Democratic’ (2009) 16(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 585, 586. 
11 Erika de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55 International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly 51, 72. 
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constitutionalism within global constitutionalist thought to show the competing 
roles for democracy. 
 
The normative strand of international constitutionalism removes democracy from 
discussions on constitutionalism beyond the state. Both de Wet and Tomuschat 
offer a discussion on constitutionalism that does not derive its legitimacy from 
democracy.12 de Wet argues that the national, liberal democratic model is 
inappropriate for the international level and, democracy does not necessarily 
equate with legitimacy.13 Within her framework, constitutionalisation is about the 
supremacy of constitutional norms, such as jus cogens and erga omnes norms. 
One of the reasons de Wet gives for rejecting democracy as part of the 
constitutionalisation discussion is that there is no consensus on democracy as an 
erga omnes norm of international law.14 This suggests that where 
constitutionalism is equated with hierarchy, democracy can only have a role if it 
amounts to a higher norm.  
 
In Fassbender’s discussion on the UN Charter as a constitution, democracy is 
part of constitutionalism. Using American and French revolutionary thought, 
Fassbender acknowledges that constitutionalism is given normative content, 
such as democracy, the rule of law and self-determination and he argues the 
people are sovereign in a democracy.15 There are many nebulous and 
overlapping terms within Fassbender’s argument that obscure the meaning of 
                                                          
12 ibid 72; Christian Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve 
of a New Century’, General Course on Public International Law (1999) 281 Recueil Des Cours 
10, 184. 
13 de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (n 11) 72. Cf Petra Dobner, ‘More Law, Less 
Democracy? Democracy and Transnational Constitutionalism’ in Petra Dobner and Martin 
Loughlin (eds) The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP 2012) 141. 
14 de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (n 11) 63. 
15 Bardo Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter As Constitution of The International 
Community’ (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529, 537. 
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democracy: intertwining popular sovereignty and democracy can restrict 
democracy to constitutional moments and it is not clear if Fassbender relies on 
an international legal idea of self-determination, or a constitutionalist idea of 
people having power over constitutional arrangements and everyday 
governance.16 Though Fassbender argues that in a democracy the people are 
sovereign, he then draws a distinction between sovereignty and democracy. 
Separating sovereignty and democracy ensures that democracy is not tied to the 
constituent moment, but it suggests that democracy has additional roles, which 
he does not elaborate upon. It is frustrating that the role for democracy in 
Fassbender’s constitutionalism is unclear, because it leaves unanswered the 
scope of people’s power in democracy.17  
 
In an attempt to move away from the small ‘c’ approach to constitutionalism, a 
new wave of global constitutionalism focuses on the allocation and limitation of 
power,18 which shapes the approach to democracy. Within the organisational 
wave, democracy is not discussed in relation to constitutional moments, rather it 
is located within everyday governance.19 This is in contrast with the principled 
wave, where focus is placed on the allocation of power and the question of 
constituent power.20 Debating the allocation of power through constituent power 
adds a new dimension to When, and given the scope of constituent power as the 
                                                          
16 See Chapter 1, section 1.5.1. 
17 Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter As Constitution of The International Community’ (n 
15) 536-537. 
18 Schwöbel has called this institutional constitutionalism. Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in 
International Legal Perspective (n 9) 21. 
19 See Chapter 4, section 4.3.3. 
20 Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power’ (2005) 12(2) 
Constellations 223, 237; Yaniv Roznai, ‘We the Limited People’ (NYU Global Fellows Forum, 10 
March 2015) 15 <http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Roznai%20-
%20March%2010th%20Forum%20draft.pdf > accessed 19 September 2017. 
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power to deconstruct and (re)constitute a governance system, it also adds a new 
aspect of the What. 
 
The very research questions associated with constitutionalism can construct a 
role for democracy, as constitutionalism can indicate which aspects of democracy 
are prioritised. Walker initiates a discussion on the relationship between 
constitutionalism and democracy, which suggests how democracy can be shaped 
by constitutionalism. Walker draws a distinction between questions of authority 
and of representation.21 Democracy, for Walker, is located in representation, 
whilst the authority question is a matter of constituent power.22 His idea of 
constitutionalism creates the institutions and processes through which 
democracy acts, thus restricting democracy to these processes.23 In contrast, 
Tully argues that democracy is needed to challenge constitutional frameworks. 
Tully asks about popular sovereignty and democracy at the constitutional 
moments. He argues that democracy is required to continually question 
constitutional arrangements and processes.24 Whether a constituent power 
question is asked, or if the focus is on popular sovereignty, or whether the scholar 
focuses on limiting or allocating power can change the What and When of 
democracy. 
 
There are risks associated with giving people the scope of power associated with 
democracy. The people wielding such power can obfuscate the checks and 
balances and human rights protections that ensure the equality of all. This is 
                                                          
21 Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 6) 216. 
22 ibid 216. 
23 ibid 215-216. 
24 Tully, ‘The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional 
Democracy’ (n 7) 205. 
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where the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy comes into its 
own. The complexity between constitutionalism and democracy ensures 
maximum democracy, without risking the individual rights of persons. 
Constitutionalism can place restrictions on the types of institutions, the processes 
and the substance of decisions. It is the iterative relationship between 
constitutionalism and democracy, which provides an understanding of how norms 
of constitutionalism (such as the rule of law and human rights) place limits on 
democracy to protect the autonomy of the individual, whilst also allowing a role 
for democracy to antagonise constitutional arrangements. Whilst such limits are 
valid, where theorists seek to place limits on the people’s power, they should 
explicitly indicate as such.  
 
Democracy is shaped by its interaction with constitutionalism. It is not sufficient 
for the global constitutionalist discourse to adopt an idea of democracy that is co-
existent with constitutionalism, as this overlooks how constitutionalism places 
limits on democracy. Not reflecting on the role of the constitutionalist lens, risks 
ignoring how adopting such a lens can alter the When and What of democracy. 
 
6.2.2 Fragmented Discourse 
 
Fragmentation arises across global constitutionalist scholarship. There is a lack 
of coherence as to the object study; the Where of constitutionalism and 
democracy is contested as scholars use the idea of ‘global constitutionalism’ to 
discuss a range of different processes, institutions, and levels of governance.25 
This raises challenges for a discussion on democracy as it is difficult to ascertain 
                                                          
25 See Chapter 5, section 5.3.4. 
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both the location of democracy and the types of actors involved. More importantly, 
there are methodological inconsistencies. There is disagreement as to the 
sources used,26 and exploring both the organisational and principled wave has 
shown that the waves adopt different research questions.27 The consequences 
of this fragmentation are crucial to understand. 
 
The sources used by the respective waves of global constitutionalist thought 
impact on how the debate on democracy is structured. The reliance on 
international law negatively influences the discussion on democracy. The 1990s 
international legal literature constructs an approach to democracy predicated on 
the state; the demos is constructed through a link to the state and the power of 
the people is mitigated by the territorial integrity of the state.28 By assuming that 
Franck’s thesis on an emerging norm of democracy is accurate, scholars within 
the organisational wave rely on international legal scholarship, rather than 
interrogating democracy within the state.29 This means that scholars are not 
necessarily considering democracy within states and furthermore, they adopt a 
state-based model of the demos, which is criticised for failing to respond to 
transnational threats and realities.30 In contrast, the use of constitutionalist 
literature, such as references to The Federalist Papers and Locke,31 reveal the 
start of an intra-disciplinary discourse. Using the constitutional literature opens 
                                                          
26 See Chapter 4, section 4.2.1 and Chapter 5, section 5.2.1. 
27 See Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
28 Chapter 3, section 3.3.1. 
29 See Chapter 4, section 4.2.1, text at fn 61-63. 
30 Andreas L Paulus, ‘The International Legal System as a Constitution’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and 
Joel P Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global 
Governance (CUP 2009) 95. 
31 See Bardo Fassbender, ‘“We the Peoples of the United Nations” Constituent Power and 
Constitutional Form in International Law’ in Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds), The Paradox 
of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (OUP 2012) 288-289; 
Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter As Constitution of The International Community’ (n 15) 
534. Cf Dobner’s discussion on The Federalist Papers and sovereignty. Dobner, ‘More Law, Less 
Democracy?’ (n 13) 145. 
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the debate on constituent power, the relationship between the individual and the 
community, as well as the difference between constitutional politics and everyday 
governance.  
 
Where previously, international constitutionalist literature relied heavily on 
international legal literature and international law,32 there is a shift towards 
sources on constitutionalism. Related to the change in sources is the different 
types of research questions across the waves of global constitutionalist 
scholarship.33 The focus on accountability mechanisms and on legitimacy result 
in a functional approach to democracy, where aspects of democracy can be 
extracted.34 Asking how democracy can achieve a particular aim is the wrong 
focus, as it places restrictions on democracy. Rather, the scholarship should be 
asking questions about the sort of power people must have in democracy.  
 
Another instance is the shift to debate constituent power in the principled wave. 
The organisational wave places little emphasis on the question of constituent 
power and the issue of constitutional politics, so discussing the allocation of 
power, and not just the limiting of power, is welcome. Within the organisational 
wave, the failure to adequately engage with When, builds a discussion without a 
genuine reflection on the democratic nature of the constitutional system. The 
focus on constituent power moves the discussion on democracy forward because 
it opens the debate on whether the people should have a role in constitution-
making within global governance. However, this shift in research question gives 
                                                          
32 See Neil Walker, Intimations of Global Law (CUP 2015) 93-94; Erika de Wet, ‘The 
Constitutionalization of Public International Law’ in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2012) 1209 
33 Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism’ (n 9) 260; O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism 
in Global Constitutionalisation (n 8) ch 6. 
34 See Chapter 4, section 4.2.2 and Chapter 5, section 5.3.2. 
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rise to siloed debates. As Patberg’s discussion on constituent power 
demonstrates, gaps remain when the debate shifts to constituent power.35 Using 
constituent power to legitimise the creation of a decision-making body, but failing 
to address how democracy is achieved in the everyday governance is a 
significant problem. Initiating a discussion on constituent power, but failing to 
debate everyday governance, constructs two incomplete narratives of democracy 
in global constitutionalism. By acknowledging the constraints that disciplinary 
boundaries place on the global constitutionalist discourse and by asking a series 
of foundational questions instead, this thesis brings democracy to the fore.  
 
Currently, the global constitutionalist literature seeks to fit a discussion on 
democracy into the pre-existing disciplinary structures. However, this gives rise 
to functional conceptualisations of democracy, debates on democracy that miss 
elements, or approaches to democracy that are frustrated by state sovereignty 
and state-centricity. To get closer to democracy, the scholarship must ask 
fundamental questions about the people and the scope of their power.  
 
6.3 Getting there 
 
There are a series of crucial questions that the scholarship needs to engage with 
to ensure that democracy is at the forefront. The Circumstances of Democracy 
ensure that all the component parts of democracy are considered and that they 
interrelate. Each Circumstance is disputed and acts as a prompt to guide the 
discussion on democracy. The Who acted as a reminder that democracy is about 
people. The What prompts a discussion on the power of the people within a 
                                                          
35 See Chapter 5, section 5.3.5. 
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democracy. If the When of democracy is skewed in favour of constitutional 
politics, the people have little or no power in the everyday governance decisions. 
If the When refers only to everyday governance, there is little potential to change 
the constitutional framework. If the frequency of people’s engagement is irregular, 
then the idea that the people have power over decision-making is a façade. The 
Where offers a reflection on actors within the private sphere or transnational 
arrangements that can have an impact on the autonomy and freedom of people, 
without people having the power to challenge this. The Circumstances interrelate 
to ensure democracy is a discussion about people and the scope of their power 
over constitutional arrangement and their own self-government.  
 
6.3.1 Crucial Questions to Consider  
 
Who: Individuals v Community  
 
Much scholarly attention is paid to the demarcation of the demos within global 
constitutionalist literature and global governance but other pertinent questions 
must be considered, including the actors that fall within the demos and their role. 
This section reflects on the importance of ascertaining the types of actors being 
discussed, how they are conceptualised, and the role afforded to them. 
 
There is a plethora of actors referred to within global constitutionalist debates on 
democracy.36 One key concern is the interchangeable use of individuals and 
citizens as the core unit of democracy.37 Typically, the term ‘citizen’ within global 
                                                          
36 See Chapter 1. 
37 See Chapter 4, section 4.3.1, text at fn 153-158. 
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constitutionalist literature can be state-based or can fall within a cosmopolitan 
project of global citizenship.38 When tied to the state, the term ‘citizen’ is a 
restricted basis on which to build global constitutionalist democracy, it constructs 
the state as quasi-representative and yet, excludes persons without citizenship 
within that state.39 In contrast, the term ‘individual’ is suggestive of a less 
restricted category to the extent that it could invoke humanity as a whole. The 
interchangeable use of individual and citizen is a failure to reflect on how the 
conceptualisation of the unit of democracy operates to restrict the application of 
democracy.  
  
Within global constitutionalist scholarship some prioritise the individual. Building 
on the increasing individualisation of international law, with individuals being 
recognised as the bearers of rights in international law, the individual is presented 
as the unit of democracy.40 Yet, this overlooks the collective nature of democracy. 
The relationship between the individual and the community is an example of 
constitutionalism and democracy working against each other. Constitutionalism, 
and fundamental rights, must work to protect the individual within the collective. 
The individual might be at the core of a liberal constitutionalist frame, but 
democracy can be a collective decision-making process.  
 
Who invites a discussion on the role of the people within the demos. The example 
of NGO participation is illustrative of the complex functions of actors within global 
constitutionalist literature and how this can influence democracy. NGOs can be 
representatives or direct participants.41 For the most part, NGOs are 
                                                          
38 Chapter 4, section 4.3.1, text at fn 159-165. 
39 Chapter 3, section 3.3.1. 
40 Chapter 4, section 4.3.1. 
41 Chapter 4, section 4.3.5, text at fn 271-274. 
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conceptualised as representing the interests of persons. But, for Simma NGOs 
are agents of the community interests, and thus are direct participants without 
being representative of persons.42 This creates a problem, as rather than 
representing the people, NGOs form part of the demos. The relevant people are 
missing from decision-making and furthermore, the interests of the NGOs collide 
with those of the people. Though NGOs are said to be actors within global 
constitutionalism, there is no defined role that ensures these actors genuinely 
represent the relevant people for the purposes of democracy.  
 
Global constitutionalist scholarship overly focuses on a question of demarcation. 
But, Who is not just a question of constructing a demos. Not asking questions 
about the role of the people, facilitates discussions that apply the language of 
democracy to the participation of states or non-state actors, which have 
weakened links to the relevant people. Without reflecting adequately on the Who 
of democracy, the global constitutionalist discussions of democracy are bereft of 
important aspects.  
 
What and Where: Power 
 
Currently across the global constitutionalist discourse, there is insufficient 
attention paid to the question of power. The organisational and principled waves 
replace questions of power with arguments of people having influence, voice and 
input.43 Voting of states at international organisations can become a focal point,44 
                                                          
42 Bruno Simma, ‘From bilateralism to community interest in international law’ (1994) 250 Recueil 
Des Cours 217, 262. 
43 See Chapter 4, section 4.3.2. 
44 See Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 4) 287-288 (on weighted voting); Joel P Trachtman, 
‘Constitutional Economics of the World Trade Organization’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P 
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whilst the idea that people have power over decisions is lost. This sub-section 
reflects on how state sovereignty frustrates discussions on power. The following 
discussion exposes the paucity of a debate on power within the current literature. 
 
Some scholars have sought to expand the scope of the people’s power to cover 
agenda setting45 and constitutional decisions.46 These arguments that individuals 
are ‘co-law makers’ with states,47 that they set the agenda and can make 
constitutional decisions, challenge the traditional view of state sovereignty. 
However, throughout global constitutionalist scholarship, state sovereignty 
arguments frustrate the potential exercise of the will of the people. Whether it is 
Peters’ reliance on state consent to avoid reforms to the UN48 or Kumm’s call for 
the international community to hold constituent power,49 the state-centricity of 
international law prevails within the global constitutionalist literature.  
 
Within global constitutionalist scholarship, there is a trend to reconceptualise the 
state as representative of its citizens. One approach is to assume that states are 
representative citizens. This approach leads to a trustee model of representation, 
where the state is assumed to act on behalf of the people. An alternative 
approach is to conceive of the state as a delegate for its population. Habermas, 
for example, discusses the state as the guarantor of the people’s self-
                                                          
Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global 
Governance (CUP 2009) 221 (majority voting at the WTO). 
45 Robert A Dahl, On Democracy (Yale University Press 1998) 113. 
46 Klaus Armingeon, Karolina Milewicz, Simone Peter and Anne Peters, ‘The constitutionalisation 
of international trade law’ in Thomas Cottier and Panagiotis Delimatsis (eds) The Prospects of 
International Trade Regulation: From Fragmentation to Coherence (CUP 2011) 78. 
47 See Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 4) 300. 
48 See Chapter 4, section 4.2.1, text at fn 75-77. 
49 Mattias Kumm, ‘Constituent power, cosmopolitan constitutionalism, and post-positivist law’ 
(2016) 14(3) I·CON 697, 698. 
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determination;50 within this model, the state must genuinely represent the views 
of its population. There is a power shift from the first approach to the second. 
Take the example of UN reform, if the ‘trustee’ model is adopted then states do 
not have to act on the wishes of their citizens, but rather act according to what 
the state believes is best and can then reject reform proposals. In contrast, with 
the ‘delegate’ model, the state acts upon the will of its population, should the 
population require reform, the state must act accordingly. The delegate model 
requires an investigation into how democracy is done within the state. Merely 
assuming that the state is representative of its population does little to weaken 
state sovereignty. Global constitutionalist scholarship needs to have these 
debates about the shifting changes to the scope of peoples’ power within different 
conceptualisations of democracy. 
 
The scope of the people’s power is also influenced by the types of institutions 
that are subjected to democracy. Societal constitutionalism exposes the 
limitations placed on the scope of people’s power when democracy is located 
within the public sphere. Societal constitutionalism challenges the public/private 
divide and experiments with applying constitutional norms to private bodies.51 
Arguably, societal constitutionalism is one approach to discussing democracy in 
global constitutionalism and there are other, separate projects. But, to treat these 
global constitutionalist discourses as separate projects is akin to the models’ 
approach, which sees scholars exchanging models of democracy and debating 
                                                          
50 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation 
Problems of a Constitution for World Society’ (2008) 15 Constellations 444, 449. See also, 
O’Donoghue, Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (n 8) 254; Walker, 
‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 6) 219. 
51 Gunther Teubner, ‘Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism Beyond the Nation 
State’ in Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds) The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP 2010) 
328; Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization 
(OUP 2014) 25. 
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about which is more democratic than the other. Conceiving of these strands of 
global constitutionalist literature as isolated models is to risk focusing enquiries 
on processes, rather than on power. What is really at stake is an alteration in the 
amount of power the people hold. Global constitutionalist scholars need to 
respond to the increasing influence of transnational and private institutions. It is 
not a matter of exchanging competing models of democracy, it is a question of 
whether the people should have power over certain institutions. 
 
Debates on the power of the people are missing from the global constitutionalist 
debate. Power in decision-making is replaced were mere participation, input or 
voice. Arguments that it is not feasible or practical to give more power to the 
people, given the scale of global democracy, and that states are an appropriate 
answer to this challenge, are used to justify this limitation.52 But, this obscures 
crucial debates on the scope of peoples’ power.  
 
When: Constitutional politics and everyday governance 
 
Whether democracy takes place at constitutional moments or just within everyday 
governance is at the crux of the principled wave. Shifting the debate towards 
constituent power can suggest that democratic legitimacy is required in 
constitutional moments. Yet, scholars disagree on whether constituent power is 
a democratic power.  
 
                                                          
52 Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 93; Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 4) 264 – 265.  
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Kumm argues that it is not plausible to debate whether an expression of 
constituent power is or was democratic.53 For Kumm, the legitimacy of an 
expression of constituent power is established ex post facto, and what matters is 
that the current populace accepts the constitutional order as legitimate.54 The 
problem with this argument in the global constitutionalist debate is that it does not 
explicitly provide mechanisms for the people to endorse the constitutional 
system. As the discussion below will elaborate, arguing that a constitutional 
system is legitimate if successive populations endorse it, is farcical within a global 
constitutional arrangement that lacks mechanisms for persons to express 
consent. At present academics are ‘discovering’ or creating the constitutional 
order as they look to the actions of states or non-state actors (e.g. NGOs and 
international organisations), rather than individuals or people.55 Kumm’s 
approach leaves little space for the people to endorse or challenge the emerging 
constitutional arrangements in global constitutionalism. It is paramount that 
scholars ask about constituent power and consider mechanisms for consulting 
the people on these potential constitutional developments.  
 
Arguably, the initial non-democratic exercise of constituent power can be 
reconciled with democracy, through the reflexive construction of democracy over 
time.56 This ‘reflexive’ approach can be achieved through amendment processes 
or expressions of constituent power. However, as the following discussion 
demonstrates, this still leads to a disconnect between the will of the people and 
the type of constitutional order envisaged in global constitutionalism. 
                                                          
53 Kumm, ‘Constituent power, cosmopolitan constitutionalism, and post-positivist law’ (n 49) 699-
700. 
54 ibid 699-700; Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 6) 215-216. 
55 David Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ (2008) 34 Ohio Northern University Law 
Review 827, 832. 
56 Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy’ (n 6) 215-216. 
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A question then is whether it is possible for the people to reflexively democratise 
the global constitutional order, as it is currently understood within parts of global 
constitutionalist scholarship. To consider whether amendment processes alone 
could democratise the order, the example of reforming the UN can be used. 
Scholars, such as Peters, have already noted that amendments to the UN would 
require state consent.57 But, states do not adequately represent the views of 
people and the amendment process would be restricted to UN Member States, 
thus denying representation of those persons who reside within non-Member 
States. The current amendment processes do not facilitate the questioning of 
processes, which Tully argues is required for democracy.58  
 
To explore whether constituent power could be used to democratise the global 
constitutional order, this section considers Fassbender’s use of the UN Charter. 
Fassbender argues that the Charter can be read so that ‘[w]e the peoples of the 
United Nations’ means all peoples in the world.59 He argues that this is testament 
to the idea that the people have constituent power. This approach to constituent 
power creates space for people within international law, as states become 
conceptualised as actors within international law because they represent the will 
of their people.60 Taking this to its ultimate conclusion would mean that state 
consent would have to be an expression of the will of the people. Under this 
                                                          
57 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 4) 325. 
58 Tully, ‘The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of Constitutional 
Democracy’ (n 7) 206. 
59 Fassbender, ‘“We the Peoples of the United Nations”’ (n 31) 289. 
60 Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ (n 4) 264; Anne Peters, ‘Membership in the Global Constitutional 
Community’ in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization of 
International Law (OUP 2009) 179; Jürgen Habermas, ‘A plea for a constitutionalization of 
international law’ (2014) 40(1) Philosophy and Social Criticism 5, 9.  
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model, the people would have space to reflexively reconstruct a democratic 
constitutional order. 
 
Yet, Fassbender argues that the participation of people is not necessary, which 
leaves little room for the genuine participation of people in decision-making at the 
global level. Furthermore, the approach adopted by Fassbender still 
conceptualises people as being within and represented by states. For 
Fassbender, the ‘peoples’ hold constituent power by virtue of their grouping within 
a state. If people were constituent power holders, free from constraints, then 
hypothetically they could organise to rewrite the global constitutional order. This 
would include being able to undermine the state-centric structure of the order. 
However, if people hold constituent power by virtue of being a nation or peoples 
or even as citizens within states, then it is more difficult to envisage them being 
able to challenge that state-centricity. If global constitutionalist scholarship rests 
on the idea that the reflexive construction of democracy over time would 
democratise global governance, there would remain a fundamental gap between 
the potential will of the people and the constitutional system. The iterative 
democratic construction does not do enough to change the international legal 
system that underpins global constitutionalist thought.  
 
A potential complication of introducing the democratic exercise of constituent 
power into the global constitutionalist discourse is the conflation between 
constitutional politics and everyday governance. Sieyès stressed the importance 
of a divide between constitutional and ordinary decision-making, and the 
relationalist perspective of constituent power blurs this divide. One implication of 
the blurred divide is that decisions are made constitutional and placed above the 
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people. The problem is that this reduces the scope of the power of the people; 
republican scholars, in particular, advocate democratic power over constitutional 
laws. The alternative implication is that democratic powers (whether that is to vote 
or to participate more broadly in decision-making) are considered expressions of 
constituent power, which would mean that the people have an ongoing radical 
power to frequently reconstitute. This radically changes the scope of the power 
that the people are believed to have in global constitutionalist arrangements. As 
the previous section highlighted, the people are often only said to have influence 
or input in decision-making, and not the power to overhaul and reconstitute. This 
conflation, whilst it facilitates more power for people, is problematic because it is 
not explicitly acknowledged in the global constitutionalist scholarship. 
 
To date the constituent power debate is concerned with the demarcation of a 
polity, but this is only a partial use of the domestic literature on constituent power. 
Sieyès’ theory and Loughlin’s categorisations are linked to the amount of the 
people’s power.61 Constituent power differs from the powers associated with 
democracy and so, the global constitutionalist debate should be mindful of the 
consequences of conflating constituent power and everyday governance.  
 
These questions around When need to be asked because it influences the scope 
of democracy and of the people’s power. The relationship between constituent 
power and democracy is treacherous; whether constituent power requires 
democracy is an open question and reconciling constituent power with 
democracy is difficult. But, not reflecting on the When leads to parallel debates 
with various temporalities; some are not talking about democracy per se, but 
                                                          
61 See Chapter 2, section 2.2.2. 
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about constituent power and others have constructed a limited idea of democracy 
by focusing on either constituent moments or everyday governance. A global 
constitutionalist debate on democracy is incomplete without attention being given 
to both the constituent moment and everyday governance.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
The current approach to democracy in global constitutional law is fragmented and 
too quick to reconcile constitutionalism and democracy. The different approaches 
to democracy in the two waves of global constitutionalist scholarship gives rise to 
a fragmented discussion. Different Circumstances are prioritised: the 
organisational wave is concerned with How, but the principled wave is not; in 
relation to When, the organisational wave sidesteps the question of constituent 
power, and the principled approach risks conflating constituent power and 
everyday governance. The fragmented nature of the discourse means that if the 
principled global constitutionalists hope to respond to the limitations of the 
organisational wave, they fail. Rather than engaging in a critique of the 
organisational wave, the principled wave shifts the discussion from everyday 
governance to constitutional politics.  
 
The relationship between constitutionalism and democracy is inadequately 
addressed. Walker initiates a discussion on the relationship, but how this 
complexity is manifested at the global level still needs to be considered. 
Understanding the relationship as one of complexity, exposes the undemocratic 
limits placed on democracy, whilst also subjecting constitutionalism to democratic 
critique. If global constitutionalist literature is to adopt a constitutionalist lens, then 
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it must engage with the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy. 
Failure to do so, ignores the way this frame manipulates democracy. 
 
This thesis offers an alternative approach to navigate the complexity of translating 
the iterative nature of democracy to a global level, without the limitations found in 
the current scholarship. The Circumstances of Democracy, as a series of 
questions, reflect on the ways of doing democracy, but ensures that its key 
components are present. It also requires an engagement with the intra-
disciplinary nature of the debate so that the complex relationship between 
constitutionalism and democracy is explored. This ensures not only that 
democracy as a concept is considered but also that the extent to which 
disciplinary frames shape and manipulate democracy is considered. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
The literature on global constitutionalism, its nebulous nature and biases, raise 
unique challenges for a discussion on democracy. Global constitutionalist 
scholarship is an intra-disciplinary project; the discussions on democracy are 
prompted by international law and theories of constitutionalism into asking certain 
questions and framing issues in particular ways. The distinct objectives of the two 
waves of global constitutionalist literature make it difficult to locate democracy. 
There are competing ideas about the location of constitutionalisation, the relevant 
actors and their powers within global governance, and the role of democracy in 
constitutionalisation. The two waves are siloed by their research agendas, 
leaving the fundamental aspects of democracy untouched.  
 
This thesis analysed how global constitutionalist scholarship approaches 
democracy. It demonstrated how the intra-disciplinary nature of global 
constitutionalist scholarship influences the approach to democracy. It showed 
how international law constructions of democracy are assumed, and barely 
challenged, by the global constitutionalist literature. This thesis demonstrated 
how the principled wave seeks to address the limitations of the organisational 
wave, but risks an incomplete discussion on democracy. These two waves of 
global constitutionalist literature create siloed conversations, necessitating a new 
method of discussing democracy within and beyond the state.  
 
The current global constitutionalist debate on democracy is fragmented and lacks 
a philosophical approach to democracy. Elements of democracy are isolated and 
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focused on, at the expense of others. Debates about the demarcation of a global 
demos and on the role of parliamentary assemblies abound in the literature, with 
the global demos debate in the organisational wave being replaced by a debate 
over the possibility of constituent power beyond the state in the principled wave. 
Across the waves of global constitutionalist thought, mechanisms for 
institutionalising democracy, such as participation, deliberation, and 
accountability, become synonyms for democracy. The prioritisation of certain 
elements of the Who and How of democracy means that other elements of 
democracy are side-lined. Connections to the people are often weak and there is 
little genuine commitment to the idea that people should have the power to 
govern.  
 
Debates on democracy are fragmented, girded by disciplinary biases. Informed 
by international organisational law on accountability and building on the 
international legal paradigm, the organisational wave adopts a procedural 
conceptualisation of democracy predicated on elections. Even where alternative 
means of deliberation and participation are considered, elections are used as the 
benchmark.1  
 
The principled wave adopts the constitutionalist frame as its starting point, and 
debates democracy as part of constitutionalism. As such, democracy becomes 
intertwined with the rule of law, the separation of powers, and fundamental human 
rights. Adopting the constitutional democracy model, this wave of scholarship 
                                                          
1 See Peters discussion on deliberative and participatory models of democracy. Anne Peters, 
‘Dual Democracy’ in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The Constitutionalization 
of International Law (OUP 2009) 268-270.  
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subsumes debates on the complex relationship between democracy and 
constitutionalism. 
  
The two waves of global constitutionalism prioritise different components of 
democracy. The organisational wave, influenced by international organisational 
law, is much more concerned with the How, whilst the principled wave, which 
seeks to engage with constitutional theory, shifts the discussion to new sites of 
governance and concentrates on novel methods of demarcating a demos beyond 
the states. Shaped by their respective biases, there is a disconnect between 
these two waves, resulting in a fragmented discussion. The matrix reorients 
discussions towards a philosophical basis for democracy and guides the debates 
on democracy.  
 
This thesis offers a way of diagnosing why there are limitations in the global 
constitutionalist discussions on democracy. The Circumstances of Democracy, 
as an analytical matrix, identified where the literature falls short of engaging with 
the concept of democracy. It exposes where the scholarship conflates and 
ignores issues. Most importantly, these Circumstances show where mechanisms 
of democracy side-line the What question, thus constructing mere proxies of 
democracy. Using How to facilitate the interrelation of the Circumstances, 
ensures that issues are not ignored or conflated, and that the concept of 
democracy remains central. 
 
Furthermore, the thesis argues that the global constitutionalist scholarship must 
accept its disciplinary biases. The ambiguity around whether global 
constitutionalist discourse is normative or descriptive, influences how democracy 
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is conceptualised as descriptions of reality answer normative questions about 
how democracy ought to be conceived beyond the state. The global 
constitutionalists have adopted different perspectives on constitutionalism, with 
the principled wave committing to a fuller understanding of constitutionalism. If 
the literature is to adopt a constitutionalist frame, it must engage with the 
relationship between constitutionalism and democracy. In particular, it must 
reflect on the impact of shifting the focus to constituent power. 
 
The umbrella nature of the literature on global constitutionalism raises unique 
challenges for a discussion on democracy. There is a lack of clarity around the 
Who and Where of constitutionalism, and the methodological choices of global 
constitutionalist scholarship. Firstly, as global constitutionalism is a capacious 
discourse, there is a lack of clarity around the subjects and objects of 
constitutionalism. International organisations are conceptualised as both being 
subjected to, and evidence of, constitutionalisation. This ambiguity around 
subject and object is compounded by the range of actors included within global 
constitutionalist discourse. NGOs, for example, are conceived as both constituent 
power and constituted power.2 There is disagreement around the Where and 
Who of constitutionalism and democracy. Consequently, scholars engage in 
siloed debates, giving rise to partial discussions. Secondly, the methodological 
choices in global constitutionalist literature structure debates. As an intra-
disciplinary discourse, global constitutionalism is informed, to differing extents, by 
                                                          
2 Compare Thornhill, who argues that NGOs have constituent power and Bailey and Mattei, who 
argue that NGOs are aligned with constituted actors. Chris Thornhill, A Sociology of Transnational 
Constitutions: Social Foundations of the Post-National Legal Structure (CUP 2016); Saki Bailey 
and Ugo Mattei, ‘Social Movements as Constituent Power: The Italian Struggle for the Commons’ 
(2013) 20(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 965, 1005.  
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constitutional theory, international law, and international organisational law. The 
biases of these sub-disciplines inform approaches to democracy.  
 
These sub-disciplines influence how global constitutionalist literature defines 
democracy. With respect to constitutional law, constitutionalism sits in a complex 
relationship with democracy, and ultimately the two concepts realise and limit 
each other.3 Moreover, constitutionalism’s concern with constituent power shifts 
discussions towards constitutional politics and away from everyday decision-
making. The state-centrality paradigm in international law and the formalist 
concern with collecting evidence generates a weak, procedural form of 
democracy, where the people’s power is contained within the state and tied to 
elections.4 The organisational wave is influenced by the literature in international 
organisational law, which generates a conceptualisation of democracy tied to 
accountability mechanisms. This thesis demonstrated how these sub-disciplines 
modify the meaning of democracy and structure the approach adopted by global 
constitutionalist scholarship.  
 
Chapter 2 outlines the content of the Circumstances of Democracy and how they 
work to ensure democracy is an iterative concept. Using historical examples from 
Ancient Athens, late 18th Century America and Revolutionary France, this chapter 
explores the component parts of democracy and the complex relationship 
                                                          
3 Neil Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: An Iterative Relationship’ 
(2010) 39(3) Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie 206. 
4 Gregory Fox in National Sovereignty Revisited: Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of 
Democracy in International Law (1992) 86 Proceedings of the American Society of International 
Law 249, 270-71; Thomas Carothers, ‘Empirical Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of 
Democracy in International Law’ (1992) Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 
261, 264. For a discussion on the formalist approach in this area of international law, see Gerry 
J Simpson, ‘Imagined Consent: Democratic Liberalism in International Legal Theory’ (1994) 15 
Australian Year Book of International Law 103, 118-119 and 124. 
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between constitutionalism and democracy, situating discussions within relevant 
philosophical literature.  
 
Chapter 3 investigated the 1990s international law literature on democracy, which 
informed contemporary discussions and is taken for granted within parts of the 
global constitutionalist discourse. Applying the Who and What Circumstances of 
Democracy to this literature demonstrated biases, such as the centrality of state 
sovereignty and the reification of the liberal, electoral model of democracy. State 
sovereignty, initially used to obscure a discussion on democracy in international 
law, now informs the approach to democracy. Theories of democracy in 
international law buttress the state-centrality of international law; the principle of 
self-determination and the human rights regimes that are used to underpin a 
potential norm of democracy envision a state-bound demos. Elections are a 
crucial mechanism within this literature; elections-monitoring is used as evidence 
for a developing norm of democratic governance. This demonstrates a conflation 
of How and What; rather than reflecting on the scope of the power of the people, 
elections are assumed to bring about democracy. In the international legal 
scholarship, How is a mechanism, whereas the Circumstances demands that 
How facilitates the amalgamation of the other Circumstances. Understanding 
How in this broader way necessitates a reflection on the scope of the power of 
the people.  
 
The organisational wave of global constitutionalism has made strides in debating 
the institutionalisation of democracy at international organisations. Chapter 4 
demonstrates that global constitutionalist literature is influenced by the 
accountability discussion in international organisational law. Focusing on 
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accountability mechanisms gives rise to a thin conceptualisation of the How of 
democracy. How becomes about processes, and these processes become 
proxies for democracy. Rather How should ensure the Circumstances align, with 
the emphasis placed on debating the power of the people.  
 
The organisational wave builds on the international legal paradigms, and in 
places adopts the democratic assumptions set out in the international legal 
discourse and the centrality of the state continues in this organisational wave. 
This gives rise to an under-theorisation of the Who. The state is still a central 
actor and for the purposes of democracy, the state is conceptualised as the 
container of the demos. Shifts to place individuals at the core of international law 
in this wave of scholarship, underplay the complex relationship between the 
individual and the collective in democratic and constitutional theory. This complex 
relationship demonstrates the need to reflect on the relationship between 
democracy and constitutionalism.  
 
Chapter 5 investigated the principled wave of global constitutionalism. In this 
wave, the Where of decision-making is more diverse, legitimacy in constitutional 
politics is debated, and attempts are made to disconnect the Who from the state. 
In relation to Where, this wave moves beyond particular international 
organisations, to transnational sites of governance and across levels of 
governance. The shift to focus on constituent power influences the scope of the 
What and the When, as well as the Who of democracy. Constituent power is used 
in the principled wave as a means of disconnecting the demos from the state. 
But, discussing constituent power traditionally moves the focus of concern away 
from everyday decision-making to constitutional politics; the concern becomes 
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about people choosing a system of government. Constituent power then is not 
just a Who question, but a When and What question as well. This power of the 
people to choose is in addition to the power traditionally discussed in democratic 
theory, which is the power to govern themselves. Failure to conceive of 
constituent power as a When and What question risks overlooking the shift in 
power and focusing on constitutional politics at the expense of everyday decision-
making.  
 
Using the Circumstances of Democracy to examine both the organisational and 
the principled waves of global constitutionalism exposes the shift in relation to the 
question of When. The organisational wave is predominantly concerned with 
democracy in everyday governance, and in response to this, the principled wave 
focuses on constituent power, in part, to shift focus on the constitutional politics. 
The disconnect between these two waves on the question of When highlights 
how the scholars talk passed each other and ultimately, how a thin 
conceptualisation of democracy is constructed. One wave focuses on the 
everyday, side-lining the question of the legitimacy of the system, and the other 
wave focuses on the constitutional question, without further reflection on how 
democracy should be manifested in everyday decision-making.  
 
Chapter 6 offers an alternative way to discuss democracy in global 
constitutionalist scholarship. Engaging with all the Circumstances is essential to 
strive for democracy. This chapter provides three prompts to guide future 
dialogue on democracy. With respect to Who, it is not sufficient to only debate 
the methods of demarcating the demos, the global constitutionalist literature must 
reflect on the role of the people within the demos. Both aspects of When need to 
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be debated: the democratic legitimacy of the system itself should be reflected 
upon as well as the democratic nature of everyday decision-making. The scope 
of the power of the people should not be automatically limited due to the 
impracticalities of doing governance at a global scale: the What of democracy 
demands a reflection on the idea that people govern.  
 
Global constitutionalist discourse has started a discussion on democracy, but it 
needs to work towards a more conceptual understanding of democracy and 
acknowledge the impact of adopting a constitutionalist frame. The global 
constitutionalist scholarship should abandon the use of proxies for democracy, 
such as participation and accountability. The literature must avoid drawing 
analogies, such that elections and quasi-parliamentary bodies become the focal 
points for the institutionalisation of democracy. The Circumstances proffered in 
this thesis offers the best way of discussing democracy, informed by philosophical 
reflections on the concept of democracy. 
 
In engaging with this more iterative democratic ideal, the global constitutionalist 
scholarship must be cognisant of the impact of the constitutionalist lens. 
Constitutionalism requires questions about constituent power. The relationship 
between democracy and constituent power is far from assumed, but shifting 
attention to constituent power reframes the When, the Who and the What of 
democracy. The When shifts to constitutional politics, the Who involves a 
reflection on the role of the constitution in constructing a demos, and the What 
becomes both the power to govern and the choice of constitutional system. 
Constitutionalism and democracy stand in a parasitic relationship, with each 
informing and modifying the other. Global constitutionalist discourse, where it 
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adopts a constitutionalist lens, must accept that it is discussing a modification of 
democracy.  
 
How global constitutionalist literature conceptualises democracy is a result of 
disciplinary biases. The debates on democracy within this literature are structured 
by the influence of international law and constitutionalism, and girded by the 
research choices of the distinct waves of global constitutionalist thought. The 
different waves and influences give rise to fragmented discussions that lack a 
philosophical approach to democracy. Armed with the Circumstances of 
Democracy, global constitutionalist scholarship must now acknowledge and 
challenge the disciplinary-created limitations, and it can ask the fundamental 
questions that ensure democracy as a concept is at the core of enquiries. The 
Circumstances of Democracy bring global constitutionalist literature closer to 
debating democracy.  
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